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ABSTRACT
In an 1896 essay, Frank Norris wrote that the reading world should abandon those “teacup
tragedies” to which it had grown accustomed and embrace a new literature that would depict a
“vast and terrible drama.” Realism, Norris claimed, could not be used to achieve an earnest
portrait of the conditions that mark individual lives under capitalism. Instead, the world needed a
romantic wrestling with the forces of existential inscrutability. Also, the perceived need for
literature to depict a clear ethical system needed revising from the perspective of American
literary naturalism, a school long denigrated for apparent moral vacuity. Through excruciating
“drama,” naturalism therefore confronted the economic conditions that subject individual lives to
the whims of a world wherein moral values seemed either the business of religious groups or of
rationalist Enlightenment thinkers. The writings of Norris and Stephen Crane, as well as later
naturalists like John Dos Passos and Nathanael West, refuse moral systematization and depict
human beings in extraordinary predicaments that question reductive evaluations of human
relationships. These traumatic encounters offered by naturalist fiction provide a route for us to
think about the works of the French ethicist, Emmanuel Levinas. In Levinas, we find the ethical
encounter traumatic, gut-wrenching, and overwhelming. No course of action is provided because
every person demands of us a unique response that cannot be met. Levinas offers a means for us
to expand our understanding of literary naturalism and think of its relevance in our own day,
wherein value relativism makes moral response increasingly difficult. Such an approach allows
us to find the similarities between such disparate authors as Norris and Crane, Dos Passos and
West, all of whom find the ethical relationship troubling and painful. In naturalism's scenes of
trauma, inarticulacy, and paralysis, we find the origins of a radical ethical alternative, one that
does not deny ethical possibility in its refusal to systematize, but, rather, finds it in the the
breakdown of language and cognition – in other words, the complete dissembling of the self and
the familiar structures that tend to give it precedent in the ethical relationship.
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“Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made.”

- Immanuel Kant
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the dead of a Nebraska night, a young Swedish man falls lifeless in a saloon from the
flash of a blade. Outside, the snow looms quiet and as lifeless and cold as a corpse. Just hours
before, this youth, whom Stephen Crane refers to as “the Swede” in his “The Blue Hotel,”
appeared before a hotel on the outskirts of town, wild-eyed and nervous, easy to excite and not
far from a state of agitation. Slowly familiarizing himself with his fellow guests, the Swede is
lured into a game of cards. The Swede soon becomes convinced that one of his competitors,
Johnnie, the owner's son, is cheating, and aroused to anger, has no qualms about condemning his
foe in front of the other contestants. This accusation, as if an act of fate, sets off a chain of events
that leads to a seemingly irrevocable outcome, finally ending in the Swede's death. Overcoming
Johnnie in a battle of man-against-man outside the hotel, in the freezing cold, as the other guests
look on, the Swede storms off into the night, his sense of invincibility heightened by his victory.
The Swede finally finds himself inside the saloon, where he drinks too much, makes oaths, and
ends up on the wrong side of a knife. Most revealing, however, is the account that Crane leaves
us with, months later, after the trial of the gambler (who stabbed the Swede to death), of the
dialogue between the Easterner and the Cowboy, two of the participants in the card game that
fatal night. The Easterner finally reveals to the still vindictive Cowboy (perturbed by the Swede's
wild declamations that night) that Johnnie was indeed cheating but that he did not reveal this fact
at the time because he was “afraid to stand up and be a man” (29). According to the Easterner, all
parties involved in the card game were responsible for the Swede's outcome and not just the
Swede himself. “We are all in it!” (29) he exclaims in a definitive summary of the event's
outcome.
American literary naturalism not only makes us uncomfortable witnesses to the disastrous
1

(and often brutal) endings of characters caught in the vicious cycle of “dog-eat-dog” that
characterizes a competitive modern world, it also implicates us, most importantly, in their agony
and suffering. And while the Easterner's stark realization in Crane's story may be far more
morally explicit than other examples of his work as well as that of his cohort, reading naturalism
is, nonetheless, a process of locating our own complicity – our own responsibility – in the
suffering of our fellow human beings. Conventional readings of naturalism, however, find it
convenient to overlook this complicity. These readings typically assume that naturalism's harsh
depiction of life offers no valuable statement on the seemingly significant tragedies we
sometimes face, that there is no inherent value in life and that we must resign ourselves only to a
passive acceptance. Many of these critiques claim that naturalism's unwieldy determinism
underwrites a staunch nihilism that negates any real moral potential in naturalist texts. Certainly
these critiques cannot be overlooked or easily cast aside. Claims like those made by Georg
Lukacs 1, for instance, that naturalism's deterministic vision presents a world ruled by forces
beyond our control and understanding, thus precluding meaningful political motivation, are
legitimate recognitions of the problems posed by a naturalist ethos and must be confronted as
such. Even so, I find in the determinism and seeming nihilism of the American naturalists the
seeds of a radical ethical alternative. For the naturalists, the determinism that is so strongly
castigated by the school's detractors does not necessarily deter social obligation; in fact, it holds
individuals morally responsible for the suffering of their fellows. In the spectacle of suffering,
naturalism finds the origin of an ethical responsibility that is unlike any other. Like the horrific
events portrayed in the texts (which take us beyond any normal sense of the lives of others in
their enormity), this obligation ravishes us and takes us beyond any ability to fulfill our duty to
1 “Realism in the Balance.”
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the other – it exceeds everything we are capable of giving as moral subjects, and it is very
uncomfortable. Ethics is traumatic, gut-wrenching, harsh, and even violent, a radically different
way of thinking about the matter, and one that is best elucidated by the philosophy of Emmanuel
Levinas. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas writes that the experience of conscience “is the
revelation of a resistance to my powers that does not counter them as a greater force, but calls in
question the naïve right of my powers, my glorious spontaneity as a living being. Morality
begins when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent”
(84). According to Levinas, the self is caught in a stifling and intractable web of responsibility
(subjectivity is already given over to and a product of responsibility), and ethics commands a
supererogatory giving over of the self – a process that is “infinitely demanding,” as Simon
Critchley2 terms it, and brutally exacting. This is the discourse in which I would like to place the
critical conversation of American naturalism. Rather than negating morality, naturalism's focus
upon the seedy, the disturbing, and the seeming vacuity of existence highlights the extraordinary
difficulty inherent in an ethics of trauma.
Naturalism remains the discontented proverbial “step-child” of the literary world. No one
will completely have it, and yet, we aren't willing to completely cast it away either. Naturalism
has possessed a precarious position in the American literary canon and still does. Whether
neglected due to its admitted tendency towards the overbearing and the sensational, or valued
mostly for its ability to tell harsh tales of the seedy and grotesque (but with no real philosophical
implications, at least beyond determinism), naturalism has never had it easy. It has been picked
on, picked at, and picked apart. And this makes sense, for naturalism should give us pause. After
all, when we look at naturalism, we look at a movement that suggests that the world may not
2 Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance.
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function as neatly as we would like. It replaces our notions of an orderly and rational universe
with what appears like a frighteningly uncomfortable vision of the human condition. Even today,
its philosophical intractability and existential brutality trouble us as much as they did critics and
readers of previous eras. For the most part, the study of naturalism has consisted of two
divergent lines of thought, each with its own ideas pertaining to the ethical implications of the
naturalist aesthetic. These forms of thinking about the genre should not be disregarded; in fact,
they are all very much worth our study if we are to situate ethics accurately within a naturalist
aesthetic, one that, I argue, encourages participation and action rather than passivity and despair.
One of my tasks here is to place these divergent views, despite their tendency to elide
naturalism's true potential, in conversation with an approach to the literary movement that locates
an ethics of naturalism. Such an approach is essential because it not only claims an ethics for
naturalism but demonstrates how the ethical principles of its aesthetic forbears triggered what is,
in my opinion, a radical break in the form of naturalism.
In the study of American literary naturalism, one critical school tends to stress the genre's
ties to realism while the other places naturalist writing in close proximity with romanticism; each
school, however, acknowledges the astonishing difficulty of contemplating moral direction in the
brutality depicted by naturalism. Significantly, both groups wrestle with the relationship between
aesthetics and the philosophical implications of determinism. In other words, these critics often
are very mindful of the manner in which determinism influences the naturalist aesthetic (form,
character, and plot structure), many seeing this characteristic (when compared to the aesthetic
construct 3 of morality and responsibility in realism and romanticism) as a weakness and moral

3 When I reference aesthetics or, for instance, how morality is constructed in fiction, I mean those formal traits that
create the narrative action and character in a particular genre. For instance, determinism frequently yields the
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ingenuousness. What is most striking about these approaches is that they have been so persistent
and have structured our arguments about naturalism since its incipience (Frank Norris, Stephen
Crane, Jack London, Theodore Dreiser, et al.) and through its current manifestations (Cormac
McCarthy, Don DeLillo, and Thomas Pynchon). Although one school may dominate the critical
landscape at any particular moment in this time line, both have remained remarkably consistent
ways of organizing our thoughts about the genre.
Realism seems indelibly linked to our studies of naturalism and rightfully so: Zola saw
the aesthetic of the movement as closely aligned with scientific objectivity and rational
observation (albeit of sometimes seemingly irrational subjects). Getting to the heart of the matter
through a disciplined objectivity could lead to a supreme understanding of those conditions that
create seemingly irrational behavior in human agents and society. For Zola, irrational actions
really aren't that irrational after all – everything has an explanation, assuming we can manage to
get to the bottom of things. Like Zola, realists ultimately want the truth of things. In a sense, one
might say that the goal of realism is human freedom (just as it is in Zola). Realists want to write
life as it is actually lived (at least according to our senses), to assign narrative action to human
agents, and to thereby create a coherent vision of a rational world, a world that can be
understood, organized, and molded according to a progressive vision. Senses and actions match
up, this view concludes, and these actions ultimately make sense given their contexts. Howells,
for example, believes that a careful analysis of things can yield clarity, coherence, and order.
Realists profess that their craft can avoid an obfuscation of the natural world and of the behavior
of subjects living in modern societies – in other words, there are explanations for our actions.
Thus, humans are to be thought of as cognizant moral agents in control of their actions and
depiction of characters that are not as mentally complex as they may be in a genre like realism.
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responsible for those deeds that are direct (and, in some cases, indirect) results of these actions.
For these very reasons, when placed alongside realism, naturalism has received a mixed critical
reception.
Howells is perhaps the first American critic to cite the ineluctable relationship between
the two movements. As early as the 1890s, Howells already places the writings of Norris and
Crane in dialogue with realist aesthetics, establishing a long-standing scholarly trend. These
authors, while worthy of review, fail in Howells' mind to give an accurate assessment of
conditions in a post-Civil War, industrialized society. According to J.C. Levenson, Howells
“believed that accurate observation and literal representation would necessarily confirm that his
[rational man's] truths were axioms of the universe, statements about the way things 'really' are,”
(“The Red Badge of Courage and McTeague: Passage to Modernity,” Cambridge Companion
161). “Given this belief,” Levenson continues, “failure to come up with the right, reassuring
conclusions resulted from technical error, from a failure to observe accurately and transcribe
literally” (161). Howells constructs this new unconventional school of authorship as a naïve
realism. Its inability to unify narrative action with rational explanation precludes insight into
what Howells sees as the universal truths present in realist fiction. Realism, for Howells, gives
the reader not only logical conclusions and outcomes but also a comprehensive representation of
the world, a supreme understanding of human action (or, at least, a desire for such an
understanding).
Howells' theory of fiction is heavily indebted to a desire for progress, and he thinks that
realism is the proper literary outlet for reform. Similarly, Georg Lukacs thinks of realism as the
measure for a fiction that not only accurately portrays life but provides the motivation for change.
While Howells finds the impetus for progress in a conventional liberalism, Lukacs approaches
6

society and aesthetics with a much more radical vision. For Lukacs, Marxism is the answer, and
only an art that can identify the reality of capitalist degradation and degeneracy, as well as
motivate readers, will work. This motivation does not come in the seemingly harsh outlook
offered in naturalist fiction, however. In “Realism in the Balance,” Lukacs defends the ability of
realism to objectively portray the world as well as to identify those factors inhibiting social
change. Within this portrait is the combination of the universal and the particular; essentially, the
depiction of particular characters, places, and events gives the reader insight into universal
truths 4: the reality of life in capitalist economies. By those standards, Lukacs thinks that Zola
fails because he is far too pessimistic and deterministic, lacking in objectivity and avoiding the
truth of capitalism. That is, Zola conflates economic conditions with cosmic inevitability – he
falsely thinks that those conditions that are actually produced by capitalist economics and
material conditions (in Lukacs' opinion) are those created by human nature and societies. From
this perspective, naturalism becomes an art of despair, ignoring what should be art's proper
political imperative.
Even within the last few decades, realism remains a key force in conditioning our
awareness of naturalism. Donald Pizer's work, among the most extensive collections of
naturalism scholarship, largely represents a desire to refute many of the claims concerning
naturalism made by critics like Howells and Lukacs. For Pizer, naturalism is not a deviant, nor is
it a naïve, version of realism. “The major distinction between realism and naturalism, most
critics agree, is the particular philosophical orientation of the naturalists” (9), he writes. “A
traditional and widely accepted concept of American naturalism, therefore, is that it is essentially
realism infused with a pessimistic determinism” (9). However, Pizer rejects such a formulation;
4 Obviously, Lukacs is not privy to poststructural historicism.
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in fact, realism is guilty, in his eyes, of offering a distorted depiction of the world. Unlike in the
criticism of Howells and Lukacs (both of which are fairly synonymous with conventional
thinking concerning naturalism), realism, for Pizer, presents social experience through the lens of
a moral idealism and a wealth of diverse experiences that often seem detached from the common
experience of the reader. Realism “was neither unidealized nor – for the most part –
commonplace” (8), he claims in Realism and Naturalism in Nineteenth-Century American
Literature. Rather than offering readers an unadulterated image of social reality, realism gives an
abstract depiction of relationships and experience. Such a view obviously conflicts with the
traditional means by which we have organized realist texts. Instead of offering the reader a world
in which human freedom is possible, realism actually elicits a much more narrow depiction of
human interaction (even if amid a more broadly diverse set of experiences than can be accounted
for by the so-called “everyday”). 5 Naturalism, on the other hand, can give us a glimpse into the
actual conditions that influence our lives. The genre refuses every attempt at being relegated to a
naïve realism that is simply infatuated with a pessimistic brand of determinism. According to
Pizer, naturalism “refuses to accept this formula...and so seeks a new basis for man's sense of his
own dignity and importance” (11). Making sense of this basis means reconfiguring our
understanding of naturalism, seeing present in its so-called “lowbrow” tragedies a social and
philosophical complexity that escapes the purview of conventional scholarly frameworks. 6

5 This, however, should not be mistaken with philosophical determinism, which is what influences how we
approach naturalism. Rather, Pizer argues that realism, despite its claims, does not provide an objective portrait
of the world. This portrait, instead, remains highly stylized and controlled.
6 The work of Lee Clark Mitchell maintains the preeminence of understanding naturalism through a working
relationship with realist narrative. This is not, however, to say that Mitchell conflates naturalism with a “naive
realism.” Crucial for Mitchell is an awareness of the ways in which naturalist authors refute the narrative
constructs of their realist predecessors. Instead of forming a notion of individual responsibility through
forestalled action and “scenes of deliberation, naturalism throws its characters into action, negating a
conventional notion of agency and responsibility. I will have much more to say about Mitchell's argument below.

8

Unfortunately, while Pizer defends the truth of naturalism, he cannot fully articulate its
moral implications. Not surprisingly, critics who see naturalism as an extension of romanticism
have similar problems in their encounters with the fiction of authors like Norris and Dreiser.
Along with realism, romanticism highly influences our study of naturalism. 7 Although
establishing a nexus between romanticism and naturalism seems secondary to critics like Howells
and Lukacs (who see naturalism as a naïve and negligent form, respectively, of realism), such a
connection can indeed prove fruitful. On the one hand, romanticism requires what seems like an
organic mystification of nature: we observe nature in awe, yet our understanding of this response
can be varied, and we are not quite sure how to proceed. Whether it be the seemingly friendly
ruminations of a Wordsworth and Emerson, or the harsh brooding of a Poe and Melville,
romanticism presents us with the enigma of existence, the intrigue of a metaphysics that is
beyond any capacity of comprehending nature that we might possess – something that rings
analogous with naturalism's questioning of those factors that bring suffering into view. On the
other hand, the sentimental and sensational elements of romantic fiction seem to provide a key
component to the naturalist plot. In fact, the critical neglect of this connection proves all the
more befuddling given that the early naturalists often described their work in terms of
romanticism or even formed their work through the romantic plot. Even Zola thought that the
romantic plot could be valuable to that of the naturalist. The romantic plot, ironically, could offer

7 I should clarify my definition of romanticism. On the one hand, there is Romanticism proper: emphasis upon the
individual amid a chaotic world (in which he or she may or may not always find a stable home) and the power of
emotion, as well as the belief of the centrality of the relationship between humankind and nature. On the other
hand, there are the subsidiaries of Romanticism, namely, popular sentimentalist and melodramatic fiction
(romantic fiction) that also emphasize emotion but through much more regimented and formulaic plot structures.
Although not all of the scholars whose works I examine share this understanding of romanticism (their work may
favor one or the other definitions supplied here), my use of “romanticism” in this paper should be understood as
referring to that fiction which describes the sensational and dramatic (in plots that are often very predictable).
When specific characteristics and/or definitions of romanticism need to be clarified, I will do so.
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all of the extremes of life – the jubilation and the triumphs. Although lacking sentimentalism's
unabashed plea for sympathetic identification, Zola's Nana essentially resuscitates a sensational
plot in the process of telling the life of the eponymous character, her journey from prostitution to
social intrigue to disease – a structure similar to what June Howard calls the “plot of decline.”
Norris, likewise, thought of his fiction in an 1896 essay as a departure from those “teacup
tragedies,” but a departure that would offer the ordinary as “a vast and terrible drama.”
Significantly, Norris finds naturalism “a form of romanticism,” instead of “an inner circle of
realism.” 8 The tragedy of the everyday had to be emphasized in romantic over-determination.
In Charles Child Walcutt, we find a reading of naturalism that cannot distance itself from
an awareness of romanticism. With American Literary Naturalism, A Divided Stream, Walcutt
frames the trajectory of scholarly work on American naturalism and its indebtedness to romantic
authorship and philosophy. In fact, while Walcutt is mostly concerned with the American
naturalists, he shares Zola's vision of naturalism as an intellectual project for improving
humanity. Walcutt claims that both naturalism and romanticism see an intimate connection
between science and nature that precludes any possibility of separating scientific objectivity from
larger spiritual truths. Human beings can approach truth not only through reason or intuition but
also “through science, because every natural fact is a symbol of a spiritual fact and when
penetrated by the mind will give up its ultimate spiritual meanings” (11), claims Walcutt.
Remarkably, this sounds a lot like Zola, who believes that progress can be achieved through an
understanding of nature and possibly even its subjugation – destroying the veil that hides nature
can reveal universal truths. Not coincidentally, this also strikes familiar chords with Emerson,
who thinks that “man's mind is an aspect of spirit, his body a fact of nature” (11). We see,
8 “Zola as a Romantic Writer.”
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therefore, that naturalism may not be simplistically rooted in determinism, or even in a
physiological determinism that provides no more insights than perhaps an explanation of why
one mere creature chooses to eat an apple instead of an orange. Although a highly questionable
understanding of the genre for its general optimism and meliorism, this view of naturalism posits
that the body and nature can also help reveal more fundamental truths about human behavior,
possibly allow insight into human societies and even offer the prospect of amendment and
change.
Zola, Norris, and Walcutt are not alone in constructing naturalism in terms of the
romantic. Charles Taylor makes a compelling argument for the historical and intellectual
interconnections between Romanticism and naturalism in his erudite Sources of the Self. While
Taylor sees naturalism as an inevitable outcome of Romantic thought, he tends to understand the
genre as a veritable branch of realism, making Taylor's argument (although learned) yet another
reduction of literary naturalism's complexity. For instance, he lumps the thought and writings of
Zola together with those of Flaubert, although Taylor maintains a slight distinction between the
two. 9 Nonetheless, Taylor does well in demonstrating the philosophical affinities of
Romanticism and naturalist thought. Ironically, unlike Walcutt, Taylor does not find any
similarity between the ways the two schools define the relationship between nature and spirit.
Although a controversial move, Taylor places literary naturalism, instead, in the tradition of
Enlightenment philosophical naturalism, which finds no “spiritual reality beyond or behind
things, and in particular...den[ies] all notions of a great current of nature” (430-31). Even so,
literary naturalism's philosophical monism does not exclude what Taylor calls the Romantic

9 Zola's naturalism is considered a form of realism in Taylor. Realism, however, is seen as the natural progression
from Romanticism in Taylor's mind.
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epiphanic moment. In works like Madame Bovary, for example, the reality of our everyday lives
is placed in such close (and often uncomfortable) proximity to the reader that we cannot help but
be startled by the transfiguration of the mediocre. “There is a kind of transfiguration here,” he
argues, “not the kind which reveals meaning, but rather that which gives the meaningless and
banal unhappiness the closure and shape of fate” (431). In other words, Romanticism transforms
the natural world into a spiritual revelation, while realism and naturalism put revelation into the
everyday – how the banality of life not only characterizes our days but also determines our lives
and shapes our fates. Taylor's argument here is unique, but we still find a need for a more
extensive and embracing concept of literary naturalism.
Unlike Taylor, Eric Carl Link finds the romantic influences present in naturalism aiding
far greater in evincing a metaphysical inscrutability rather than shutting off meaning beyond
materiality altogether. 10 Link's work stands as quite possibly the most well-articulated, nuanced
account of the relations between naturalism and romanticism to date. Lacking Walcutt's
unqualified enthusiasm while also void of Taylor's rigidity (his refusal to offer an extensive
account of naturalism proper), Link's The Vast and Terrible Drama refuses to reduce naturalism
to a mere by-product of romanticism but, rather, finds the relationship between the two as
palpable and productive. In other words, naturalism retains a unique identity but one that can be
better understood through a conversation with romanticism. In particular, Link finds Zola's Le
roman experimental less influential on American naturalism and, instead, the American romantic
movement (found in Melville, Hawthorne, Whitman, Emerson, and Thoreau) far more powerful
in determining the character of American naturalism. For Link, these writers and intellectuals set
10 Taylor's argument, however, avoids nihilism. Realism and naturalism may isolate the meaningless but, for
Taylor, the process of this transfiguration becomes meaningful as the ability to locate a perspective from which
we can contemplate these things adds a sense of empowerment to our lives (431-32).
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a tone for the movement of literary naturalism in America, a path that requires the supreme
power of natural forces, albeit divergent and conflicting. These forces, according to Link,
possess the power to induce preternatural experience beyond the realm of everyday “reality,” as
well as the suspension of belief in any revitalizing qualities in the natural world. While Emerson
identifies in the Oversoul the great forces powering the machine of life, Melville, upon
scrutinizing nature, sees the power of blackness and the nebulous “pasteboard mask of nature”
(91). Like Melville and Norris, Zola acknowledges the immense unknown that surrounds us;
however, he believes the mask hiding nature can ultimately be removed. According to Link, this
faith demonstrates that Zola, in employing the scientific method, has much more in common with
what Link deems positive forms of romanticism and naturalism – those representatives that
locate some sort of knowledge amid the immense unknown, rather than those forms that find an
intractable mystery surrounding human endeavors and being, like what we find in Norris or much
of Crane's work (indeed, the majority of the American naturalist school). This distinction not
only pits “bad” and “good” (negative and positive) forms of romanticism and naturalism against
one another but also places realism back into the discussion as well because all of these
movements are profoundly concerned with our relationship with nature. Naturalists, as Link has
it, grapple with things “beyond us” while realists grapple with “ourselves.” Realists want to
understand what we can know about both human nature and nature itself through careful
documentation and un-embellished study of behavior, culture, and psychology. Romantics and
literary naturalists, however, want to gain access to nature and being by dissecting the
relationship between human behavior and psychology (and the environment that influences these
forms of behavior), while also desiring to understand those factors that affect our interpretive
capacities for comprehending this relationship and its environment:
13

This “environment of forces” takes a wide variety of shapes, from Hawthorne's
“truth of the human heart,” to Poe's glimpse of “supernal beauty,” to Melville's
threatening visage behind the “pasteboard mask” of nature, to the natural laws of
Dreiser, the brute within McTeague, and the blend of scientific and providential
determinisms in Crane. (166-67)
For Link, positive forms of this intellectual phenomenon look at nature as a mystery that can be
unlocked. We should think of this tendency as an ethical project steeped in the tenet that
uncovering nature can reveal supreme truths. Negative forms, however, think that nature and
supreme truth cannot be unmasked, and I would argue, that for these writers and thinkers
(Melville, Poe, Norris, Crane, etc.), attempting to do so is actually an injustice that discredits the
demands of existence and relationships. For these thinkers, mystery casts doubt about the
adequacy of our metaphysics; in fact, mystery belongs to otherness because it balks every
attempt we make at consuming what is around us. Certainly, given the seminal influence of the
struggle of the individual and our emotional response (although this particular facet is highly
contested among naturalist scholars) to this struggle, we cannot underestimate any relationship
that naturalism may possess with romanticism and its various beneficiaries. For all his amazing
insights, however, Link (like others) fails to fully examine what the implications of this mystery
might be for approaching a naturalist ethics.
After briefly evaluating the critical history of naturalism, we've found two predominant
schools of thought: one that places naturalism in conjunction with realism and one that cites
romanticism (in some form) as preeminent in influencing literary naturalism. Both of these
criticisms are indebted to an extreme anxiety over the relationship between ethics and literature,
particularly how to reconcile a deterministic vision of the world with one that offers the prospect
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of social amelioration. We are stumped by a deterministic vision of the world, social relations,
and/or human biology. A working awareness of determinism is highly useful in evaluating the
actions, behaviors, thinking (or lack of, as the case often seems to be), and destinies of naturalist
characters, and while complicating our understanding of naturalism, I'm not certain that these
questions are absolutely essential to finding an ethics here. In fact, such questions may even be a
digression. Interestingly enough, Norris did not find determinism as a primary trait in defining
the genre and delineating its distinct characteristics. Norris, even though highly familiar with the
writings of Zola and other naturalists (particularly of the French/European school), “nowhere in
his criticism...identif[ies] naturalism with a deterministic ideology” (8) states Pizer in his
introduction to The Cambridge Companion to American Realism and Naturalism. “Naturalism,
to Norris,” Pizer continues, “is a method and a product, but it does not prescribe a specific
philosophical base” (8). Rather, naturalism is attractive, for Norris, “in its character as a
sensationalistic novel of ideas flexible enough in ideology to absorb the specific ideas of
individual writers – and this despite the efforts of several generations of later critics to attach an
unyielding deterministic core to the movement” (Pizer 8). Nonetheless, the impetus for reading
naturalism alongside nineteenth- and twentieth-century understandings of determinism cannot be
cast aside in any honest account of the genre today. While often a reductive way of lending facile
methods for categorizing and periodizing American literature, such an account can, ironically,
help us in understanding how naturalism becomes widely received not only as nihilistic but
potentially meaningful, according to some critics.
Determinism has played an understandably significant role in studies of naturalism, and
these approaches cannot be ignored, nor are they uniform. Many detractors of naturalism resort
to consolidating the movement through a determinist vision only as a reductionist move that
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limits not only literary possibility but also human potential. Proponents of the genre, on the other
hand, find determinism as a means of exploring ethical potential and as offering a literary
richness. James T. Farrell may be the first critic/writer to find in naturalism's determinism some
sort of philosophical ambiguity that frees the genre from oversimplification. In “On Naturalism,
So Called,” Farrell argues for a vision of naturalism that is materialist; this philosophical
monism, however, does not mean determinism and does not negate the capacity for free will.
Farrell has what essentially amounts to a compatibilist approach that finds free will compatible
with the ability to assert some form of control over nature and the self. Similarly, John J. Conder
provides what may be the critically richest estimate of determinism's role in literary naturalism in
his Naturalism in American Fiction: The Classic Phase. According to Conder, naturalism 11 is
unified philosophically through a deterministic outlook that pervades the happenings of texts and
influences characters' lives. Like with Farrell, this fact need not conflict with a more optimistic
evaluation of naturalist works in Conder's study. “Even if the questioning [of human freedom]
leads to both determinism and freedom, no individual work studied here suffers from a logical
contradiction as a result,” he claims. “On the contrary, when these seemingly irreconcilable
opposites appear in a work, its inner coherence is as strong as that of a work that is monolithic in
its denial or assertion of man's freedom” (4). In this regard, Conder sets up a compatibilist
approach that unifies Hobbesian causality and Bergsonian temporality. While critically useful,
questions concerning free will and determinism are not essential for me, however, because such
questions, from a Levinasian perspective, are irrelevant – ethics is before any notion of the will
and subjectivity can only be responsibility. Looking at naturalism in such a way allows the

11 Conder is hesitant to even use the term “naturalism” at times. Instead, his use of the term tends to be a
convenient means of organizing previous scholarship.
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possibility for alternative readings that open up entirely new manners of thinking about the
movement most often held as the bleakest in American letters.
Whether a valid question or not, at the heart of all these evaluations (among naturalism's
detractors and proponents alike) of the role of determinism in naturalist fiction is a severe anxiety
over the potential of an ethics of naturalism, a crucial concern that I share and find still
complicating our understanding of the movement today and still lacking in a systematic
approach. Although Conder certainly stands as one example of a systematic critical examination
of naturalist ethics, culling from Hobbes and Bergson in order to locate a specific idea of
responsibility, naturalist scholarship has overwhelmingly failed to go beyond simplistic moral
arguments that amount to more than essentially this: naturalism, good or bad. The arguments
finding an ethical potential, while necessary and providing valuable steps for my own work as
well as that of scholars yet to come, fail to take into account the full ethical nuances of the
fiction. This is mostly due either to a frustration with the unwieldiness of naturalism's
determinism or an unwillingness to fully engage its nihilism with any specificity. In addition,
although the prospects offered by these thinkers are certainly worth our examination, we should
not reduce moral responsibility to the hope of meliorism. For instance, Walcutt sketches together
a rather hazy conclusion that amounts to an affirmative capacity present in naturalist texts to
affirm hope and faith in humankind, even amid a world of degradation (29). Pizer's argument, as
alluded to above, doesn't amount to much more, although Pizer certainly makes the humanistic
tradition he sees present in naturalism a pivotal part of his scholarship. No one should confuse
this for a systematic approach, though, one that lends ethical specificity to the movement.
Elsewhere, in the tradition of Walcutt, James R. Giles observes that even the most pessimistic
examples of the school have a reformist impulse. While characters may lack freedom, author and
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reader can enact social change (The Naturalistic Inner-City Novel in America). In his
Determined Fictions, Lee Clark Mitchell sees the moral possibilities in naturalist form and
aesthetics but refuses to examine these due to what he finds to be not so much a repudiation of
ethics out of philosophical principle on the part of naturalists but a shared frustration these
authors possessed with representative forms (3). 12 So we see that frustration and lack of
specificity, in particular, have hampered previous approaches.
Luckily, the recent ethical turn in literary criticism has enabled a resurgence in evaluating
the naturalist movement and its various manifestations over the last century, a resurgence that,
fortunately, calls for much more systematic approaches. Ian F. Roberts' “Determinism, Free Will,
and Moral Responsibility in American Literary Naturalism” salutes Pizer but also takes him to
task for representing a vague, “milquetoast humanism” in his understanding of both Zola and the
American literary naturalist tradition. According to Roberts, Zola's truth is a deterministic truth
and at odds with humanism, which, in turn, it should also be pointed out, is at odds with
naturalism's de-centering of human freedom and cosmic significance (123). Instead of following
any sort of humanistic ethics, Roberts thinks that naturalist studies may best be served by placing
these in conversation with the ethics of John Stuart Mill. Mill's ethics support a compatibilist
conception of moral responsibility. On the other hand, deontological ethics construe actions as
inherently right or wrong and regard people as morally responsible in some metaphysical sense.
Roberts, however, thinks we should look to Mill in our readings of naturalist fiction, a critical
viewpoint that has largely been overlooked, so much so that Roberts wonders why literary critics
continue to neglect a compatibilist coalition of free will and determinism even when, in his mind,

12 I will examine Mitchell's argument concerning naturalist form below, because it possesses productive
implications for my own argument.
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science and philosophy have essentially come to terms with this understanding of human agency
since Hobbes. 13 In addition to Roberts' thinking about naturalism and ethics, Rick Armstrong's “
'First Principles of Morals': Evolutionary Morality and American Naturalism” offers nineteenthcentury social and moral evolutionary theories as viable mediums for reading naturalist
authorship. Social evolutionary ethics at the time saw moral and physical fitness as
indistinguishable and intertwined. Such pseudo-scientists and philosophers as John Fiske, for
instance, argued that moral unfitness should (and would be) punished by physical extinction. As
Armstrong argues, characters like Dreiser's Hurstwood exhibit such traits in his moral unfitness,
which, consequently, results in physical and financial degeneracy. Such a fate, as this particular
philosophical outlook would have it, is the appropriate one. Nonetheless, the tragedy of
Hurstwood (and similar characters) cannot be underestimated as his demise is complicated, and
his failure should not necessarily implicate him for blame. Armstrong thinks that an evolutionary
ethics can be productive for reading naturalist fiction, but may not explain the moral complexity
of such texts. Similarly, Mary E. Papke thinks that looking specifically at nineteenth-century
consumer culture can be a means of identifying the particular ethical concerns and potential
present in naturalist fiction. According to Papke, we may view naturalism as a byproduct of
commodity culture because it not only seems the end-result of such a historical development but
simultaneously seems to offer a diagnosis. Naturalism, in fact, is capable of pointing to the ways
in which our infatuation with commodity culture trumps “our having to think of...” our own
“moral responsibility” (298). For Papke, studying the relation between naturalist fiction and
earlier periods of consumerism brings naturalism out of the narrow confines of “the late
13 I find this a questionable statement. Although Roberts' view certainly finds nothing but respect here, I'm not so
sure that the debate between free will and determinism has been settled, nor am I certain that philosophy at large,
at least, has come to terms with compatibilism.
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nineteenth century and into our own time” (303). Indeed, we are still struggling with the allure
of this culture as it continues to inflict suffering upon those in its grasp. Naturalism should
certainly be viewed as a diagnosis of life under unbridled consumerism, whether during the
relative free market capitalism of the 1890s or the era of the transnational corporation and
finance. And there's no need why this diagnosis should not offer a portrait of the ethical
possibilities that can aid in ending (or at least tempering) this suffering.
No doubt there remains much room for an ethical reading of naturalism in the wake of
such scholarship, and such a reading is what I intend to offer here. Naturalism takes human
degradation and suffering as the preeminent problem facing society. Approaching this suffering
requires an entirely new way of thinking about ethics. Generations of critics have attempted to
dispel any real moral potential in the writings of naturalist authors, simply casting such texts
aside as the product of an unprecedented historical skepticism. This, however, is in fact not the
case, as these works offer an abundance of moral questions and dilemmas that cannot help but
reward our discourse on the relationship between ethics and literature. In fact, naturalism offers
the worst in humanity while it asks us what can be done to help. The answers to this question
may not be so simple, but there is no doubt that naturalism seeks to improve our condition rather
than leave us out to dry.
Specifically, naturalism offers us a literature relentless in deconstructing conventional
ethics, whether those authorized by religion or Kantian (or other liberal forms of) rationalism or
those instructed by mass ethics like popular sentimentalism or other popular rhetorical forms
(nationalism comes to mind in an author like Dos Passos, for instance). These conventional
forms held sway over (and still largely do) Western philosophy, politics, and cultural life in
different capacities for generations. The naturalists offer an alternative view, a perspective from
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which such ethics no longer seem viable and, in fact, seem counter-productive and possibly even
harmful. For many naturalists, the problem with these ethical forms stems from an inability to
diagnose the sincerity of the ethical relationship as well as an over-zealousness (unwittingly as
the case may sometimes be) in eradicating the particularity of this relationship along with the
particularity of the other. In other words, these ethics tend to abstract the ethical relationship and
often place ethical action (the decision to act upon an ethical demand) on the part of the
individual agent, on the part of the actor. Naturalism, on the other hand, finds ethics to be much
more harsh, much more demanding, and much more out of the hands of the agent. Morality and
acting morally are gut-wrenching and infinitely demanding obligations that take the agent to the
point of an overwhelming trauma, which disrupts any notion of free will and freely-offered
participation we may have of the ethical relationship. Just as “The Blue Hotel” points to our
culpability and folly in human suffering, as well as the overwhelming presence of this suffering
and the unreasonable demands it places upon us, naturalism also offers us the possibility of
confronting this suffering on its own terms (and not that of a conventional approach) and locating
ethical sincerity. According to the naturalists, one does not come to this relationship of his or her
own accord; rather, we are commanded forward into action by the other (a unique kind of
determinism, if you will), an individual who disrupts our capacity to assume what she needs.
Instead, the other in naturalist fiction presents an enigma and one that cannot be easily consumed
by all-embracing convention with pretenses to providing answers for every moral dilemma.
Naturalism posits moral dilemmas as demanding on their own terms. 14 This disruption of free
will and universality, significantly, helps answer those concerns we understandably possess about

14 The fact that naturalism never offers clear-cut guides for moral action probably helps account for our willingness
to avoid a real confrontation with the moral potential of the genre.
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a literature that seems to bar any notion of significant human action with its staunch and
seemingly dogmatic determinism. Such a disruption of the will, whereby naturalist characters
seem commanded into their actions, accompanied by a construct of ethical dilemmas without
readily-tailored answers, sounds strikingly familiar to the work of the late French philosopher
Emmanuel Levinas. In fact, it is the work of Levinas that I am now offering as a crucial starting
point for only beginning our task of unlocking the ethical potential of naturalism. 15
Before I offer my specific justifications for the authors and historical periods (naturalism
transcends the 1890s) I have chosen for this argument, I think it imperative to again turn to the
demands that Levinas places upon us as moral beings and as readers. Levinas requires out of us
a giving that is far beyond any sense of ethical duty we are familiar with – it disarms us just as
naturalism implodes every capacity we have to think of ethics as conventional forms of selfsacrificing. In fact, we cannot escape ethics; it's already a fact of our subjectivity and being. We
are commanded to the ethical relationship by the very fact of our existing, and this is also
naturalism's argument about the self. Although his thought doesn't come to prominence until the
late twentieth century, Levinas provides a way for us to understand better what I see as
naturalism's ethics of trauma and vulnerability as characters are thrown into traumatic encounters
with others, often with very little recourse to deliberation. For Levinas, subjectivity and ethics
are a dynamic of trauma, meaning that others make demands upon the self that are already prior
to my consent and are beyond my reach, my capacity to fulfill and satisfy. (This, however, does

15 I should go ahead and state here that I don't necessarily see all naturalism as lending itself to a Levinasian
argument; however, a significant number of naturalists do seem appealing in a Levinasian reading. I will offer
my specific justifications for the authors I choose to examine in detail below. Furthermore, and it should go
without saying, my argument here is just a beginning. It is certainly not comprehensive, and there is far more
room for other specific ethical examinations of the fiction. In particular, I see a lot of potential for Bergsonian
readings of naturalism (Conder is a good start) and possibly some room for John Dewey as well. Stuart Mill, as
Roberts points out, may also be a good direction, but such a reading, with due respect, is at odds with my own.
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not minimize responsibility.) The subject falsely resides in what Levinas deems its “atheist
separation,” comfortable within its isolation, enjoying its “promiscuous freedom,” where it feels
no obligation to anyone else if the self doesn't immediately see how it may be responsible. Such
a subject thinks that it comes to the other of its own volition. However, this notion of an
autonomous, freely giving self proves fictive, according to Levinas, for subjectivity is borne in a
chaotic confrontation of the self with the world of others that takes us out of the smug comfort of
our felt sense of autonomy. The ethical relation calls the freedom of the I into question,
commanding the I forward in order to account for itself before the presence of the other
emanating from what he deems the “face.” “The way in which the other presents himself,” Levinas
claims, “exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face…. The face of the Other at each
moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure
and to the measure of its ideatum – the adequate idea…. It expresses itself (Totality and Infinity 5051). No matter how much I may desire, I cannot reduce the other into an idea that is familiar and
comfortable to me – I cannot reduce him or her into an object that I command, so to speak, by
disrupting the other's individuality and irreducible particularity. When, however, the self attempts to

reach its ethical capacity (which is unreachable), it does so in a giving of the self that is a
vulnerability whereby the I is completely exposed to the unbearable burden of the other. As
Levinas emphasizes throughout his philosophical works, ethics is not an encounter of the self
with the other in the manner of comfort and reciprocity, but rather, ethics is a traumatic event that
completely displaces the self's familiarity and commands a supererogatory giving and suffering
on its behalf. In fact, it is striking that Levinas bathes his ethics in metaphors and imagery not
only pertaining to trauma but also to nausea, masochism, persecution, and guilt. We can never
really give a full account of ourselves before the other who will command more from us than we
23

are capable of giving, nor can we even begin to defer our responsibility before the other; rather,
we are caught in a matrix of responsibility that commands us forward without heed to our own
volition and without recourse. Most importantly here, Levinas's ethics of trauma provides us
with no systematic ethical code, no rules or standards to live by that will help us know whether
we have done our duty or not. Instead, we must engage the other on his or her own terms.
This sounds strikingly like naturalism, which refuses to systematize the ethical
relationship (perhaps explaining why so many critics have ignored the school's ethical potential)
and gives its characters no simple guides for moral conduct when faced with inescapable crises.
These similarities suggest that we can no longer read naturalism as amoral, as unaware of the
import of the ethical relationship. Admittedly, naturalism's call to responsibility is nebulous, but
the call is there nonetheless in the inability of characters to distance themselves from the
suffering and demands of others. Interestingly, Levinas's desire to prevent the reification of the
world, self, and ethics shares a lot in common, at least in intention, with Lukacs, perhaps the
most avid opponent of literary naturalism. In Lukacs' mind, naturalism only lends to the
reification of objects and human relations. How then can naturalism actually counter these things
through a Levinasian reading? Levinas, like naturalism, constructs ethics as a traumatic
encounter, involving the absolute giving over of the self to the other in a relationship that is
asymmetric and non-reciprocal, thus making unstable a coherent notion of self as well as that of
the other. For Levinas and naturalism, suffering is a part of being, and we cannot escape human
suffering nor can we escape those conditions of subjectivity that confer ethical responsibility.
Recognition of our moral responsibility is key, even if this responsibility is prior to deliberating
on what moral action we should take. Levinas bars any codified ethical approach, and this
refusal on his part and that of naturalist authors points not only to the ambiguity of “correct”
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moral action but also signifies the singularity of moral response (there is no all-embracing answer
to every moral problem; such a panacea would deracinate the personal, the human, from the
ethical relationship). Such a singularity prevents any process by which the world and individual
human beings may be reified.
While Levinas helps us read naturalism, the rationale behind both my selection of
particular authors and my understanding of naturalism as a movement that escapes the confines
of the 1890s may not be readily apparent. I think a justification of these decisions only necessary
before moving forward. Furthermore, it is imperative that I also clarify how exactly I am
defining naturalism as a unified literary movement in this dissertation. The former task means
that we will first have to investigate those naturalists that anticipate Levinas in their
preoccupation with the underside of modernity, its mechanization of humans and bodies into
machine-creatures and beasts. These naturalists we count as the classical school of naturalism –
Frank Norris, Stephen Crane, Jack London, and Theodore Dreiser. For my purposes, I will focus
almost exclusively on Norris and Crane in regards to classical naturalism. 16 After evaluating how
moments in Crane and Norris anticipate Levinasian theory, I intend on also engaging Levinas
with two naturalist authors of the 1930s, in John Dos Passos and Nathanael West. These two
writers are concerned, among other things, with a mass rhetoric that shapes individuals into cogs
in the system of capitalism and modernity. This is particularly striking as we know the role of
mass rhetoric and propaganda in fueling the Fascist machine of the Thirties and Forties, a
development that would not go unnoticed by a young Levinas. Such a critique, I argue, expands

16 I see Norris and Crane's works as lending themselves with most facility to a Levinasian reading. I think Dreiser
may possess some potential here as well, but it is not as readily clear how so, and for the sake of brevity, I have
decided to mostly avoid a full confrontation with Dreiser. Nonetheless, I think all four share some semblance of
moral potential. I'll leave this task, however, to other scholars or even my own future endeavors.
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our location of naturalism and those works that qualify as “naturalist” beyond the 1890s-1900s
and offers a radically different way of thinking about the school's philosophical concerns.
Lastly, my understanding of naturalism here is twofold, but obviously interconnected.
Basically, I have two distinct notions of naturalism: one is Naturalism proper (that collection of
authors from the late 1800s to today that fall under a methodology of determinism as a response
to realism and romanticism's respective plot structures); the other is naturalism as unified through
ethical affinities (such a definition does not account for the entire movement), which is my
primary definition here. The former is unified methodologically while the latter coheres
philosophically. Although a good deal of naturalist writers largely seem fascinated with common
philosophical issues (like agency, freedom, determinism [beyond form], and metaphysics), I
agree with such critics as Pizer, who claim that the entire school cannot necessarily be unified
philosophically (although philosophical determinism often seems to dominate). Instead, like
Pizer, I find the school unified at large through methodology and form. However, while this
understanding of Naturalism proper will also be critical here, I see a group of naturalist authors
who are indeed united not only in their concerns with method in rendering the tales of human
lives amid modern society, but also united in their moral outlook for humanity – an ethics of
trauma best gleaned through an awareness of the Levinasian alternative. In fact, attention to
form/method helps reveal these ethical inquiries in the texts and, as such, an awareness of
naturalism's relationship with realist and romantic forms will be indispensable. Realist and
romantic forms offer their own worldviews and moral prospects, whether through plot structure
(or other aspects of form), through their respective constructs of the individual, agency, and the
nature of human relationships, or both. These inform generations of naturalist authors,
responding to what they see as flaws in their predecessors' (or peers', as the case may be)
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structures and constructs. This approach aids a better grasp on naturalism's confrontation with
conventional forms of morality, whether these be elements of Christianity, philosophical systems
that depend upon rationalism and a humanist/liberal notion of self, or forms of nineteenth-century
bourgeois meliorism, like the commercialization of emotional response we see in popular
sentimentalism, for instance.
Sentimentalist literature, for one, will play a significant role in my next chapter, as we
turn towards an examination of those historical factors and discursive cultural practices in 1800s
America that helped create the naturalist moment, not out of solidarity but as a response to the
horrors of unfettered capitalism (for instance) and the inadequacies of conventional forms of
response. No account of naturalism and its ethical concerns should go without an
acknowledgment of the adverse effects of free market capitalism and the competitive nature of a
rising consumer society. Certainly, capitalism enables investment, job creation, and economic
growth, while also often aiding increased wealth among members of any society, not just
America for that matter. At the same time, there are negative effects, and it is these implications
that create inequalities in human relationships that cannot be ignored. The authors that emerge
during the mid to late nineteenth century, whether realist, sentimentalist, or naturalist, directly
and indirectly respond to these particular economic and cultural developments. The key in
Chapter One will be to identify how both historical developments in American society at this
time and certain cultural and artistic practices set the stage for a reaction on the part of a
generation of dissatisfied naturalist writers, disgusted at the inadequacy of previous artistic forms
but mostly outraged by a society seeming to increasingly turn its back on the helpless and needy.
Their diagnosis, as I argue, however, does not prove an easy or facile one. Thinking about ethics
as trauma does not provide easy answers to the ills of nineteenth century American society. At
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least a Levinasian reading can help us determine why these particular naturalist authors might
have sought so intransigently to make us witnesses to human suffering and its unreasonable
demands. In that regard, acknowledgment will also be given to how the same cultural and
metaphysical forces weighing upon early literary naturalism also set the stage for an ethics like
that of Levinas. The same conditions of possibility that enable the naturalists also enable Levinas
and, as I will argue, it is not until Levinas that we find the naturalist perspective articulated.
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II. CAPITALISM, COMMERCIALIZED DISCOURSE, AND THE NATURALIST
MOMENT
Although a historical awareness is not necessary for understanding a Levinasian reading of
naturalism (Levinas's ethics is ahistorical, at least from his perspective), it certainly provides a
more informed approach to unlocking naturalism's response to capitalism and the various cultures
of solidarity and consolation that spring from its disruption of traditional community. The single
most important development affecting the moral outlook of American naturalists, in my view, is
the arrival of capitalism and its culture of commodity ownership and consumption. Papke, for
one, sees an examination of the naturalists' awareness of the cultural byproducts of capitalism –
its wealth disparities, corruption in government and business, etc. – as crucial in unlocking the
potential of naturalist texts and in expanding the margins of the historical accessibility of
naturalism, making it clearer how the genre spans from the turn of the century to our own time,
rather than losing stylistic and philosophical coherence (as well as cultural import) after the
1890s. Even while this may be the case, and a more extensive study should take into
consideration transmutations of capitalism, I would like to focus the conversation now
specifically upon mid- to late nineteenth century capitalism, which gave rise to the first wave
naturalists of the 1890s.
Capitalism brings social forces into play that raise some very important metaphysical
questions, questions that plague the first naturalist generation and their successors. As early as
Pizer in the 1980s, the negative consequences of decades of poorly managed production and
labor and an unchecked industrialization starting in the middle half of the nineteenth century are
seen as very much influential in the response of the early naturalist authors, beneficiaries (if,
oddly, we might call them that) of retrospection; however, the relationship still remains largely
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unexamined. The mid-1800s saw a shift towards a largely laissez faire approach to economics,
characterized by vacillating cycles of boom and bust; the period signaled remarkable economic
growth and vast financial gains, expanding markets, and new opportunities at the same time it
marked increasing discrepancies in wealth among American citizens. On the one hand,
tremendous growth occurred in the railroad, banking, coal, steel, and oil industries, providing
numerous jobs and an unprecedented spark to the American GDP. According to twentiethcentury economist Raymond W. Goldsmith, the Rate of Growth of Reproducible Tangible Wealth
(RTW) among the entire U.S. population (Total Wealth) grew by an average rate of 5.2 percent
per year between 1850-1900 as opposed to 4.4 percent annual RTW in the half-century before
(269). Other economists, including Milton Friedman, have noted that the 1880s, in particular,
mark an inordinate rise in RTW and capital investment relative to any other decade, even during
the latter half of the century. 17 Obviously, this increase in wealth affected not only the wealthy
but those seeking sustainable income, providing employment opportunities for a growing
populace and the prospects for social mobility to individuals willing to work.
On the other hand, such opportunity often proved illusory and falsely optimistic. The
economic climate beginning during the mid-century created countless social ills that would have
far-reaching implications beyond the nineteenth century. “Because of its vastness, the richness of
its resources, the lure of its opportunities,” Frank Browning and John Gerassi write in The
American Way of Crime, “it [America] could not help but become a living, thriving experiment in
social Darwinism” (204). The dramatic proximity of the poor and the wealthy in urban centers,
for instance, facilitated class strife and antagonisms, frequently devolving into what might have

17 A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1963. Co-authored with Anna
Jacobson Schwartz.
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seemed a struggle for sheer survival for those at the bottom of the social ladder. Growing
numbers of Americans wondered why they weren't allowed at the proverbial “table” while
groveling with one another under detestable living conditions. By the late 1870s, for example,
New York City had 25 percent unemployment and an estimated 30,000 homeless (Browning and
Gerassi 226). The prospects for the unemployed were not much better nationally, with an
estimated 3 million either out of work or unemployable out of a total population of 45 million
(Browning and Gerassi 226). The cause of such high unemployment rates can be traced to the
mismanagement of wealth by the U.S. and state governments and the corruption of big business
leaders seeking favors from maleficent and dishonest politicians – mismanagement and
corruption that led to frequent economic downturns like the Panics of 1857 and 1893, just to
name a couple. Additionally, with little government regulation and with little cooperation
between owners, on one side, and workers and union leaders on the other, labor grievances were
not unfounded:
In the 1880s the average American worked 14 to 18 hours a day for subsistence
pay. In New York City, bakers put in at least 84-hour weeks and 120 hours was
not uncommon. And while the trusts consolidated their power, 5,183 businesses
worth over $200 million failed. Almost 2 million people lost their jobs.
(Browning and Gerassi 213)
Workers, strained by long workdays and dangerous work environments, demanded healthier
working conditions and more favorable, sustainable wages – not an unfair asking price in light of
the earnings procured by their corporate owners. “While workers starved or died on the job (in
1900, 2,550 railroad workers were killed and 39,643 were so badly injured they could not resume
their duties; they were not covered by insurance), the rich of the Gilded Age...enjoyed their
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wealth as never before” (Browning and Gerassi 213). The so-called “robber barons,” corporate
pioneers of oil, coal, banking, and steel – men with the names of Morgan, Rockefeller, Gould,
and Vanderbilt – built vast empires through means fair and foul. The wealth that the private
sector accumulated during this period is unfathomable and had never before been witnessed. J.P.
Morgan, as just one example, eventually controlled 60 percent of the nation's steel, according to
Browning and Gerassi. His United States Steel Trust employed 170,000 workers and controlled
over a thousand miles of railroad. By 1912, he presided over an empire that included 112
corporations and was worth $22 billion (Browning and Gerassi 212).
No wonder, then, that left-leaning writers and intellectuals were concerned over the
increasing gap between those with wealth and those who buttressed that wealth with the labor of
their backs during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Numerous examples of fiction
documenting the travails of the working class or the horrors of the expansive financial system
emerged during this time. Herman Melville's Bartleby, the Scrivener, for instance, critiques the
imposition of Wall Street upon human relationships and interaction. While the lawyer is incensed
and equally perplexed by the mysterious behavior of his scrivener, the reader gets the sense that
what Bartleby is denying is a set of conditions and values that places men like himself into
menial positions, separating them from non-professional forms of communion and from nature as
well. Melville was certainly not alone in his critique. In Life in the Iron-Mills, Rebecca Harding
Davis channels the disgust with such wealth disparity and deplorable labor environments in her
writing of what may stand as the first indictment of American capitalist culture – its conscious
“disarmament” of the common workingman or woman's means to improve their lives – by a
“naturalist” author in the U.S., nearly thirty years before the arrival of the naturalist generation of
the 1890s. In her tale, Harding Davis condemns those forces beyond his control that lead a
32

workingman like Wolfe to his ultimate demise. Wolfe is a lot like his tortured statue, the product
of industrial debris and dwindling hope – in other words, the product of his environment (not
unlike Bartleby). While the wealthy owners and investors can sojourn temporarily in this
environment, observing his work, Wolfe inhabits this spot permanently, and his desperation can
end in only one unfortunate result. Harding Davis, much like Zola, Norris, and Crane, wonders
what are the conditions that produce Wolfe's death and how might we remedy such conditions.
If Harding Davis and Melville witnessed the beginning of the mid-century economic
proliferation, then the later naturalists had even more material to work with after nearly half-acentury more of these traumatic economic booms and busts, coupled with the American
government's persistence in siding with the forces of industry often at the expense of the worker.
Furthermore, accelerated ethnic and cultural animosity influenced the general outlook of the
latter part of the century, as many “Anglo-Americans” harbored animus towards the rising
numbers of immigrants (men like Harding Davis's Wolfe), many of whom offered competition to
the American working class's access to jobs. Nativist propaganda and sentiment, coupled with
economic schizophrenia, only added to the general sense of unease looming as the country
drifted in uncertainty towards the twentieth century.
Amid these ethnic tensions and the social inequalities of an unchecked expansion of
capitalist economics was the sense shared by many intellectuals and everyday Americans alike
that the world was becoming more and more a “smaller” place, one in which the comfort offered
by traditional bonds of communal identification no longer held tight against things like
existential doubt about humanity's place in the cosmos, secularization, and perceived intrusion
upon conventional mores. The very idea of community itself comes under close scrutiny in
modernity, wherein economic relationships seem to characterize social relations rather than
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shared value systems or fellowship. 18 Emile Durkheim thought this remarkable phenomenon,
wherein the economic contract conditions the social relationships of individuals, the key problem
facing modern societies. 19 It's no wonder, then, that the first wave naturalists, such as Norris,
Crane, London, and Dreiser, thought the late nineteenth century in dire straits, individuals
constantly battered by and, as a result, detached from previous communal forms of comfort and
identification offered by such sources as religion and integral shared social values like the
integrity of individual choice, for instance. As a consequence, some writers sought new forms of
social attachment and cohesion that could be harmonized with the socioeconomic dynamics of
the capitalist market. In Social Criticism and Nineteenth-Century American Fictions, Robert
Shulman makes the case that much of mid- to late century American literature, from Melville to
Dreiser, is a direct response to this rift between individual and public largely created by the
forces of capitalist culture. For Shulman, the capitalist model usurps previous models of human
interaction:
Along with all the benefits of American capitalism, the underlying imperatives to
expand, to maximize profits, and to commodify relations – to make consumer and
commodity exchange relations the model for human relations – these powerful
tendencies have fragmented American society, whose divisions often reappear as
internal splits within individuals. (3)
The inevitable outcome of such internal division in the subject and in society becomes the source
18 Obviously modernity does not mark the death of traditional forms of community or conventional value systems.
The Enlightenment, capitalism, and industrialization, however, are things that mark a fundamental shift in Western
intellectual thought and culture, calling into question the ability of traditional values to consolidate communities
without inherent problems.
19 Durkheim solves this problem through his notion of the “cult of the individual.” However, as the critic Adam B.
Seligman points out in The Problem of Trust, Durkheim's solution here proves rather unsatisfactory. In fact,
according to Seligman, Durkheim simply re-articulates the bonds of pre-modern society rather than embracing
the difference of modernity.
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of inquiry for such writers as Dreiser, for instance, who examines self-fragmentation through the
workings of the market, where, according to Shulman, “the production and manipulation of
consumer needs were becoming integral” in absorbing the nearly overwhelming explosion of
goods (284). Pizer, for one, thinks naturalist fiction attempts to heal this fracture by drawing a
continuum between humanism and modern selfhood; this, however, might be a simplification of
naturalism's confrontation with capitalism, and it is not clear exactly how authors like Norris and
Crane wed humanist selfhood to the implications of modernity. A better alternative to attempting
to solve Pizer's dilemma might come in evaluating other responses to capitalism.
Responses to the problems mentioned above were not solely the domain of naturalism. In
fact, the century or two leading up to the naturalist moment saw multiple attempts to revitalize
conventional forms of identification in the wake of an increasingly fractured social world, where
individuals no longer enjoyed what was thought of (perhaps too romantically at times) the
relatively uniform social values of a pre-modern age. These attempts at consolidating the public
sphere and repairing modern communities must be examined as well, if we are to comprehend
fully naturalism's dialogue with ethical alternatives. Nineteenth century meliorism, often
indebted to Enlightenment beliefs in the necessity of social improvement (emphasis on reason,
effective modern governance, etc.), includes theories promulgating the bio-moral development
and evolution of human beings 20 (and, by extension, communities) and discourses of bourgeois
humanitarianism, predicated upon sympathy with those less fortunate. One example of such
20 By “bio-moral,” I mean those theories (influenced by pseudo-science) that often integrated what was thought to
be the implications of Darwin's thought into a narrative of biological and moral betterment. In fact, a whole
scientific and intellectual literature sprung up from such an outlook. Authors like Spencer and Stoppard
characterize this group. Not coincidentally, perceived negative moral behavior was often attached to physical
degeneracy at the time. The thinking is that higher physical types coincide with a developed moral sense.
Guarding oneself against physical and moral degeneracy, then, could lead to an improved society, particularly in
America, where racial and ethnic diversity could weaken the “American race” if left unchecked. Norris seems
influenced by such theories at times in his texts, particularly in McTeague and Vandover and the Brute.
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meliorism, in particular, is the capitalist byproduct of popular sentimentalism. By labeling this
school as a “byproduct” of capitalism, I mean to suggest that the movement often makes a
commodity out of emotion as a bid for making itself viable among an emerging middle class
readership and public that values what proves to be simplified ethical portraits (not requiring too
much out of the reader other than his or her sympathy and rewarding said reader for his or her
sympathetic identification in the process), contrary to the aims of philosophical sentimentalism,
which neither reduces moral response to a series of generic formulae, like weeping displays or
meretricious scenes of suffering, for instance, nor seeks egoistic gratification like its popular
counterpart. Ironically, popular sentimentalism plays a crucial role in shaping the aesthetics and
moral outlook of the naturalist school and, while popular sentimentalism certainly possesses its
merits, 21 the naturalists found its narratives of suffering and moral triumph flimsy, a
romanticization of ethics out of touch with real human problems. Perhaps no other popular
discourse weighed heavier upon the naturalist imagination than that produced by the
commodification of human relationships in popular sentimentalism. Even Harding Davis's early
naturalist text seems precariously torn between naturalist determinism and sentimentality, for
instance, obviously influenced by popular sentimentalism's attempt to resurrect traditional
community (in a world marked by commodity consumption) not so much through shared cultural
values as through the faculties of affect – those bonds that feel as if they connect us as human
beings at an emotional (or even instinctual) level and, significantly, those bonds that can easily
tug at the heartstrings of an emerging readership of middle class customers.
Before approaching popular sentimentalism and its various manifestations, it's important

21 Namely in its role in abolition and in exposing the plight of the urban working class. I'll discuss this in more
detail below.
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to note that sentimentalism is a multivalent discourse. While largely the product of an expanding
market and bourgeois culture, popular sentimentalism owes much of its moral outlook to
philosophical sentimentalism, although the two should not be conflated. Philosophical
sentimentalism arose in the Enlightenment and, in the minds of some Western intellectuals, was a
valuable way to counter two troubling developments: 1) the loss of social unity throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a result of modernization, and 2) the Enlightenment's
overbearing emphasis upon rational actors and free will. By cultivating sensibility, a heightened
ability to feel and to be affected, the individual could participate in a reinvigorated community
which found social bonds in sympathy and solidarity rather than economic (or rational)
transactions. One aspect of the Enlightenment, and the most well-known at that, was its
emphasis on reason – the assumption that principled and rational reasoning could facilitate social
bonds between human agents (fully aware of themselves and the world around them) and help
build a cohesive, well-functioning civil society. Such a view construes reason as the basis for
civic relationships and morality. Kant, for instance, thinks that the self can make judgments
about universal rights and behave accordingly. Moreover, as John Rawls states in his Lectures on
the History of Moral Philosophy, the social contract, for Kant, is a product of the “idea of reason
and as such it is nonhistorical” (364). Although Kant is not representative of all Enlightenment
idealists who stressed the potential of mind, we see how an emphasis on reason's perceived
universality influences ideas about human relationships. There is another component of the
Enlightenment, however, which was characterized by a reaction against the view that solidarity
could be achieved only through appeals to the universal applications of reason. Although still
empirical, this thought emphasized the principled use of our emotional faculties instead of
relying purely upon reason as moral motivation. Thinkers like the Earl of Shaftesbury, for
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example, stressed the integral role of the passions rather than the intellect in enabling affective
kinship among disparate agents, each consumed with his or her diverse interests and aims. Later
philosophers, such as David Hume and Adam Smith, take their moral cues from Shaftesbury,
claiming that altruistic human relationships could begin with moral sentiments and observations,
especially since, from this line of thought, reason alone cannot possibly serve as motivation to act
ethically. From the perspective of sentimentalism, humans are emotional beings – emotion
stands as our most basic reaction to stimuli and, for this reason, must possess some role in
morality. Contemporary critic Joseph Duke Filonowicz maintains that this assumption is the
product of observation and not without practical application. “[I]f self-convenience is the mold
that forms the grand majority of human actions,” he claims, “and if helping behavior, altruism, if
you will, does break the mold, however seldom or momentarily, then what motivates it must be
something that can actually burst the bubble of self-absorption that we all seem to wear around
our heads” (15-16). This “something” capable of bursting the bubble, for Filonowicz, is
emotional response. Human relationships cannot help but require and strain our emotional
potential and capabilities. “This is what appears to me to be happening when one individual
pauses to help another for his sake” (15), he writes. Understandably, sentimentalism meets stiff
resistance from those who think predicating ethics and moral response upon emotional impulse
leads to an obfuscation of the ethical demands placed upon us by others. Furthermore, many of
these same critics claim that sentimentalism is the product of an historically-conditioned
consciousness, the product of an emerging marketplace and bourgeois culture with its seeming
exaggeration of self-display. Filonowicz responds by pointing to the bias and naivety inherit in
such criticisms, as well as the fact that these views cannot escape history either:
Modern diffidence toward these earliest Moralists' enterprise betrays a
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phobia of antirationalism or subjectivism that is itself likely to be highly
historically conditioned. It perpetuates a misunderstanding of their thought as
well as an overly narrow and probably outmoded conception of the proper task of
ethics. (45)
Obviously, we cannot simply cast sentimentalism aside for its philosophical methodology nor its
far-reaching cultural influences, which made the cultivating of affect, from the perspective of the
first wave Sentimentalists (like Shaftesbury who writes at the turn of the eighteenth century), a
task of the utmost earnestness. In fact, the period between the mid eighteenth century and the
mid nineteenth century was marked by so-called “cults of sensibility,” as men and women alike
were encouraged to essentially “train” themselves to feel a heightened sense of things, to stir at
the call upon the heart and to feel deeply the demands of others. 22 “To be endowed with
sensibility in its most attractive…form,” claims Andrew Burstein in Sentimental Democracy: The
Evolution of America’s Romantic Self-Image, “meant to have an enlarged capacity to perform
benevolent deeds, to show affection readily, to shed tears and empathize strongly with human
suffering” (7). As Burstein notes regarding Shaftesbury's approach to the moral consolidation of
the public sphere, “[S]ociety was made strong and cohesive through the cultivation of intimate
connections, the natural, generous affections” (11). In a sense, sentimentalism is a practice that
seeks to secure community in a world becoming increasingly divided by enabling the natural
affections of human beings for society and charity, while also challenging those widening class
divisions produced by capitalism. Even while sentimentalism recognizes such things as poverty,
need, and social dissonance, the discipline cultivates the self as a moral foundation and center for

22 It's no accident that sentimentalism and humanitarianism develop largely in the middle class around the same
time.
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tackling such tasks, which can be dangerous and even subversive to its own project. Once
brought into society as a general principle of proper living and conduct, fellow-feeling moved

beyond a philosophical outlook and aspiration to become a cultural phenomenon and practice,
encouraging sensibility and an aesthetics of the self perhaps at the expense of social action. It's
not hard to see, then, how sentimentalism, a practice that calls for ethical motivation and selfdisplay, can lend itself easily to commodification in a burgeoning consumer market at the time.
Perhaps no other literature did more to influence actual social change in America as well
as elicit vitriolic detraction from its opponents than that of nineteenth-century sentimentalism.
Popular sentimentalism responded directly to the crisis of capitalism by identifying class
problems and divisions, condemning systems of slavery and free or low-wage labor, and
exposing such ills as dangerous working conditions and child labor. In order to enable this
critique, however, popular sentimentalism has been castigated for its aesthetic vacuity. The
movement utilizes an entire series of codified plots, characters, and developments – hardly
unpredictable and hardly original as the case most often seems. In fact, the genre's formulaic
typologies also codify ethics into a series of visible sufferings (often highly noticeable) and
appropriate responses that are either successful, or at least noble, on the behalf of characters
seeking to help. (If a response is lacking, then the tragedy of the situation and of the individual
weighs heavily upon readers' hearts and they feel the social failure that led to such a tragic
outcome.) Despite this codification, popular sentimentalism possesses a real capacity to initiate
social change and aid interpersonal interactions. We must not overlook the historical and cultural
significance of a novel like Uncle Tom's Cabin in American abolitionism, for instance, or
countless others for educating the reading public about the woeful labor conditions of numerous
American workers and the dire positions of their families. While recognizing the emotional
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fabrication frequently present in sentimentalist scenes, Jane Tompkins thinks that we should not
undervalue the impact of nineteenth-century popular sentimentalism. In Sensational Designs:
The Cultural Work of American Fiction 1790-1860, Tompkins argues that sentimental fiction
possesses the potential to connect the reader with political and cultural reality:
Once in possession of the system of beliefs that undergirds the patterns of
sentimental fiction, it is possible for modern readers to see how its tearful episodes
and frequent violations of probability were invested with a structure of meanings
that fixed these works, for nineteenth-century readers, not in the realm of fairy tale
or escapist fantasy, but in the very bedrock of reality. (127)
According to Tompkins, sentimentalist fiction engages readers in both the moral dilemmas and
social conflicts of the day, offering a system of codified approaches (an economical ethics, if you
will) that even the most uneducated readers still might recognize as carrying the utmost cultural
significance and, therefore, also recognize how to respond properly. For Tompkins, criticism that
denies sentimentalism's moral and aesthetic potential falls prey to socially and historically
contingent perspectives. “When critics dismiss sentimental fiction because it is out of touch with
reality,” Tompkins writes, “they do so because the reality they perceive is organized according to
a different set of conventions for constituting experience” (159-60). As Tompkins continues,
“The real naiveté is to think that that attack is launched from no perspective whatsoever, or that
its perspective is disinterested and not culture-bound in the way the sentimental novelists were”
(159-60). In other words, while detractors of sentimentalism find it limited by its historical
myopia, these critics, too, fail to realize how such a discourse could prove valuable within its
own time, even if it may seem weak and highly limited today.
Even so, opponents of sentimentalism have rightful cause in their argument with the
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cultural form, and this attack is no product merely of twentieth-century irony and historicism. As
early as Melville, some American authors and critics were identifying the inadequacies of
sentimentalism as an authentic moral response to human suffering. As already discussed,
Bartleby, the Scrivener attacks conventional forms of sympathetic identification on the part of
readers with characters, claiming that the emotional basis of such a connection is often induced
on false terms. One only has to look at the Lawyer's sense of charity and giving for Melville's
opinion of a popular morality fueled by the emotional sentiments of the self. On the European
side as well, authors like Gustav Flaubert condemn popular sentimentalism in its alliance with
bourgeois consumerism and morality. Madame Bovary scathingly critiques attempts to put
bourgeois sensibility and popular romanticism into fiction, often resulting in what Flaubert views
as a warped sense of reality. Such views of sentimental fiction share much in common with more
contemporary criticism. In The Feminization of American Culture, Ann Douglas argues that
sentimentalism stands completely oblivious to numerous sociopolitical realities.
“[S]entimentalism might be defined as the political sense obfuscated or gone rancid,” she states;
“Sentimentalism…never exists except in tandem with failed political consciousness. A relatively
recent phenomenon whose appearance is linked with capitalist development, sentimentalism
seeks and offers the distraction of sheer publicity” (254). For Douglas, sentimentalism is the
product of a consumer society that places surface (physical display and personal possessions)
above depth in not only its existential outlook but also in its art and cultural forms. As she states,
“Involved as it is with the exhibition and commercialization of the self, sentimentalism cannot
exist without an audience. It has no content but its own exposure, and it invests exposure with a
kind of final significance” (254). 23 There is a certain level of performativity in the production of
23 In “What is Sentimentality?,” June Howard argues that we need to move beyond the so-called “Douglas-
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sentimental characters, their acts the result of a mystification of real-world events in order to
elicit certain reader responses; such performances, then, also ask readers (albeit perhaps
indirectly) to exercise their performative capacities in response to the suffering of their fellows
by which a degree of falseness and even moral hedonism attaches itself to sentimental response.
The sentimental self is thus a performative piece, from such a perspective, and the extent to
which we may engage with others using authentic emotional response becomes much more
difficult when under the influence of a sentimental outlook. Although her criticism may at times
unfairly ignore sentimentalism's significant social gains, Douglas condemns sentimentalism for
its commercialization of human emotions in generic displays, which serves, in her mind, no other
purpose but inauthentic moral indulgence or egoism.
Offering such a glimpse into popular sentimentalism, rather than some other version of
nineteenth-century meliorism, may at first seem gratuitous, yet (while it may be no more
exceptional on its own than any other meliorist discourse) sentimentalism stands as possibly the
most significant aesthetic force in motivating the literary naturalists. 24 As discussed above, we
already know how influential romantic fiction was in developing the aesthetic of Norris, in
particular: those “vast” and “terrible” dramas that could shake us to the bone only by offering a
melodramatic depiction of the human state. Looking at a novel like Crane's Maggie: A Girl of
the Streets, we also see another example of the influence of romantic, popular, and sentimental

Tompkins” debate. For Howard, previous studies of sentimentalism have been reductive, frequently ignoring the
“systematic distinction between sentiment and nineteenth century domestic ideology” (63). Furthermore, not
only does our understanding of things like sentiment and sentimentality need a “transdisciplinary” approach, but
we also need to rid our arguments of an inherent gender-bias, associating sentimentalism with the domestic
fiction of some nineteenth century female authors. While I obviously see popular sentimentalism as misguided
(although well-intentioned), my argument has drawn a distinction between eighteenth century philosophical
sentimentalism and those popular discourses designed for marketable consumption by middle- (predominantly)
and lower class readers.
24 My apologies to the realism school of naturalist studies.
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fictions. Quite simply put, popular sentimentalism weighed preponderantly upon the figurative
shoulders of the early naturalists and, while its aesthetic may have had varying degrees of
popularity with individual naturalist authors, the significance of sentimentalism's moral outlook
cannot be understated. In popular sentimentalism, the naturalists witnessed a fiction that
completely denied the reality of social life under more advanced stages of capitalism, offering
what the naturalists perceived to be false terms of consolation. It is not surprising, then, that,
given readers' familiarity with such conventions and its cultural import, some naturalist authors
would use the formal traits of such a fiction in order to turn it on its head and direct our attention
to the actual implications of capitalism.
When we look at the work of Frank Norris and Stephen Crane, for example, we see how
an awareness of sentimentalism influences their work and outlook. We tend to think of the break
between naturalism and sentimentalism as complete, yet the line that divides the two schools is
much thinner than we may think. We often think of sentimentalism as subjective and sloppy,
naturalism as objective and deterministic, for example; however, the plot structures and
techniques of each school are not so easily proscribed. Texts like McTeague, Vandover and the
Brute, and Maggie: A Girl of the Streets often blur the line between sentimental and naturalist
fiction, much of sentimental literature's formulae serving to populate and animate the naturalist
world. The tragedy of the burly, dumb dentist that makes us feel intensely the travails of home
life; the plot of moral demise that spurs Vandover's life's direction; and the social isolation and
death of the down-on-her-luck young prostitute all risk submerging naturalist narrative below the
thin line separating it from the sentimental. Howard has discussed the affinities of naturalist and
sentimental fiction at some length, particularly focusing upon the notions of “home” and
“domesticity” in the two genres. In her opinion, both naturalism and sentimentalism share an
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innate obsession with the domestic. This obsession encourages the centrality of family in
sentimentalism but finds the family burdensome and overbearing in naturalism (178). Howard is
right in this regard, but her analysis needs expanding. Although critics like Tompkins cite
sentimentalism as a direct critique of capitalism (and, indeed, it's difficult to argue with her on
that point), the difference between the two school's respective social critiques is one of degree
and response. Unlike sentimentalism, naturalist authors share a suspicion of self-congratulatory
beneficence and what may very well be sheer self-satisfaction garnered from the process of
reading sentimentalist texts. What we find most shocking in sentimentalist literature naturalism
amplifies. The extent to which the naturalists emphasize the brutality of capitalism, its culture(s)
of false consolation (like sentimentalism), and our inability to find easy solutions overwhelms us
as readers – not so much to trigger consolatory emotions but to leave us with a sense of
abandonment as our previous moral and cultural discourses unravel. For writers like Norris,
Crane, and Dos Passos and West later, popular sentimentalism and rhetoric offer marketable
solutions, not real ones.
In the historical climate of late nineteenth century American capitalism – with its harsh
work environments and degrading living conditions for the urban poor, its unprecedented
obsession with commodities and fashionable consumer-display among an emerging middle class,
and its commercialized artforms and ethical approaches – it's easy to see how the groundwork
was laid for a new generation of authors and ethical thinkers in the literary naturalists. Changing
historical circumstances warranted a new approach to what increasingly seemed outmoded moral
systems. Meliorist discourses cannot be faulted for seeking human improvement and programs
of social betterment, yet we can criticize these for the direction pursued in attempting to achieve
such valuable goals. Furthermore, thinking about ethics from the perspective of the rational actor
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after Darwin becomes exponentially more difficult. It may be that we cannot really come to
terms with things like determinism (at least not on our own terms or principles); instead, we may
have to pursue an ethics that doesn't necessarily posit humankind's betterment as a given but,
rather, works with our actual conditions in order to improve our lot. We see now that the crisis of
capitalism, indeed the crisis that is the late nineteenth century at large, stands as a crisis in
morality, not altogether dissimilar from the moral crisis produced half-a-century later in the wake
of our learning about such places as Auschwitz. While Levinas writes in the aftermath of the
Holocaust – an era in which Adorno thought poetry now unthinkable, cruel, and barbaric – we
see the moral groundwork for such an ethics in the earlier thought of the American literary
naturalists, and both seem aware of the implications of popular sentimentalist thinking. In fact,
Levinas, naturalism, and sentimentalism all see suffering as center to their morality. Social and
existential conditions alike make life dangerous, traumatic, and harsh. Furthermore, all see
human emotion as a useful (and unavoidable) tool – we are all capable of connecting on some
emotional basis, and such a connection is not necessarily undesirable. We feel the tragedy of
McTeague and the Swede, no matter how despicable they may be, just as we feel the horrifying
shadow of the Holocaust in Levinas (and the desire to avoid such an event happening again) and
the need for solidarity with fellow human beings suffering under the duress of slavery or harsh
work environments in sentimentalism. Although this is the case, both the naturalists and Levinas
posit a discourse like popular sentimentalism as fundamentally unsuitable, its universalizing of
bourgeois emotion and selfhood eschewing the nature of human relationships. In fact, Levinas
helps us explain the amplified difference between the naturalist understanding of human emotion
and moral response with that of the sentimentalist. This need not imply a straight correlation
between the two camps, that Levinas was directly influenced by literary naturalism or that he
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read the aesthetic theory or cultural criticism of any one naturalist author; indeed, this is not what
I intend to suggest. Rather, in the works of the first generation American literary naturalists, we
find the origin of a unique ethical alternative that realizes articulation in Emmanuel Levinas,
whose work is precisely the place I would like to now turn.
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III. LEVINAS AND THE ETHICS OF TRAUMA
American literary naturalism asks something entirely different from its readers: it asks us to
completely push aside our previous assumptions about ourselves and our actions and how these
function together in the world. Sentimentalism, for instance, gives us a choice; it encourages us
to act out of some innate sense of our own goodness or charity. It also enacts humanist and
bourgeois precepts as universal law, and certainly there has to be fundamental flaws in any
system that defines emotion and feeling through its own unique set of cultural principles, like
Enlightenment or bourgeois sensibility. Not only does sentimentalism construct the self as
central to moral response, it defines the self as coherent in the process. Perhaps the self as a
unitary, fully-cognizant agent doesn't adequately describe our being, and because of this, perhaps
the de-centering of the self that we see in naturalism, for example, calls for a new approach to
moral conduct. If the self is no longer the key factor in moral duty and action – in other words, if
we cannot rely upon the self any longer as a moral agent who freely comes to the ethical
relationship and determines how he or she should proceed – then we should rightfully call for
some sort of alternative. Indeed, naturalism makes such a radical and controversial move, and,
while generations of critics have struggled to come to terms with naturalism's moral outlook,
Levinas offers us a useful and appropriate route towards understanding the naturalist dilemma
and unlocking its potential. Levinas may arrive as a theorist over half a century after the first
generation of naturalist authors, but his ethics are nonetheless a harsh (yet promising) response to
life in an age of modern turbulence and trauma, a fact that makes him directly relevant to any
discussion of American naturalism.
As I suggested earlier, Levinas provides a way for us to harmonize determinism with
responsibility, and this directly coincides with naturalism's construct of social obligation even if
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characters may initially seem absolved of responsibility. According to Levinas, the suffering of
others constitutes our own identity, making obligation inescapable; thus, ethics is the precondition of being and subjectivity. This is essentially what is meant by his famous mantra,
“Ethics before ontology.” By my having been born and brought into relations with others,
brought into society and, indeed, living in society, I am already given over to others: my
subjectivity is already pressed upon by others and they call me to their aid, defense, and
reckoning. Levinas is so persistent about the absolute demands placed upon us by subjectivity
that Critchley depicts Levinas's construct of being as neuroses:
Levinas describes the relation of infinite responsibility to the other as a trauma….
In short, the Levinasian ethical subject is a traumatic neurotic…. The point here is
that, for Levinas, the ethical demand is a traumatic demand, it is something that
comes from outside the subject, from a heteronomous source, but which leaves its
imprint within the subject. At its heart, the ethical subject is marked by an
experience of hetero-affectivity. In other words, the inside of my inside is
somehow outside, the core of my subjectivity is exposed to otherness. (61)
Levinas rejects the idea of a self-determining subject (one that traditional moral ideals are predicated
upon). Instead, he insists we are the product of our relations with others, our indebtedness to our
fellows as the basis of our being, our living in the world of others. While Levinas's notion of

determinism may not be one that confirms conventional notions of social and biological
determinism (for instance, Levinas thinks us still capable of actions that are intentional, of our
own volition, rather than merely instinctual), 25 his notion of subjectivity positions the self in a

25 Even intention is something that Levinas occludes, however. We are granted our intentions, but these conscious
actions are on the side of the self and not the other, according to Levinas. Intention doesn't matter so much in the
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veritable matrix of impressions, words, and commands that others press upon us. This is a setting
we cannot escape because it is the condition of our being and consciousness. Levinas's ethical
approach therefore cannot start with the self. Levinas posits the ego as uncomfortable and
unsettled in the ethical relationship. This is because ethics do not belong to the self, the “I,” or
the “Me,” but, rather, belong to the other, the indescribable and mysterious.
Levinas's intellectual project is marked by an attempt to subvert what he sees as the
impoverished trajectory of Western philosophy over the last century with its construct of Being.
In particular, much of the epistemological and ontological conceptions of modern philosophy,
according to Levinas, tend to favor a one-dimensional understanding of the self and its position
in the world (one that positions the self as facilitator and arbiter), rather than one that finds the
self's position far more precarious and complex, subject to the indelible impressions left by
others. In his philosophical predecessors, most notably Husserl (transcendental idealism) and
Heidegger (ontological hermeneutics), Levinas finds a neglect of proper metaphysics, leaving
philosophy, according to Levinas, to misguided conceptions about the self's relations with others
and avoiding the true extent of the self's vulnerability in the world. As Levinas claims, practices
like Western ontology ignore the preeminence of the other in its relationship with the “I.”
Ontology, according to Levinas, consumes otherness into concepts that esteem the self and
sameness above all – that is, the manner in which consciousness confronts the world and
appropriates objects. For instance, in Levinas's mind, Husserl's phenomenology only approaches
the world as an estimation of the self, rather than completely separate and invulnerable – an
appropriating outlook that construes the self as the center of the epistemological, and even moral,

Levinasian formulation as what is required out of us by the other. Ethics starts with the other and not our own
intentions. In fact, intention is antithetical to ethics in Levinas.
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universe. “Ontology, which reduces the other to the same,” he states, “promotes freedom – the
freedom that is the identification of the same, not allowing itself to be alienated by the other” (TI
42).
According to Levinas, consciousness and being cannot reach a point of objectivity (the
goal of phenomenology, for example), a point from which the world may be subject to the self
instead of the other. 26 Instead, the self is immersed in a dynamic world of otherness, of
unfamiliarity and instability – a position that makes subjectivity precarious and demanding. I
may think myself to be completely and literally “myself,” but I am not aware of the impressions
left there by others or of the ephemeral nature of every attempt I make at extracting something
from others, extracting some notion or concept that I can locate in order to make her more
familiar and comfortable to me. In fact, the other calls me to approach her on her own terms. “A
calling into question of the same,” claims Levinas, “which cannot occur within the egoist
spontaneity of the same – is brought about by the other” (TI 43). For these reasons, Levinas
thinks that philosophy, and ethics most importantly, has been too focused on the self rather than
otherness, the acknowledgment of which should be the proper aim of morality:
We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other
ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and
my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my
spontaneity, as ethics. (TI 43)
Ethics precedes ontology for Levinas. Ethics places the freedom of the I, the self that is at home
in its comfort and “promiscuous freedom” (the chez soi, as Levinas calls it), under harsh scrutiny,
26 My use of the term “other” is not necessarily meant to place my work in conjunction with postmodern notions of
selfhood and otherness, although “other” here does indeed suggest an “outside” of the self that is completely
foreign, strange, and troubling to the so-called “integrity” of the self.
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calling this freedom into question. Instead, the I must step forward in order to account for itself
before another who totally breaks apart every notion of obligation and duty we may have
previously possessed – the face of the other 27 that exceeds every capacity of my understanding.
The other exceeds definition so much so that reaching a point from which I may feel satisfied in
fulfilling my duty onto him is an impossibility in Levinas. The only means by which I approach
him in earnest and responsibly is through the act of speaking, in what Levinas calls the “saying.”
Giving signifyingness, as Levinas describes it, in the form of saying, however, requires a
vulnerability and a passivity that strips the self of any authority, completely prostrating the self
before the unbearable presence of the other. This ethical asymmetry places the other in a position
that is far beyond any capacity the self may possess – it commands a supererogatory giving out
of the self that establishes it firmly in a relationship marked by non-reciprocity.
Before we get too engrossed in the specifics of Levinasian ethical duty, we should back
up to see exactly how he arrives at such a perspective. While Levinas's ethics may be tersely
summarized as an infatuation with the preeminence of the other (an other-centric philosophy),
there are two key traits of his thought that I see as indispensable if we are to fully come to terms
with the precedent he sets for the other. Foremost, Levinas's ethics is haunted by the Holocaust.
As a Jewish man who managed to escape murder in the camps and elsewhere during the war,
Levinas never forgot those victims that passed in the name of a warped modern rationalism and,
although he never directly refers to the Holocaust or its victims, we are aware of its implications
in his use of metaphor and misdirection, that part of his ethical vocabulary distinguished by a

27 Levinas cites the face as the finite manifestation of infinity and transcendence. While the face is human, it also
belongs to the infinite, that which gives us our unique personality and humanity, none of which may be
consumed by another. Levinas's ethics is often bathed in the language of mysticism and theology, a fact that
owes much to his Jewish ancestry and religious upbringing.
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resort to terms invoking trauma, suffering, and exhaustion. The second aspect, and one that is
often overlooked, is the amount of attention Levinas devotes to subjectivity and the self in its
vulnerability and exposure even though the other is given a superior position in the ethical
relationship. This is a construct of subjectivity that cannot be neglected if we are to sincerely
confront Levinas's argument concerning the primacy of the other.
Levinas finds the Good in subjectivity, in the obligation to the other that is a part of being
and yet works against the subject's will and intention. 28 Before the I (as Levinas is sometimes
given to naming subjectivity) can come to a recognition of this responsibility, however, it resides
in a world of comfort, what Levinas calls its “promiscuous freedom” and “atheist separation.”
Alone in its interiority (its sense of what is I from what is not-I), the self takes advantage of its
“freedom” and separation, its break from participation with others. In the theological terms 29 to
which he frequently resorts, Levinas describes this break as the work of the atheist subject who
refuses (whether consciously or not) God and the Infinite. “One lives outside of God, at home
with oneself,” he claims, “one is an I, an egoism. The soul, the dimension of the psychic, being
an accomplishment of separation, is naturally atheist. By atheism we thus understand...the
breaking with participation by which the I posits itself as the same and as I” (TI 58). For
Levinas, “atheism” is not only a separation from God but also a separation from the world as
inhabited by others; instead, this atheist separation provides the self with an inauthentic sense of
wholeness and egoist freedom as the self resides within the chez soi, or the “home” seemingly

28 In Otherwise than Being, Levinas claims that the Good authorizes not only subjectivity but freedom as well
because the Good determines obligation to the other despite the self's will (10-11).
29 Levinas's use of theological language does not stand as a religious prescription or diagnosis however.
Furthermore, I do not necessarily think that his understanding of atheism is purely theological or religious (in
other words, meant to describe religious belief), although it is certainly indebted to such a notion of God and
separation. Rather, atheism in Levinas describes the inherent condition of subjectivity that is a neglect of its
responsibility to the other (and to God, since the other is a finite manifestation of Infinity).
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offered us by notions like free will and conventional responsibility (the sense of only being
responsible directly for one's own actions). According to Levinas, such a subjectivity approaches
the world of others through a blindness that both appropriates otherness into the same (into
concept through the work of consciousness) and prohibits the self from realizing the presence of
otherness in being. Whereas being and consciousness may seem completely my own, I am not
aware of the other that is always already before me, in my presence and an obstacle to my ability
to gain leverage over the world and make it my own. In practical terms, the presence of other
people in my life, the demands they place upon me and the inscrutability of their subjectivity,
upset every capacity I may think I possess for making myself comfortable by extracting
something from them (say, based upon their personal appearance or dialect) or avoiding
obligation (even if it may not be immediately clear how I may be responsible for them). Despite
every attempt I make at proscribing others with categories, with essence (essentialism), these
individuals simply will not allow me. This disempowerment of my subjective capacities, while
belonging to the authority the other wields over me, does not, however, completely isolate
subjectivity from the Good or the Transcendent (as stated above). This cannot be reiterated
enough: for Levinas, transcendence is “otherwise than being,” and subjectivity belongs to the
otherwise than being in its responsibility for the other and inability to ascribe essence.
Subjectivity is responsibility for the other; as promiscuity it is a rejection of ethics but as itself (in
other words, what it really is), it is a complete disavowal of the self's powers. As an invitation
from the other, it is a part of the Good.
The Goodness of my selfhood can come only in my obligation to others. This obligation,
however, comes before any thought or intention I have given towards them. For this reason,
Levinas claims that obligation is the pre-ontological, without origins, meaning that obligation
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comes before being and intention – is is non-reflective and is always already present in my
existence. In “Rethinking Justice: Levinas and Asymmetrical Responsibility,” Sara E. Roberts
claims that the pre-ontological obligation of the Levinasian self is best understood as a position
wherein “I find myself involved with others in the moment of finding myself.... [T]he self is best
understood as a kind of responsibility to and for the other” (6). The pre-ontological condition of
responsibility serves as the bedrock for Levinas's approach to ethics. The basis of our
subjectivity is already an obligation to others that we do not arrive at on our own but to which we
are commanded. It is therefore an obligation without origins, at least from a conventional
perspective (e.g., utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, etc.). Levinas has the following to say about the
pre-ontological, pre-original necessity of subjectivity and ethics:
The responsibility for the other can not have begun in my commitment, in my
decision. The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself comes from the
hither side of my freedom, from a 'prior to every memory,'...from the non-present
par excellence, the non-original, the an-archical, prior to or beyond essence. The
responsibility for the other is the locus in which is situated the null-site of
subjectivity. (OB 10)
Subjectivity is a product of Goodness, but it is also nullified in its promiscuity by the command
of the other. “Goodness is always older than choice,” Levinas claims, “the Good has always
already chosen and required the unique one” (OB 57). For Levinas, we cannot conflate intention
and ethical commitment. The other determines our obligation, not us. What appears to be our
own intentional action in the ethical relationship has already been mandated by the other. This
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obviously sounds strange, 30 but Levinas's point is that our obligation has already been
determined, and we are infinitely obligated – no single response to the suffering of the other can
satiate all of the demands she places upon me. Because my subjectivity is defined in such a
capacity, this means that I am extremely vulnerable and exposed; in other words, I stand naked
before the presence of the other. My ethical relationship with the other cannot be deferred nor
can it be satisfied. This relationship requires an obligation that is beyond any idea I may possess
of commitment – it is a duty that points to the particularity of moral response, the fact that each
need requires its own unique address and that each individual that needs me requires a particular
response rather than one tailored through a systematic understanding of ethics. In “Ethics,
Religiosity and the Question of Community in Emmanuel Levinas,” Thomas A. Carlson
characterizes Levinasian obligation as a commandment that is addressed to us all but completely
unique in its individual cases; we are all addressed but singularly, and each person that addresses
us commands a different response. “Like my death in Heidegger,” Carlson states, “which no one
can take over for me, my responsibility in Levinas signals what is most mine and what is mine
alone. Insofar as I am responsible, I am singular, and, indeed, only insofar as singular can I be
responsible” (60). This means that the self is engaged with the other in a capacity that cannot be
represented nor can it be systematized. The Goodness of subjectivity comes in its inherent
obligation to the other, a duty which cannot be represented by normative approaches to ethics;
instead, an approach is required that demands the absolute degradation of the self before the
presence of the other.
This approach to ethics may seem abstruse, obscure, and demanding. In fact, it is.

30 This, however, makes perfect sense as Levinas's project is to make ethics strange, to estrange us from
conventional notions of ethical action.
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Levinas balks at normative assumptions about the relationship between the I and the you
deliberately in order to demonstrate the necessity for a radical revision of moral conduct. There
is no moral regiment or code of conduct (an ought) that Levinas offers us. We have learned
about Levinasian subjectivity and its centrality to his ethics; we have also found that his approach
remains entirely unconventional. However, it remains to be proven how Levinas's ethics might
be utilized. What is ethical experience according to Levinas, and how might we use it to address
moral dilemmas? Most importantly, how can we, as individuals, utilize Levinasian ethics in a
manner that can serve us in our day-to-day ordeals, those encounters we may face in practice and
not simply in the theory of a philosophical treatise? The answer to these questions is not simple,
nor is it completely definitive, although Levinas's response does provide us with an incomplete
(and rightfully so) option 31 that prepares us for the overwhelming demands of human suffering as
well as the difficulty in preparing any sort of moral response to alleviate this suffering. This is,
however, not to say that Levinas neglects suffering or its demands; in fact, he takes these things
very seriously, which explains the difficulty he finds in addressing such matters. After all, any
system that professes to understand human suffering completely and, most significantly, to offer
us a solution to its alleviation – to offer a palliative of sorts – underestimates the extent of
suffering from his point of view. Levinas's great achievement is his recognition of not only the
extremity of human suffering but the overwhelming demands we place upon others through our
infinite needs.
The experience of ethics in Levinas requires an absolute giving. In other words, what we
31 Levinas provides us with an option. What else would be the point of developing an ethics? However, this option
is not one that provides us with definite answers and solutions to moral dilemmas. To provide such a response
would be antithetical to his project, which seeks to refute those theorists who systematize ethics by developing
codified solutions. Instead, Levinas' option is “incomplete,” one that refuses systematization but also provides us
some insight into our conventional notions of responsibility and action.
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are to give according to Levinas is far more than what we could imagine; indeed, it is even more
than what we are capable of giving. Despite what may seem like the obvious and justified
critiques of this approach for its apparent impracticality, Levinas does not wish for this revelation
to lead to despair. On the contrary, he hopes that such an ethics can lead to honesty as well as
overcome what he considers the misdirection (those otherwise disingenuous ways in which
“ethics” tells us we can address every moral question) of conventional ethical approaches. While
traditional forms of response may command particular actions or approaches, frequently
conflating normativity with obligation, Levinas tends to clothe his ethics in more ambivalent
terms, ones that hopefully complicate our ability to summarize the suffering of the other into a
universal solution. However, this does not mean that Levinas provides us with any gesture
towards how we may derive some sort of proper action.
In Levinas, ethics originates in the fact of suffering. The experience of ethics (the
dilemmas we experience and must act upon), on the other hand, is predicated upon the sense of
one's own responsibility. In other words, ethics starts with the other, but action is commanded
out of the self who owes a limitless amount. For Levinas, shame and guilt are the routes by
which the self may come into the presence of the other denuded and willing to give. The
experience of the self's conscience before the other is a movement of what Levinas calls
“metaphysical desire,” a desire that wishes for more than anything than can possibly promise it
completion (a notion similar to Lacan; however, its origins are not from any lack or need):
The metaphysical desire does not long to return, for it is desire for a land
not of our birth, for a land foreign to every nature, which has not been our
fatherland and to which we shall never betake ourselves. The metaphysical desire
does not rest upon any prior kinship. It is a desire that can not be satisfied. (TI 3358

34)
Metaphysical desire seeks beyond the possibility of completion: it is a desire that recognizes the
impossibility of completion and seeks that which takes the I out of its comfort zone. Such a
desire can only be one that makes the I uncomfortable within its own home and alienates us from
the chez soi. It is a desire that is spontaneous and insatiable – it does not belong to the I; it calls
my freedom into question. Levinas claims that the other “is desired in my shame” (TI 84), a
desire that is the experience of moral consciousness as well as a recognition of my freedom as an
injustice. Moral conscience and desire for the other are thus a coming-into-awareness of my
cruelty as an “atheist” subject. Levinas has the following to say about the experience of
conscience:
Conscience welcomes the Other. It is the revelation of a resistance to my
powers that does not counter them as a greater force, but calls in question the
naïve right of my powers, my glorious spontaneity as a living being. Morality
begins when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary
and violent. (TI 84)
For Levinas, the freedom of the I is a perpetuation of injustice. Only when I arrive at a
recognition of my freedom as an injustice can I begin to come to the other in a manner of giving
and sacrifice. When I welcome the other in shame and guilt, I realize the violence perpetrated
against alterity (otherness) by my freedom as the atheist chez soi. Levinas calls this welcoming
whereby the self's freedom proves vulnerable “as-sociation.” According to Levinas, as-sociation
is a non-a priori, or conceptless, experience of the other through conscience. “If we call a
situation where my freedom is called in question conscience,” he argues, “as-sociation or the
welcoming of the Other is conscience.... [I]n conscience I have an experience” of the other “that
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is not commensurate with any a priori framework – a conceptless experience. Every other
experience is conceptual, that is, becomes my own or arises from my freedom” (TI 100). My
experience of conscience belongs to the other; it is an experience that exposes my injustice and a
move that refuses to consume his or her particularity. The experience of my guilt and shame
before another individual marks the power the other wields over me – I have no way to
comprehend this power, nor any recourse for dissembling her strangeness. “The welcoming of
the Other is ipso facto the consciousness of my own injustice – the shame that freedom feels for
itself” (TI 86). Conscience proves the means by which the self comes to a recognition of its
responsibility and its previous neglect of the other, but it is in the manifestation of the face of the
other before the self that we must give an account and address our responsibility with what
Levinas calls “signifyingness.”
The face, that image of absolute alterity that belongs to the other, calls me forward. The
face belongs to the other as a “manifestation” of Infinity as well as institutes ethical interchange
and communicative interaction. For Levinas, the face is the finite apparition of the Infinite. In
Toward the Outside: Concepts and Themes in Emmanuel Levinas, Michael B. Smith has the
following to say about the relationship between the face and Infinity, which Levinas characterizes
as a relationship between the trace and presence:
The concept of the “face,” which indicates the presence of alterity, is the
mediating concept by which the infinite is manifested in and to the finite. But the
term “manifested” is not the proper term for any effect or action on the part of the
infinite, since the latter is characterized by lack of manifestation. A demotion to
the status of being would alter its quality of infinity. This is perhaps why Levinas
develops the idea of “the trace,” a more discreet form of evidence of the presence
60

of the infinite within the finite. (35-36)
Perhaps it is best to think of the face as an apparition of the Infinite – Infinity is there yet not
there. Nonetheless, the face is indeed there, right before us, physical, alone, and suffering. The
most crucial encounter, according to Levinas, is that of “the face to face.” In this encounter,
which presupposes language, an opportunity for communion is offered the self in her obligation
and responsibility to the other. The face is already speaking to the self, already instituting
discourse even before a word is spoken. “The face is a living presence,” writes Levinas, “it is
expression. The life of expression consists in undoing the form in which the existent, exposed as
theme, is thereby dissimulated. The face speaks. The manifestation of the face is already
discourse” (TI 66). The face already speaks and in its appearance refuses any capacity the I
possesses for conceptualization, for converting the other into concept and form. The other
dissembles conceptualization even despite the I's effort to convert him into theme in language.
The face speaks through and beyond all forms that would otherwise attempt to limit its
particularity and strangeness. Levinas characterizes the face and its powers as an “overflowing”:
The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in
me, we here name face.... The face of the Other at each moment destroys and
overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure and
to the measure of its ideatum – the adequate idea.... It expresses itself. (TI 50-51)
This overflowing not only establishes the other as supreme in his radical alterity but exceeds
even my capability for power. “The expression the face introduces into the world,” writes
Levinas, “does not defy the feebleness of my powers, but my ability for power” (TI 198). The
expression of the face dissimulates any image or form I may possess that would aid me in my
account, that would help me make myself more comfortable and at home in the ethical
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relationship. In other words, the face that attends his own speech resists what Levinas deems
“vision” – the desire of the self to locate the speaker, the other, in an image of familiarity. For
Levinas, ethics is the opposite of home, of being at home – it is the strange, the unfamiliar, that
which ravishes me. The presence of the face makes the world uncommon, un-homelike,
according to Levinas, because it disrupts the self's desire for sameness. “The Other remains
infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign,” he claims, “his face in which his epiphany is produced
and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be common to us” (TI 194). This
expression, this epiphany, this alienation of the self from home: this is the burden that the
encounter with the face institutes, and it demands the I respond as an ethical subject.
The face commands ethical response; it commands the I to approach the other in the
capacity of a responsible speaking subject, as a signifyingness, rather than one that would defer
this opportunity to means that avoid the gravity of the situation. In language, in the act of
speaking, we offer something up – we push our chips forward, so to speak. The outcome of this
gamble, however, is never certain and, for Levinas, there are proper ways to take our risks as well
as those that, while perhaps offering us more security against our initial bets, only delay the
inevitability of our losses. The work of metaphysical desire approaches the other through
language, explaining precisely why our participation in language can be such a risky and
dangerous ordeal. Arriving at an ethics of language in Levinas requires the establishment of a
dialogic relationship, one that places us in a conversation that cannot be dissuaded by a third
party, whatever that may be (rhetoric, sophistry, demagogy, etc.). In Altared Ground: Levinas,
History, and Violence, Brian Schroeder writes that language in Levinas “institutes the
metaphysical (ethical) relation.... The ethical self is desirous of the Other, not for the sake of
possession or dominance, but to formulate a dialogical relation” (108). According to Levinas,
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metaphysical desire for the otherwise than being not only deracinates the self from its freedom
but also makes the self open to the inquiry of the other. Language is one of the primary forces by
which this dynamic happens. “The relation between the same and the other, metaphysics,”
Levinas claims, “is primordially enacted as conversation [discourse], where the same, gathered
up in its ipseity as an 'I,' as a particular existent unique and autochthonous, leaves itself” (TI 39).
Language requires the self to give response, a response that is a giving over of the self as the
other stands waiting; it is a giving over that cannot be deflected and one that places the self in
conversation. 32 As conversation, language takes the I out of its comfort zone as it firmly places
him or her in a relationship that demands address:
Conversation, from the very fact that it maintains the distance between me
and the Other, the radical separation asserted in transcendence which prevents the
reconstitution of totality, cannot renounce the egoism of its existence; but the very
fact of being in a conversation consists in recognizing in the Other a right over this
egoism, and hence in justifying oneself. (TI 40)
In conversation, we are addressed by another human being who, while retaining her particularity,
demands of me a response, a direct engagement in the dynamism of the spoken word. This
address, as I would argue, is not only the address that comes from the other in the greeting, in
what Levinas calls the “Hello,” but is also the metaphysical invitation to consciousness and
subjectivity offered to the I by otherness. In both forms of address, we are commanded to
respond. As humans, we exist in a world that welcomes us, in the language of Levinas, to

32 Levinas distinguishes between two types of conversation: speaking and rhetoric. He also makes two distinctions
in language: the said and saying. While conversation primarily preoccupies his study of language in Alterity and
Transcendence, the said and saying do not take precedence until Otherwise than Being. I will have more to say
about these distinctions below.
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conscious experience. This is a coming-into-awareness through the dynamism of language and
discursive engagement. “Discourse is not simply a modification of intuition (or of thought),”
writes Levinas, “but an original relation with exterior being” (TI 66). Even though this
engagement may be a welcoming or an invitation, as Levinas claims, it is nonetheless an
encounter that requires an absolute giving over of the self, interlocution that demands my
vulnerability and “nudity” as I have no recourse to a language or response that can thoroughly
“speak” the other or fully resolve his needs. By speaking to me, my interlocutor disrupts
whatever power I may possess towards mastery, enjoyment, or knowledge and understanding.
And in responding, in my address to the other, I stand naked before them, absolutely devoid of
any systematic approach 33 that might aid me and help solve his ills, a fact that, for Levinas,
ironically makes ethics possible.
In language I am exposed to the blow of otherness, a hit that knocks me completely off
balance. The other needs a response in which the I approaches in the manner of “saying,” or a
sincere discursive encounter that engages the other's suffering. Attempting to circumvent such an
obligation, however, takes language to the form of “the said.” Such language is a refusal of
engagement and seeks to dislodge the self from the ethical relationship by resorting to statements
that are declarative, “definitive,” and deflecting. In other words, language that avoids the
sincerity of the ethical moment but also attempts to offer the self comfort by making the world
familiar in the manner of totality (language or systems that consume otherness by avoiding
otherness). As Schroeder explains, “The said is language which makes propositional statements
or declarations about the truth and falsity of an event or thing” (111). The said is thus an attempt

33 Indeed, Levinas thinks the systematization of ethics, or its codification, a disingenuous regard for the demands
other individuals place upon us.
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at making the dyad that is the ethical relationship into a triadic (third-party) one; the said desires
to avoid the dyadic and dialogic encounter between the other and the I by deflecting the energy of
this dynamic into “dead” propositions (that expect reciprocity) or assumptions about alterity. As
Critchley claims, deferring the dyadic relationship to the third-person disrupts the experience of
the other in her alterity and is a move towards symmetry and equality, hiding from the
asymmetry that is the relationship between the other and the I (59-60). In deferring
responsibility, the said seeks to make the world common, to place a veil before the presence of
the face and reinforce (albeit illusory) my sense of mastery, freedom, and knowledge. According
to Levinas, the said is therefore aligned with Being. “The birthplace of ontology is in the said,”
he states (OB 42).
With saying, however, we give an offering in the manner of speaking to and engaging
with the other. Rather than making triadic statements about the world or our interlocutor, rather
than speaking about otherness, saying is a direct response to the other. 34 Saying attempts to open
up the world and open up to otherness in a speaking that unravels in time, making every effort of
authentically responding to the other who constantly dissembles the image I have of him even as
he stands before me. Saying is therefore multiplicity and movement, the “very signifyingness of
signification,” as Levinas claims, the responsibility that “is put forth in the foreward,” in the

34 Although saying is ethical language, according to Levinas, saying is teleologically directed towards the said.
While this does not mean that the said takes precedent or priority over the saying, it does mean that, for Levinas,
saying inevitably becomes the said. As soon as the act of speaking takes place, saying “is betrayed in the said
that dominates the saying which states it” (OB 7). In other words, saying attempts to engage with otherness in
the particularity of the moment but in doing so cannot help but eventually lose traction, so to speak, as the
demands that the other places upon the speaking subject will constantly be changing. I like to think of this
concept as I would Heraclitus's example of the river that can never be stepped in twice. Even once the foot is in
the river, the river has already changed and taken on an entirely new presence. Nonetheless, Levinas thinks that
saying goes beyond essence and is bound with diachrony. The saying is aligned with diachrony in its resistance
to history and memory – the desire for things like synthesis and the synchronization of the same. For Levinas,
the diachronic nature of the saying is outside of being.
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address (OB 5). Saying requires a giving signifyingness that, while an “unblocking of
communication,” is the very vulnerability of exposure. “It is the risky uncovering of oneself, in
sincerity,” Levinas writes, “the breaking up of inwardness and the abandon of all shelter,
exposure to traumas, vulnerability” (OB 48). Saying uproots the self from the comfort of the
chez soi and places the self in a gut-wrenching interchange with the other that is a vulnerability
unlike any other.

“The one is exposed to the other,” argues Levinas, “as a skin is exposed to

what wounds it, as a cheek is offered to the smiter” (OB 49). The most passive form of passivity,
in the words of Levinas, saying denudes the self before the unbearable presence of the other;
saying is the “for-the-other” of speaking that seeks to give an account, that seeks to respond even
under the extreme duress of ethical asymmetry.
Such a response and such an inequality in the ethical relationship point to the traumatic
nature of ethics in Levinas. The ethical encounter is a violent one, 35 and the speaking
subjectivity that comes to the other in the manner of saying is one that is very uncomfortable and
unstable, one that is held hostage in his or her responsibility to the other. The notion that acting
ethically can be violent, or describing responsibility in figurative language we might typically
tend to only set aside for the most harrowing and traumatic events, takes Levinasian ethics out of
any conventional moral framework we possess. In Levinas, responsibility and obligation are
preeminent – these stand above any other characteristic of my subjectivity, above anything else
that I am capable of delivering. This makes my duty unto the other excessive and the fulfillment
of my ethical capacity a meaningless concept. For Levinas, ethics is supererogatory, a brutally
exacting set of infinite demands that can never be fulfilled nor responded to quite appropriately.
35 The violence the I perpetuates against the other as a form of its atheist separation and freedom should not be
confused with the violent nature of the ethical relationship. The violence of the atheist self is injustice, while the
violence of the ethical encounter offers justice in the prospect of responsibility.
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Spargo claims that this notion of duty points to Levinas's singularity in the world of moral
philosophy. “In Levinasian responsibility, we venture outside the permissible limits of
exteriority's obligating force (for instance, as Kantian duty) to find ourselves,” he writes,
entrenched in a obligation to the other that exceeds anything “we imagined, subjects suddenly not
to obligations of our choosing but, rather, to what lies beyond our culturally self-limiting
constructs of obligation” (17). Ethics, in Levinas, is a traumatism precisely because my duty to
the other can never be fulfilled and every capacity I may possess for response is exceeded by her
commands and needs. It is an asymmetry that cannot be renegotiated and defines the condition
of ethical subjectivity. In a sense, ethics can be thought of as a mouse running the wheel and
possibly thinking he's really going somewhere, or even Sisyphus endlessly pushing the boulder
up the hill only to watch it roll back down over and over again. These are duties that are beyond
any capacity the mouse or Sisyphus may possess for fulfillment. And such is ethics for Levinas.
The ethical self is obsessed with alterity, an obsession that takes it to the brink of ethical
neuroses, a “disorder” that is irrevocable and relentless. The self can neither be satisfied in its
relationship to the other (the object of obsession) nor can it satiate those demands placed upon it
by the other.
Thinking of ethical subjectivity and ethics as neuroses raises two key concerns, however.
If subjectivity is defined in such a capacity, then perhaps there is no means by which the self is
ever really itself. Perhaps we should even think of the self as the null-site of ethics in Levinas.
This, of course, contrasts sharply with other approaches to ethics, wherein the self must be what
we might call a negotiable presence – that is, a coherent, autonomous agent capable of rational
decision-making and intentional action, a self that could be trusted in any so-called decent theory
of ethics. Furthermore, one might wonder what options we might have for acting ethically in a
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world where we seemingly have no answers, can never fulfill our ethical responsibility, and,
indeed, this responsibility voids even the notion of free will and intention. What is the point of
ethics in such a world, and how should we act? More pointedly, how can we act at all? Levinas's
understanding of selfhood and ethics can understandably be highly frustrating; it is not only
abstruse and enigmatic but leaves us with no moral plan, no systematic approach that can give
individuals definitive guidance in a world marked by chaos and crises however small. While
legitimate questions (and I think significant ones), these are really of no consequence for
Levinas, whose other-centric ethics is marked by anti-presence (anti-Being). Such questions,
according to Levinas, are nullified by the metaphysical relationship of the self and the I – the
ethical relationship that calls me and makes me responsible even before my intention. Free will
has no place in the Levinasian vocabulary: ethics come before ontology. We are not to designate
one action as right or another as wrong, nor are we to think of our responsibility as something
that can be addressed through the will. Further, Levinas offers us no systematic approach
precisely because doing so would consume otherness and the absolute particularity of the ethical
moment. Any approach to ethics that starts with a system starts with the self, according to
Levinas, and such an ethics does violence against the other. People around me are constantly
changing, constantly eluding my grasp. To think that I can grasp this image of otherness and
keep it, commune with it, and address all its needs is a disservice to moral thought, in Levinas's
opinion. While this may be disconcerting to many, Levinas's approach defines ethics as an
exposure to extreme alterity, and the inability to act “appropriately” in any case retains the radical
particularity of the other. Levinas does not offer us a plan because doing so would eliminate the
other. We must understand that ethics is a process (and a gritty one at that) rather than Being.
Although elusive and intentionally vague, perhaps Levinas's ethics is the only one suitable for a
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modern world 36 marked by such things as capitalism, mass media and culture, and the Holocaust
– in other words, a world marked by constant flux, inexplicable trauma, and relentless chaos.
In the ethical relationship, I find myself completely and utterly disheveled, an existential
slop before the presence of the other whose burden presses down upon me unlike any other.
Obligation, for Levinas, is infinite and overwhelming; it takes the self out of its comfort – it is the
not-at-home. Like Levinas, literary naturalism often finds a self who is “not-at-home,” a self that
is isolated, battered, torn, harried, discomfited, and inexorably confused by a world in turbulent
motion. Rather than construe this deracination of the self from a world that ultimately makes
sense as a denial of existential significance, we should interpret naturalism's anxieties as fertile
ground for ethical potential. Levinas provides the clearest way for us to locate this potential. For
naturalism, obligation and responsibility exceed any conventional notion of duty that we might
possess as the ethical encounter provides us with no resort, no guide for how we should proceed.
Neither naturalism's seeming deterministic vision nor its perceived misdirection in assigning
actions to agents can detract from the sincerity that the movement lends to the ethical encounter.
In the process of this critique, I do not wish to offer Levinas's idiosyncratic theology or his
indebtedness to quasi-religious notions of Infinity, or even God, as the stuff of which naturalist
ethics are made. These are claims on Levinas's part where I think he and naturalism may very
well depart. I am, however, offering Levinas's ethical traumatism and theory of language and
ethical discourse up for our consideration when reading naturalism. We can no longer think of
naturalism as simple pessimism or, if placed in ethical terms, as a movement whose ethics are
completely defined through a concern with such things as free will or determinism. In
36 Because thought can never be completely divorced from a cultural setting, I think Levinas's ethics are clearly the
product of modernity – most notably those traumatic events like the Holocaust. Even so, Levinas thinks of his
ethics as ahistorical and timeless. Subjectivity is always already obligated to the other.
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naturalism, as in Levinas, ethics comes before ontology, before any concerns about intention.
Ethics is a harsh business indeed, and in the following chapter, we will see how Frank Norris
constructs both subjectivity and ethics as something beyond hardship – in fact, even beyond the
traumatic. Norris and Levinas posit the self as an inarticulate one (who cannot account for its
actions or those of other humans) in the presence of the inscrutable other, yet, nonetheless, the
self is thrown into action and is called upon to speak. What the self does in such moments,
however, points to the inadequacy of every approach we possess in actually addressing the needs
of our interlocutor, and this is ultimately why subjectivity is inarticulate in Norris and Levinas.
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IV. THE UNBEARABLE BURDEN OF THE OTHER: THE ETHICS OF
INARTICULATE SUBJECTIVITY IN THE WORKS OF FRANK NORRIS
Frank Norris is not typically renowned for writing “morally sound” fiction; his racism has been
documented well by both critics and biographers, and readers tend to interpret his novels of
despair as public manifestos of existential abnegation. Some of this has merit, but how can these
images or portrayals of Norris alone explain an episode like that of the sinking of the Mazatlan in
Vandover and the Brute (1914)? The passenger steamer carrying Vandover and hundreds of other
lives sinks off the coast of California, forcing crewmembers and passengers alike to take to
available lifeboats. Vandover's lifeboat, built for thirty-five, is filled beyond capacity with forty
passengers. Even so, the members of the boat, including Vandover, cannot easily ignore the
desperate cries for help from a man drowning nearby. Vandover and others plea with the
engineer in charge of the life raft to spare the man's life by taking him aboard; others aboard,
however, including some women fearful for the lives of their children as well as the crew, fear
taking on the man described as “the little Jew” will capsize the boat and endanger all lives
already safe aboard. Despite the protestations to save the man's life, he is denied access and soon
drowns, much to the frustration of Vandover. Arriving back in San Francisco after the harrowing
ordeal, Vandover faces what might be described as persecution from beyond the grave. “ 'Well,
wait till I tell you,' ” vociferates the bartender at Vandover's haunt, “ 'the authorities here are right
after that first engineer with a sharp stick, and some of the passengers, too, for not taking him in.
A woman in one of the other boats saw it all and gave the whole thing away. A thing like that is
regular murder, you know'.” Vandover can only “shut his teeth against answering.”
Vandover seems indicted in the death of the Jew, whose name we learn is Brann, but there
are several ways in which to interpret this event. The engineer in charge of the small vessel
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makes a good case for a utilitarian argument; the ship is already filled beyond capacity and taking
on more passengers could risk sinking, endangering all those on board. Such an approach is not
unfounded and is morally pragmatic. In a world where we might not have objective measures for
determining what actions are good or desirable, why not accept a credo that guides our decisionmaking through rational, decisive steps for ensuring the greatest good? In principle, why would
we not want to maximize what is desirable or good? And the engineer may very well have saved
all lives on board by his actions. On the other hand, if we bring a sentimentalist perspective into
view, the engineer's decision would be dramatized either as an existential necessity or as the endproduct of a society marred by selfishness and greed. Brann's death would then call upon the
reader's affective faculties, and we would feel the tragedy of his death as a personal
enlightenment – yes, the world is dangerous and forbidding, but the exposure to tragedy can
remind us of the good and can illuminate within us what we find desirable (i.e., a sensitive side).
The problem with these two perspectives, which Norris appears to be examining, is that they give
far too much precedence to the self. One assumes the self can be a rational arbiter in deciphering
what is good both for it and for others (utilitarian) while the other assumes the self resides in a
position from where it may judge others and extend appropriate responses accordingly – a sort of
moral egoism, in a sense (sentimentalist). Furthermore, like any good naturalist who can pull his
weight, Norris refuses to convert the death into an edifying readerly experience, although it is
clear we should feel its significance harshly.
Naturalism reduces humanity to its most basic elements, portraying us as the product of
seemingly meaningless circumstances beyond our control and knowledge – inarticulate
subhuman particles battered about in a universe that remains silent. Indeed, if humans are mere
machines, then why should any of us care about the suffering of others? Such a callous attitude
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should create in us a sense of detachment from the suffering of characters portrayed in
naturalism. The effect, however, is precisely the opposite; despite their reduced circumstances,
these characters demand a response, and neither a sentimentalist response nor a utilitarian one
will work. We do not feel ennobled by our empathetic condescension; we feel subjugated and
persecuted by our care instead. Ethical normativity can't help either because the letter of the law
reduces suffering to a problem that can be dissected and potentially solved. Norris admittedly
retains a sentimentalist vision, yet he transforms this into a subjugating empathy rather than a
condescending one. We are oppressed by our concern for the other, and there are no simple
solutions or perspective points from which we can look in and determine how the needs of
another can be met and satisfied. Like Levinas, Norris disrupts the power of the self in the
ethical relationship and claims that in being made witness to the suffering of the other, we are
somehow obligated, and this obligation is harsh, demanding, and insufferable.
Before looking further into Vandover and McTeague, however, I want to briefly reference
Norris's attempt at detailing the moral degradation involved in the production and distribution of
every American's food, a process that minimizes the suffering of the other in a system that
otherwise erases the average man and woman who depend upon fair prices to feed their families.
While a later tale, this account provides an interpretive shorthand for representing Norris's ethics
– the inextricable link between our own lives and actions and the suffering of others – and clearly
presents Norris as an ethical author, in case we need further prove. Norris originally intended for
his account of the production, marketing, and consumption of American wheat to be told in three
tales. He made it as far as The Octopus (1901) and The Pit (1903), novels that concern the
agricultural process of harvesting wheat and the troubles of bringing it to market in California as
well as the trade and speculating of these farmers' products by Chicago operators, respectively.
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The third installment of this Epic of the Wheat remained incomplete at Norris's passing in 1902.
He leaves us another tale, however, that can just as easily serve as a veritable Cliff's Notes of the
trilogy (at least thematically). In “A Deal in Wheat” (1903), Norris laid the groundwork for his
great epic. Much of the tale, albeit imperfect as a literary work, was to serve as basis for his
trilogy, and in the story, we essentially peer into the entire cycle of wheat Norris was hoping to
demonstrate with his much more extensive work.
The narrative begins with Sam Lewiston, a Kansas farmer, worrying about the future of
his family and small farm as he prepares his wheat for market. At the moment, the price of wheat
is holding at $0.66 per bushel. Lewiston can barely maintain his farm at that price, and he and
his wife, Emmie, have apparently spent a good deal of the past night discussing their prospects.
“For a long moment neither spoke,” at Sam's departing for market, “They had talked over the
situation so long and so comprehensively the night before that there seemed to be nothing more
to say” (3). Arriving at the local purchaser, Sam is astounded to find wheat has fallen even
further to $0.62. A bear market has made it impossible for him to maintain his farm and,
reluctantly, Sam decides it best to take a job with his brother-in-law in Chicago. Meanwhile, the
speculators in Chicago deal and gamble with the price of wheat. Truslow, the Bear, has driven
down the price to the point that farmers like Sam have been forced to sell their farms. The Bull
boss, Hornung, however, intends on driving up the price in order to squeeze his competitor out of
business. From this point forward, Hornung appears to have the run of the market, setting the
prices of wheat higher and higher in increments, until a seller appears on the market that can
offer an even lower price. In an effort to avert a fall in prices and keep the market steady,
Hornung tells his brokers to “Support the market”:
'Sell May at 'fifty; sell May; sell May.' A moment's indecision, an instant's
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hesitation, the first faint suggestion of weakness, and the market would have
broken under them. But for the better part of four hours they stood their ground,
taking all that was offered, in constant communication with the Chief, and from
time to time stimulated and steadied by his brief, unvarying command:
'Support the market.' (14)
As it turns out, Truslow is the secret seller: he has bought wheat at a lower price and shopped it
around town on trains after the price has risen, after Hornung's speculative increases, meaning
that Hornung has lost out on his own product. Once it becomes apparent to the Bull that
something is amiss with the current market, a detective who has been on the case for some time
alerts him that Truslow is actually the mysterious seller and has been buying Hornung's product
at $1.10 while charging $1.50 for its purchase. In order to combat his counterpart's move,
Hornung decides to raise the price of wheat from what he had intended in the coming days
($1.75) to $2.00 a bushel. Such a move, while making Hornung more money, proves to cost
those needing wheat for subsistence, those down-on-their-luck such as Sam, who now stand in a
Chicago bread line after having sold his farm. Having finally realized his part in the game as a
mere pawn, Sam stews over his current state of affairs:
He had seen the two ends of a great wheat operation – a battle between
Bear and Bull. The stories (subsequently published in the city's press) of
Truslow's countermove in selling Hornung his own wheat, supplied the unseen
section. The farmer – he who raised the wheat – was ruined upon one hand; the
working-man – he who consumed it – was ruined upon the other. But between the
two, the great operators, who never saw the wheat they traded in, bought and sold
the world's food, gambled in the nourishment of entire nations, practised their
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tricks, their chicanery and oblique shifty 'deals,' were reconciled in their
differences, and went on through their appointed way, jovial, contented,
enthroned, and unassailable. (25-26)
“Lucking out” in gaining a low-end job in Chicago, Sam reflects upon the hand he has been
dealt. Although Sam is luckier than most of his peers in the bread lines, like those around him,
he is entrapped by a system that is constructed to obscure the needs of common men and women.
In Levinasian terms, we could say that Sam is obliterated within a socioeconomic structure that
refuses to recognize the face of the other, refuses to acknowledge need rather than desire. On the
one hand, the depreciation of prices drove Sam to sell his farm in Kansas. On the other hand, the
increase in the price of wheat (which could have benefited him as a farmer) turns him into a
pauper, a man who has to stand in line for free hand-outs from the local bakery (which has to shut
down after the price is raised to $2.00). All the while, the great operators benefit and never once
suffer, their minor market woes merely motivated by greed and desire unlike the needs – fueled
by the hunger, the poverty, the homelessness – that drive those like Sam.
In a school of authors who we typically have enough difficulty reading as “moral” or
“ethical,” Norris may be the most recalcitrant of the lot. “A Deal in Wheat,” however, firmly
establishes Norris as an author who is very much concerned with people, their individual crises,
and those factors that lead to their suffering. Link claims that Norris's career is marked by two
distinct periods. Norris's earlier career, for Link, is one of pessimism and general disregard for
any possible form of moral sustenance. His later career, though, marks a turn towards a much
more optimistic outlook, according to Link. Link may very well be correct in assuming that
Norris becomes a more explicitly ethical writer in his later career; however, Norris's literary
career, as well as his life, was far too short, in my opinion, to make distinctions between “early”
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and “later” periods legitimate. “A Deal in Wheat,” while published posthumously, firmly
establishes Norris as an author preoccupied with questions of moral obligation and responsibility,
questions that troubled him throughout his entire career rather than only one period. Norris
wants to locate those forces that have brought such things as foreclosure, unemployment, and
starvation into being in turn-of-the-century America, and the implication is that we are somehow
involved. How can a reader with food on his table, for instance, justify something like the bread
line or the foreclosure of farms supplying his meal?

How can a reader, whether then or today,

rationalize a system that is fundamentally constructed upon inequality and the neglect of those at
the bottom? While “A Deal in Wheat” may be more conspicuously concerned with such things
than his earlier work, we should not overlook Norris's previous texts for their perceived moral
complexity and ambiguity. These texts are also very much indebted to anxieties about the role of
socioeconomic and cultural structures in obscuring the humanity and needs of the other.
McTeague may be the most difficult work in Norris's canon and stands as the perennial
undergraduate introduction to naturalist novels, The Red Badge of Courage aside. Via
McTeague, we are introduced, for the first time as readers, to such things as raw sexual desire,
unrestrained indulgence, and deleterious behavior that appears to have no explanation other than
bad genetics. It is an eye-opening text that, not surprisingly, garnered much concern in its time
over its appropriateness. It is orthodox, by naturalist standards, and it is cliché by those same
standards – a lowly miner tries to make good in the city, yet money and competition become his
undoing in a deterministic world that seems to provide no other opportunities. Nevertheless,
McTeague may very well be the most significant example we have in our fiction of a literature
that begs us to rethink our conceptions of human agency and responsibility, as well as interrogate
the possibilities of a world that functions otherwise than that according to a comfortable and
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coherent middle-class worldview. McTeague, the dentist, is a character whose honest animality
seems to invoke the goodness of the primitive who walks outside civilization and balks against
its complacence and triviality, yet he also points to the fear of an atavistic regression of
individuals in modern society, who cannot progress as functional Anglo, middle-class citizens
should (according to the nativist and racist discourses of the time) but find themselves
relentlessly borne back into the cycle of violence, greed, laziness, and sloth from which they
came. For Pizer, McTeague finds “tragedy...inherent in the human situation given man's animal
past and the possibility that he will be dominated by that past in particular circumstances”
(Realism and Naturalism 17). The study of Norris has been dominated by such criticism: we
recognize the suffering present in naturalist fiction, yet we are unwilling (or lack the proper
critical tools) to fully come to terms with this suffering. There are numerous ways in which to
read McTeague, which probably explains, at least in part, its lasting appeal to generations of new
readers, who find in its seeming moral confusion and ambiguity and its violent and horrifying
episodes, the appeal of the grotesque, the sordid, and the strangely exotic. Yet Norris leaves us
with a way to avoid pessimism in our approach, despite the novel's seeming capacity to pull us in
different directions.
As I just alluded to above, McTeague begs some serious moral questions beyond its
concern with agency and determinism. Although often manipulating romantic plot lines, the
novel refuses the sentimentalization of the fact of human suffering, and so we feel the weight of
McTeague's tragedy without a filter that places our response within a particular framework. Why
do we feel this tragedy so deeply if Norris does not seem to provide us with any means of making
sense out of McTeague's animal demise? The answer may lie in Norris's ability to salvage the
distinctly “human” in his story, despite its formidable racism, which has been duly noted as
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detracting from any moral concerns readers might find. We do not feel indifference or disdain
towards McTeague; instead, we feel the brunt of the assaults upon his humanity. Despite
McTeague's “racial flaws,” despite his biological “deficiencies,” we still relate to him as
fundamentally human, as a man with a face, in other words.
While we must also understand race in Norris as yet another factor that – according to the
author – threatens the humanity of his characters, admittedly, the presence of racism in Norris's
text initially appears to detract from the immediacy of his ethical imperative. Zerkow, the Jewish
junk dealer, for instance, may be one of the most anti-Semitic depictions in all American
literature, an accomplishment which is no small feat when taking into account the history of
ethnic and racial relations in this country. “He had the thin, eager, catlike lips of the covetous;
eyes that had grown keen as those of a lynx from long searching amid muck and debris; and
clawlike, prehensile fingers – the fingers of a man who accumulates, but never disburses” (34),
states the narrator concerning Zerkow's physical appearance. “It was impossible to look at
Zerkow and not know instantly that greed – inordinate, insatiable greed – was the dominant
passion of the man” (34). While Pizer by no means apologizes for Norris's ethnocentrism and
racism, like any good naturalist scholar, he attributes much of Norris's negative views of nonAnglo Americans as largely a product of social climate. “It would be easy in Norris's case, given
the range and consistency of his racial biases,” Pizer argues, “to attribute this aspect of his beliefs
to a personal flaw. But although there may indeed be a psychological misalignment in Norris's
deepest nature...it is both more feasible and productive to examine the sources and nature of his
anti-Semitism in relation to his distinctive historical moment” (American Naturalism and the
Jews 15). Pizer clearly recognizes the stain such beliefs leave upon not only the fiction of Norris
but of other authors of the 1890s, which makes the investment in human suffering that these
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authors wager all the more baffling, if not altogether perturbing. “What is intriguing in any
consideration of the anti-Semitism of these writers is the contradiction between the regressive
nature of this belief, with its underlying atavistic hate and fear of the stranger/outsider,” he
writes, “and the more enlightened character of their values, writings, and activities in many other
areas” (ix). Certainly, Norris's ethnocentric sentiments and claims should give us caution when
moving forward with any approach that seeks a progressive view of naturalism. Such ideologies
only detract from whatever progressive values these authors may have possessed and certainly
threaten something like a Levinasian ethics; for these reasons (among others), such harmful
beliefs are inexcusable. Nonetheless, if we are to account for such detrimental elements present
in the works of Norris (and other naturalists), elements which lend irony to his ethical project, we
should take Pizer's advice and start with the historical climate of the 1890s.
Benn Michaels has discussed at length the “rising tide” of nativism in America between
the 1890s and 1920s, particularly after the First World War. Racial and ethnic essentialism
marked numerous cultural and intellectual responses to an increasingly pluralistic society.
Perhaps even more aptly, June Howard's discussion of the impact of such discourses like late
nineteenth century criminology upon the American cultural imagination informs our
understanding of the portrayal of race, ethnicity, and social class in literary naturalism,
particularly in Norris. According to Howard in Form and History in American Literary
Naturalism, the writings and ruminations of several contemporary criminologists may very well
account for the construction of McTeague's “bad blood” and immoral behavior. Howard thinks
that much of this thinking, as well as McTeague, is haunted by a fear of proletarianization, a fear
that often results in the misrepresentation of the working class as brutish, dull, inarticulate, and
ill-adapted. For Howard, such notions as autonomy, awareness, and control are the markers of
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class privilege, and the middle class would have certainly found in the pages of a novel like
McTeague a fair sense of validation and self-importance. We can only imagine the somewhat
perverse voyeuristic pleasure (and fear) a late Victorian middle class reader would have taken in
his or her reading of the bestial struggles of the burly dentist. Such constructs of the working
class and of other so-called “primitives,” whether racially or ethnically, would have served a
more “functional” and “coherent” sense of bourgeois self-identity, although this means that the
“abnormal” obviously works to define what is considered normal and appropriate.
Ironically enough, these ideologies are quite possibly invested in an antiquated ethical
paradigm, which positions such factors as race, ethnicity, and social class alongside physical and
moral fitness – in other words, genetics match actions and actions match genetics. Although he
claims naturalism's full endorsement of evolutionary ethics may be far more complicated than
what we might be prone to think even in a novelist like Norris, for instance, Armstrong admits
that the ethical model present in McTeague equates perceived inherent physical pathologies with
moral degeneracy. In “ 'First Principles of Morals': Evolutionary Morality and American
Morality in American Naturalism,” Armstrong argues that McTeague's demise at the end of the
novel points to a Lamarckian construct of adaptation, whereby the physically unfit (connected
with McTeague's Irish ancestry, Trina's German lineage, and lower socioeconomic origins/status)
not only disintegrate morally but also become biologically extinct. For Armstrong, Norris
reveals the consequences (perhaps unwittingly) of social evolution, reinforcing Le Conte's fear of
amoral species development with no direction or purpose. So, we see that while an ethical
reading of naturalism is by no means possible without due complications and anxieties, we
should not simply divest our critical approach of the potential for more nuanced understandings
of naturalism's ethical projects. McTeague may be a racist caricature of sorts, but we tend to care
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deeply for his struggle and his humanity; we cannot remain indifferent. Furthermore, and
perhaps most strikingly, racial stereotypes in the novel act as deterministic forces, bad genetics
that contribute further to the question of responsibility. McTeague's heredity is no different than
his social environs in this respect and, while this does not excuse Norris, it does help make more
sense out of his ethical vision – despite all these deterministic factors, McTeague still emerges
transcendent as distinctively “human” rather than a cipher. This deterministic vision forces us to
see the novel's characters as products of grave metaphysical forces, yet tests our capacity to
recognize their humanity despite the sense that we should otherwise be reconciled to the
inevitability and hopelessness of their fate. The fact remains, however, that we are not resigned,
and the characters that inhabit the world of McTeague are not merely reducible to such concepts
or deterministic factors as race or such blind action as animality – they are something more and
demand of us a response that acknowledges this. When we step outside of what Levinas thinks
of as a triadic perspective (concerned as it is with free will, rationality, identity, etc.), we see
McTeague as a human with needs, and we see ourselves implicated in his downfall as members
of the system, of the forces that stand against him. Naturalist literature is definitely invested in
suffering and in a desire – at the point of painstaking artistic effort – to find some way by which
this suffering might be addressed, and Frank Norris is no exception.
McTeague, however, generally conjures images of the morally destitute and relentlessly
pessimistic in our popular imagination. Unfortunately, this construct has preoccupied our
scholarship as well, and we don't have to look too long or hard to figure out why. Greed,
mistrust, fear, deception, hatred, violence, and the inability to communicate seem to characterize
human relationships in the novel, and no one really seems capable of rising above the muck of
such squalor. There is no doubt that McTeague often reduces humans to the level of the bestial.
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In fact, dog imagery and canine hostility are interspersed throughout, sometimes standing in as
metaphoric of human interaction and subjectivity – a component of the novel that complicates
our ability to resuscitate anything “humane” from the text. In the yard directly outside the
apartments that McTeague and Marcus Schouler inhabit, for instance, Alexander, Marcus's Irish
setter, and a neighboring collie that resides on the other side of the fence separating the two's
“territory,” explode in a vicious standoff: “Suddenly the quarrel had exploded on either side of
the fence. The dogs raged at each other, snarling and barking, frantic with hate. Their teeth
gleamed. They tore at the fence with their front paws. They filled the whole night with their
clamor” (48). The dogs' hostility and suspicion towards one another does not relent, each afraid
that the other poses a legitimate threat to his “rightful” territory, each afraid to give way or
concede ground. These dogs act as is according to their “nature,” and we should expect nothing
otherwise. The problem posed here, however, is if we should expect the same for human
relationships, and to what extent might we exercise some control over our own nature?
More so than any other problem we encounter in a novel like McTeague, that of the
amount of autonomy allowed to individuals seems to hold our critical attention nearly
exclusively. Such a problem also begs the question of whether or not we can hold individuals
morally responsible for their actions. Characters constantly appear subdued by their nature as
men and women. Once sexualized, McTeague finally succumbs to his biological disposition as a
man who can conquer his wife, Trina McTeague: “But he had only to take her in his arms, to
crush down her struggle with his enormous strength, to subdue her, conquer her by sheer brute
force, and she gave up in an instant” (69). Trina, likewise, cannot escape her own nature as a
woman who identifies with material objects, most notably gold (one cannot forget the iconic
scene of her wallowing in her gold), or as a woman sexualized through her submission to a
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hulking example of masculinity in McTeague: 37
Suddenly he caught her in both his huge arms, crushing down her struggle
with his immense strength, kissing her full upon the mouth. Then her great love
for McTeague suddenly flashed up in Trina's breast; she gave up to him as she had
done before, yielding all at once to that strange desire of being conquered and
subdued. (142)
Although there is quite a bit of romantic posturing between the two throughout the novel, each
with scenes that find him or her wondering if love indeed motivates their relationship, for the
most part, a bizarre (and sexually-charged) game of domination and submission – rooted in
nature – defines McTeague and Trina's relationship. 38 For this reason, Benn Michaels describes
McTeague as the first work concerned with masochism in American literature, Trina not only
tolerating “her husband's brutality” but also taking “an explicitly erotic pleasure in it” (The Gold
Standard 119). In McTeague, men and women alike appear as productions of nature – raw,
sexual, dynamic, incomprehensible, and unrestrained. Assigning responsibility seems an
impossible task at first glance and, admittedly, Norris does us no favors. This, however, does not
mean that Norris dispenses altogether of any sense of ethical subjectivity in the novel.
Interestingly, while Trina and McTeague's relationship proves perilous to say the least, we also
see the origins of something morally significant (although brief and fleeting) enabled through this
very relationship.
When McTeague walks about, he does so “moving his immense limbs, heavy with ropes
37 Obviously, there's a good deal of gender essentialism in these constructs, which shares analogs with Norris's
conceptions of race, ethnicity, and class.
38 This dynamic greatly resembles Norris's earlier work in the short story “Fantaisie Printaniere,” wherein the first
appearance of McTeague and Trina (the story was to act foundational in the development of McTeague) finds
Mac beating his wife,and Trina taking an ironic pleasure in these beatings when boasting to a neighbor.
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of muscle, slowly, ponderously” (3). In order to extract “a refractory tooth,” McTeague often
does so by placing aside his forceps and making use of the immense strength of “his thumb and
finger” (3). His square and angular jaw resembles “that of the carnivora” (3) – hardly the
appearance of a man nature might have endowed with those traits in which we might willingly
desire to confide. From the very beginning of the novel, Norris characterizes McTeague's life
through several weighty materialist terms that point to the highly corporeal nature not only of his
physique and physical presence but also of his existence, one that does not entail a good deal of
thinking; rather, sensual experience primarily informs McTeague's habits and desires. “It was
Sunday, and according to his custom on that day, McTeague took his dinner at two in the
afternoon at the car conductors' coffee joint on Polk Street,” the narrator begins; “He had a thick,
gray soup; heavy, underdone meat, very hot, on a cold plate; two kinds of vegetables; and sort of
suet pudding, full of strong butter and sugar” (1). Returning to his dental office, he makes
himself comfortable and relaxes in his operating chair beside the window, “reading the paper,
drinking his beer, and smoking his huge porcelain pipe while his food digested; crop full, stupid,
and warm” (1). “By and by,” the narrator continues, “gorged with steam beer and overcome by
the heat of the room, the cheap tobacco, and the effects of his heavy meal, he dropped off to
sleep” (1). We get the sense that this Sunday in McTeague's life may very well be no different
from any other and, indeed, we are correct: “McTeague looked forward to these Sunday
afternoons as a period of relaxation and enjoyment. He invariably spent them in the same
fashion. These were his only pleasures – to eat, to smoke, to sleep, and to play upon his
concertina” (1-2). McTeague experiences and makes sense out of the world primarily through
sensory and bodily evidence. Much like Eugene O'Neill's Yank a little over a decade later, he is
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not a thinker, although it is imaginable that possibly under other circumstances he could be; 39
instead, things happen and McTeague responds. “McTeague's mind was as his body,” Norris
writes, “heavy, slow to act, sluggish” (3). Whenever his one good friend, Marcus, would rant
against the capitalist system, against those “white-livered drones” (a posing on his part often
without much substance), McTeague routinely responds absent-mindedly and stupidly: “ ' Yes,
that's it; I think it's their livers” (11). McTeague often seems much more like an automaton than a
real man (perhaps even a capitalist production, as Benn Michaels has pointed out concerning
naturalism's production of “unnatural” selves), although we are still not indifferent to him as
readers since he appears to be the main character in whom we invest interest. 40
The only experience capable of disrupting McTeague's general physical indulgence and
malaise is his encounter with Trina, which seems to make him aware of something other than
himself. However, he arrives at even this awareness through sensation and raw emotion more so
than through his intellect and, although Trina upsets McTeague's insularity (she forces him,
unwittingly, to become aware of something above the level of the self), she remains an object that
possesses a precarious position in relation to McTeague. “By degrees McTeague's first
awkwardness and suspicion vanished entirely,” the narrator observes; “The two became good
39 McTeague's appreciation of his canary and delight in the playing of his concertina demonstrates an aesthetic
awareness that takes him above the level of a mere animal and brute, no matter what his actions. McTeague may
not be a thinker or have much in the way of intellect, but he does have some sort of faculty for the appreciation of
beauty that, while sensory (the aural pleasure of the bird's voice and the concertina), functions above a base
materialism. In addition, McTeague's desire for his gilded sign to hang outside his parlor demonstrates an
ambition that rises above animality: “It was his ambition, his dream, to have projecting from that corner window
a huge gilded tooth, a molar with enormous prongs, something gorgeous and attractive” (4). McTeague's idea of
beauty and art may be amateurish and juvenile, but he can at least appreciate such things.
40
The Gold Standard.
On another note, while Marcus and McTeague's “discussions” concerning capitalism lack substance, we get
a picture of two men who do not decidedly understand those forces that control their destinies and actions.
Marcus comprehends that something is wrong with the system, yet his approach is ill-informed, and he is
ineffectual. Similarly, McTeague, the son of a miner and once a miner himself, lacks the education and
intellect proper to understanding how things like economics and politics may have great effects upon his
life.
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friends. McTeague even arrived at that point where he could work and talk to her at the same
time, a thing that had never before been possible for him” (21). An entire new world begins to
appear for McTeague, a world mysterious and unknown, yet one promising and inviting. “With
her the feminine element suddenly entered his little world,” Norris's narrator claims, and “It was
not only her that he saw and felt, it was the woman, the whole sex, an entire new humanity,
strange and alluring, that he seemed to have discovered” (21). Awakened from something
apparently resembling an existential slumber, McTeague sees “all at once...that there was
something else in life besides concertinas and steam beer” (21). Although Trina appears to upset
McTeague's world, disrupting his philosophical field of vision by introducing him to something
transcending the self, his base ability to process her soon becomes mediated through a primal
reaction and instinct that returns him to the level of a mere beast.
Towards the end of these operative sessions, McTeague discovers a deep cavity in one of
Trina's teeth, which needs repair yet causes quite a bit of pain to her when he initially attempts a
fix. Wary of the dangers of putting a patient under with nitrous oxide gas, McTeague opts for
ether instead. Trina quickly succumbs to the anesthetic, assuming a pose of tranquil beauty in the
dentist's eyes. “For some time he stood watching her as she lay there,” writes Norris,
“unconscious and helpless and very pretty. He was alone with her, and she was absolutely
without defense” (23). At this moment, those instincts and urges that were lying dormant just
beneath his conscious level of experience begin to shake McTeague's pose of equanimity. With
every fiber of his being that has somehow escaped the base and the bestial, he fights against
himself, trying desperately to maintain his control. He is a self in turmoil, but clearly there
remains some moral sense even in the brute. Unfortunately, Trina's innocence as she lies there in
that unconscious state (as she loses her personality and individuality, although perhaps not her
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humanity) proves far too much for McTeague to handle as he steals a heavy, “gross” kiss from
her lips. This moment of weakness terrifies McTeague, who can hardly account for himself as he
plunges desperately into his work in order to distract him from his momentary impropriety. “But
for all that, the brute was there. Long dormant, it was now at last alive, awake. From now on he
would feel its presence continually; would feel it tugging at its chain, watching its opportunity”
(25), the narrator states. We are reminded that McTeague's indecorous action reflects the taint of
his fathers, from his dad to his great-grandfather “five-hundred” times removed:
The evil of an entire race flowed in his veins. Why should it be? He did
not desire it. Was he to blame?
But McTeague could not understand this thing. It had faced him, as sooner
or later it faces every child of man; but its significance was not for him. To reason
with it was beyond him. He could only oppose to it an instinctive stubborn
resistance, blind, inert. (italics mine, 24)
The discovery of his sexuality wracks McTeague to the bone, and nature has not equipped him
with the proper material to make sense out of this awakening. McTeague may have limited
intellectual resources, yet we identify with him nonetheless as a human plagued by the same
ontological questions that trouble ourselves. “We are never completely one with McTeague,”
Pizer states, “his brute strength and dull mind put us off. But because he is trapped in the
universal net of sex, and because we recognize the poignancy of the loss of his world, we
respond to him ultimately as a human being in distress, as a figure of some significance despite
his limitations” (Realism and Naturalism 16). Even so, a new view of McTeague, the honest
animal, emerges here, one that calls for a reexamination of our approach to morality and agency
in the novel.
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What we see here, despite McTeague's inability to rise above experience unmediated by
the flesh, is something resembling a moral agent. The interior monologue of the above passage
depicts a McTeague who has indeed somehow discovered something completely foreign, strange,
and other – a McTeague who can contemplate not only his actions and decisions (and possibly
their effects upon others), but also his self and such notions as blame and responsibility, although
unable to comprehend those larger processes by which he arrived at his kiss (“it's significance
was not for him”). Although it may be difficult to assign something like blame to individual
characters in McTeague, we cannot ignore the fact that Norris gives them some form of moral
subjectivity, albeit rudimentary and often inarticulate. Maybe we should, therefore, stop
discrediting any sense of ethical subjectivity in Norris despite the difficulty we have with him in
assigning blame in a conventional sense. Concerning the scene above that gives us pause to
consider McTeague's identity as a moral actor, Conder states that “Norris seemingly grants status
to these concepts, all of which imply man's freedom, responsibility, and guilt; but he questions
them, and the novel's determinism repudiates their adequacy for evaluating the world of
McTeague” (71). Conder is right in the difficulty inherent in such an ethical approach that would
assign responsibility, yet we must not forget the unavoidable exposure to something beyond the
self here. An inarticulate ethical agent is one that is not fully aware of itself, in fact cannot
possibly be fully aware of itself, but such a construct of the subject places him or her out of the
fold and brings the other into the center. If we really want to unlock the moral potential of a text
like McTeague, or a novelist like Norris, we must look at any approach that foregrounds the self
(as the center of moral agency) with some caution and advance with an alternative approach that
decentralizes the self instead. As Norris seems to suggest, if we are going to locate an ethics in a
world wherein discourses like evolutionary science and capitalist economics make responsibility
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an increasingly difficult notion to grasp, in a world where – much like McTeague – we cannot
adequately give an account of ourselves, we would do well in finding one that does not rely so
heavily upon the self for its moral universe.
The final scene of the novel may in fact point towards such an approach, rather than that
pessimistic reading which consistently posits the desolation of the outcome of McTeague's fate.
The image of McTeague handcuffed to the dead Marcus in the middle of Death Valley is
desolate, no doubt, perhaps even morbid; however, this outcome suggests something other than
mere tragedy or pessimism. “As McTeague rose to his feet, he felt a pull at his right wrist;
something held it fast,” writes Norris, “Looking down, he saw that Marcus in that last struggle
had found strength to handcuff their wrists together. Marcus was dead now; McTeague was
locked to the body. All about him, vast, interminable, stretched the measureless leagues of Death
Valley” (347). The final scene of McTeague leaves us with an image of the absolute subjugation
of the self before the other. McTeague has served his own immediate ends: he has beat his friend
(who would otherwise arrest and turn him in) to death, thus sparing his freedom and future.
McTeague's motivation is completely selfish and violent, yet seems to make sense in a world that
threatens to reduce humans to caged beasts. In other words, human motivation (at least from a
Hobbesian perspective) is self-preservation. Even in this enactment of self-preservation,
however, McTeague cannot finally separate his victory from the outcome he has caused, from the
implications of his actions – he cannot separate those actions (and even factors) that led to his
temporary triumph over Marcus from his permanent fate there on the desert floor. McTeague
attempts to cast Marcus aside, a mere obstacle hindering his escape, yet he finds placing the
world of “things,” the world of others, out of sight and out of mind an impossible task. Marcus
handcuffs McTeague, refusing to allow him to escape any of the actions that have led him to that
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very moment. Rather than absolve him of any responsibility, Norris directly implicates
McTeague in those actions and processes that have brought suffering into view. Understandably,
we may have some anxiety about reading McTeague's episodes of violence and animality as
separate from determinism, a fact that even Conder, for instance, a compatibilist critic, cannot
look past when he claims that McTeague's “hard determinism” bars any sense of actual blame
(70). Admittedly, we are on some very shaky ground here; however, we cannot continue to
distinguish actions from responsibility in the novel. For Norris, as with Levinas, questions of
freedom or agency are secondary to our responsibility. Even in the despair of this final scene, as
we see McTeague unable to escape the inevitability of his actions, we still find something
salvageable in his dire humanity, in his guilt and in his need. For Levinas, our vulnerability to
death – a vulnerability McTeague now certainly faces – proves the ultimate guarantor of our
humanity. Our vulnerability to death is the final line that divides the living and the dead; in other
words, it is the final line that distinguishes the human from the mere object. McTeague is no
inconsequential object, and Norris forces us to acknowledge him as the other that is more than
nothing, that claims his humanity, regardless of his flaws and moral culpability.
The lasting image of the inarticulate McTeague handcuffed to Marcus's corpse on the
desert floor certainly serves as one of the most iconic in all literature. Perhaps not strikingly, it
conjures similarities to the final image in Norris's earlier work, Vandover and the Brute, a novel
that remained somewhat unfinished even at his death. A ragged, motley Vandover assumes a
position of complete degradation and submission before the presence of the contumacious boy,
the harsh, unforgiving desert floor of McTeague replaced with the hard floor of a kitchen in
which Vandover huddles, currently gathering his cleaning materials into a bundle: “As he
finished, he glanced up. For an instant the two remained there motionless, looking into each
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other's eyes, Vandover on the floor,...the little boy standing before him eating the last mouthful of
his bread and butter” (591). Just as McTeague finds no sustenance as he gazes around him,
nearing what will surely be his end, Vandover gains no sympathy or compassion from the little
boy who polishes off his last bit of food rather than offer it to a man who is clearly in foul shape.
But perhaps we can simply excuse this as the child's carefree nature, one of those cruel acts that
mark all our childhoods at some point or another. Or perhaps Vandover finds himself at the
lowest point in a world marked by asymmetry, where the one that stands before him refuses to
offer any comfort or assurance.
While an earlier novel, Vandover and the Brute serves not only as a solid point for further
evaluating Norris's earlier career but may also serve as Norris's greatest example of something
that looks like an ethics of trauma. The novel was not published until 1914, well after Norris's
death, although Norris worked extensively on the project throughout the 1890s, before he had
even written a word of McTeague. Among his works, Vandover stands alongside McTeague as
one of Norris's most notoriously obstinate texts, so much so in fact that astute critics like Link
(no detractor of naturalist texts and their moral capabilities) see no progressive value in
Vandover's physical and moral degeneration whatsoever. Although pointing to the philosophical
complications in assigning responsibility and blame, Vandover's fall, according to Link, is
another tale of descent, a provocative warning about the trajectory of American life amid a world
of quack late nineteenth-century social evolutionists. “Unlike Presley in The Octopus, he
[Vandover] has no final redemptive vision,” Link states, “no 'transcendental' or intuitive
awareness that evolution and determinism may lead toward perfection, utopia, or the good;
instead, there is the confusion and darkness of a 'spiritual death,' a de-volution, a dark and
grotesque lapse into a brutish state without redemptive harmony” (90). While Link may find
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some redeeming value in Norris's ultimate struggle with the intractable forces of life, Paul
Civello takes the negative implications of Norris's literature even further by claiming that
Vandover offers nothing but a no hope determinism. On the contrary, Vandover and the Brute is a
valuable piece for evaluating Norris as an author indebted to drawing attention to the significance
of human suffering and pain. We cannot dissect his literary career between moments that seem to
have moral compunction and scruples and those moments that appear to scoff at such
possibilities. In fact, there is no such divide in his works. Norris's texts remain (as a whole)
indelibly linked to a legitimate concern about suffering, human relationships, and ethical
possibility.
Like other examples from his oeuvre, Vandover follows what essentially amounts to a
sentimental plot: from a youth full of artistic promise, Vandover slowly falls into whoring,
drinking, and gambling, depicting that decline which seems to characterize the fall from grace in
so many dramatic novels. Unlike the works of melodrama, however, Vandover's fall neither
offers his redemption and rise from the ashes nor unequivocally condemns such a decline. After
matriculating to Harvard as a result of his father's unwillingness to see him leave for Paris,
Vandover and his cohort soon find themselves sinking into debauchery and college carousing.
Vandover becomes inebriated for the first time after the Yale and Harvard football game.
Although he does not completely lose his senses, Vandover is keenly aware that he is
experiencing a new sensation, and one that he is not so proud of at the moment: “He was not so
drunk but that he knew he was, and the knowledge of the fact so terrified him that it kept him
from getting very bad” (296). Sleeping it off, however, Vandover finds himself nearly carefree
the following morning:
In the morning he was surprised to find that he felt so little ashamed.
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Geary and young Haight treated the matter as a huge joke and told him of certain
funny things he had said and done and which he had entirely forgotten. It was
impossible for him to take the matter seriously even if he had wished to, and
within a few weeks he was drunk again. He found that he was not an exception;
Geary was often drunk with him, fully a third of all the Harvard men he knew
were intoxicated at different times.....Certainly, neither he nor any of the others
drank because they liked the beer; after the fifth or sixth glass it was all they could
do to force down another. Such being the case, Vandover often asked why he got
drunk at all. This question he was never able to answer. (296-97)
Vandover slides into a life of debauchery, a life in which he eventually cannot avoid and for
which he almost seems destined, much to the detriment of his art, grades, and emotional stability.
After college, he and his Harvard friends, Dolly Haight and Charlie Geary, return to San
Francisco, where Vandover's continuous decline only accelerates. While Haight and Geary
participate alongside Vandover in late night “bacchanals” at The Imperial, drinking and taking up
the company of local prostitutes, neither seems as grossly and ill-effected as Vandover (although
Geary's greed will eventually result in his ruining Vandover by swindling him in the Wade
lawsuit).
In fact, Vandover's fall is one so steep, dramatic, and, most importantly, animalistic that
critics like Link have given serious consideration to the theme of lycanthropy in the novel, a tale
which he sees as “[p]erhaps the clearest example of 'naturalist Gothic'...in which lycanthropy
serves as a forceful symbol of the influence of Vandover's lower, brute nature” (152-53). As
Vandover's life becomes increasingly complicated by his debauches and animal instincts, he
reverts to a wolf-like state, given over to moments of growling, drooling, howling, and walking
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upon all fours. Such a reversion signals, for some critics, an infatuation with primitivism on the
part of Norris that makes his work incredibly difficult to read as optimistic or promising. For
Gina M. Rossetti, Vandover and the Brute participates in a nativist discourse that warns against
the prospects of a society “overrun” by the lower classes and the moral degeneracy of other
social pariahs – a stern caveat that not only confirms the status of the lower class but also points
to the inevitable future of the upper class and so-called “good Americans” if they do not insulate
themselves from such personal vices and social contamination. Nineteenth century sociologists
and pseudo-scientists like Lambroso, Giddings, and Sumner, advocated a view of the lower class
and non-Anglo ethnicity as dangerous to American culture as well as argued for a biological and
race determinism that laid much of the foundation for the growing nativist movement. For
authors like London and Norris, according to Rossetti, the primitive became an ideal way of
invoking a robust conception of American identity. Bad primitivism, like what we witness in
Vandover, serves as a disturbing warning against the devaluation of good American stock.
“Naturalism is not simply pessimistic determinism or a failed realist aesthetic,” Rossetti argues;
“On the contrary, naturalism produces contradictory images about the primitive and the
devolution of this particular character and all those...” he or she may encounter. “Naturalism
rebukes the primitive,” she continues, “for his or her debasement. At the same time, however, it
necessarily posits a privileged class and confirms that class's elite status” (5), something that
distinguishes both Vandover and McTeague. Rossetti describes Vandover's specific condition and
state of affairs as a “wanton crossing of class lines” that proves the danger entailed by an
“unmediated contact with the primitive” (38), placing his animality witnessed here within an
atavistic discourse that directly links Norris (and naturalism) to nativism. This factor obviously
calls into question how we might think of a work like Vandover as a productive point from which
95

we might claim a naturalist ethics. Nativism is obviously counter-productive to pluralism and
otherness, and the atavism invoked in a character like Vandover, or the racism and anti-Semitism
we find in a novel like McTeague, for instance, certainly do complicate our approach. Even so,
what remains evident is that Vandover is a novel very much troubled by notions of responsibility
and obligation. Vandover, like McTeague, may be some sort of caricature, but Norris directly
implicates him in the suffering of others, providing him with no moral compass or rational
account to process this suffering.
Aside from concerns with primitivism and race degeneracy in Norris, Vandover's tale
presents us with a couple of social and moral dilemmas as readers, dilemmas that I think make
the foregrounding of Norris's less desirable personal characteristics as guides for interpreting his
fiction much more difficult. One of these dilemmas I broached at the beginning of this chapter,
and it concerns both the sinking of the Mazatlan, the over-booked, second-class steamer
Vandover is a guest upon in a return trip up the California coastline, and Vandover's response
during and after the sinking. “This homeward passage turned out to be one long misery for
Vandover,” states the narrator; “He had never been upon a second-class boat before and had
never imagined that anything could be so horribly uncomfortable or disagreeable” (387). Born
into a life of relative privilege and ease, Vandover finds himself appalled at the poor
accommodations and the cramped living space aboard. The presence of his fellow passengers in
the cabin, most of whom are members of the working class or lower middle class, proves
upsetting for Vandover, so much so that his seasickness seems almost as much the result of their
stifling presence as it does the result of the motion of the ocean's waves:
About two o'clock in the morning he woke up in this place frightfully sick
at the stomach and wretched in body and mind. He had an upper bunk, and for a
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long time he lay on his back rolling about with the rolling of the steamer, vaguely
staring straight above him at the roof of the cabin, hardly a hand's-breath above his
face.... By and by, for no particular reason, he rose on his elbow and, leaning over
the side of his berth, looked about him....
The cabin was two decks below the open air and every berth was occupied,
the only ventilation being through the door. The air was foul with the stench of
bilge, the reek of the untrimmed lamps, the exhalation of so many breaths, and the
close, stale smell of warm bedding.
A vague murmur rose in the air, the sound of deep breathing, the moving of
restless bodies between the coarse sheets, the momentary noise of the scratching
of blunt finger-tips, a subdued cough, the moan of a sleeping child. (388-89)
Exposed to the unruly and suffocating presence of others, of the masses to which he has had little
exposure, Vandover cannot neatly process his current environs and must abscond from the cabin
for the deck so that he might gain the relief of fresh air. “The continued pitching, the foul air, and
the bitter smoke from the saloonkeepers' cigars became more than Vandover could stand,” Norris
writes; “His stomach turned, at every instant he gagged and choked. He suddenly made up his
mind that he could stand it no longer, and determined to go on deck, preferring to walk the night
out rather than spend it in the cabin” (390). Making haste towards the deck, Vandover “was
seized with such a nausea that he could hardly keep from vomiting where he stood.... He sank
back upon an iron capstan with a groan, weak and trembling, his eyes full of tears, a bursting
feeling in his head. He was utterly miserable” (390). Once on deck, Vandover finds the respite
he wished to be offered by the night air short-lived.
Standing on deck, battling nausea and stomach sickness, feeling the weight of the world
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upon his back, the deck literally moves beneath Vandover's feet, upheaving whatever ability he
may possess to command his balance with facility upon deck. It had just occurred to him
moments before that he could spend the rest of the night inside the smoking room, upon the
cushions and away from the cabin below: “The deck was jerked away from beneath his feet, and
he was hurled forward, many times his own length, against a companionway, breaking his thumb
as he fell. A second shock threw him down again as he rose; everything about him shook and
danced like glassware upon a jarred table” (391). Thrown to all-fours (a position which
anticipates Vandover's lycanthropy), Vandover listens attentively to the sounds of the ship in the
night. Once he realizes that the ship is sinking, he can think only about his personal safety and
welfare: “Vandover's very first impulse was a wild desire of saving himself; he had not the least
thought for anyone else. Every soul on board might drown, so only he should be saved” (392).
Vandover's instinctual desire to immediately save himself at any cost is not unlike how many of
us would act under such duress. After all, human existence would probably not have lasted as
long as it has without such instinctual self-preservation (right or wrong as may be the case), a fact
that Norris sees directly linking humans with their animal counterparts. Speaking of Vandover's
initial reaction, the narrator claims, “It was the primitive animal instinct, the blind adherence to
the first great law, an impulse that in this first moment of excitement could not be resisted” (392).
If natural law determines such actions on the part of human beings, then the task of assigning any
sort of moral blame to any of our instincts becomes an arduous one indeed. The implications of
such actions as those expressed by Vandover here are clear: what prospects for negating our
nature may we find? And if we and our actions are merely the results of factors beyond our
control, then what hope might there be for a better society? As I've stated before, while
compatibilist theories and those of soft determinism seek a way around such a problem, ethical
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traumatism confronts the problem directly by making such questions, if not meaningless, at least
unnecessary for locating an ethics. While we understandably maintain a fondness for agency, the
will should not necessarily be looked upon as a necessity in answering moral questions and
dilemmas. Vandover appears as an object of metaphysical forces beyond his purview or reach,
yet this does not detract from his obligation; in fact, his subjectivity is his obligation. According
to Levinas, morality should be viewed as a part of our subjectivity, rendering the will a nonfactor in questions of responsibility, and this realization makes us moral agents, whether we act
responsibly or not.
After a short time, Vandover collects himself along with his wits, gathering alongside the
other passengers in awaiting their collective fates. In fact, the passengers, who moments before
had rushed the deck in a giant surge of fear, reach a calm complacency upon deck. Although
temporary composure seems to pacify those natural laws by which men and women are
governed, the deck quickly becomes animated through “animal behavior” again. Dozens kneel
down in prayer; the “Salvation lassie” enthusiastically declares her absence of fear, protected, as
she claims, by a God of mercy; the “little Jew of the plush cap cries, “God 'a' mercy! God 'a'
mercy!” (395). Although religious belief is not animalistic in itself, the invocation of humanity's
primordial desire for self-preservation, however, can very well be. Shortly after, the boatswain's
mate, a dignified older gentleman of stoic composure who had previously pacified the crowd
with confidence and given Vandover inspiration, suddenly seems to lose himself and his resolve
altogether, climbing over the rail and diving off the ship's tottering side: “Some strange reaction
seemed to have seized upon him. Of a sudden he rushed to the rail, the starboard rail that was
heaved so out of the water, stood upon it for a moment, and then with a great shout jumped over
the side” (396). This action proves infectious as four men immediately follow the boatswain's
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mate over the side while general unrest among the throngs on deck once again rules. The
Mazatlan no longer seems a boat, “no longer a thing of wood and iron, but some strange huge
living creature that was dying” directly underneath Vandover's feet, an “enormous brute that was
plunging and writhing in its last agony” (397). Preparing for the final plunge of the ship into the
sea, women and children are loaded into life boats, followed by the men.
The lifeboat in which Vandover takes sanctuary had apparently been built for only a
capacity of thirty-five people. “[M]ore than forty had crowded into it, and it needed all prudence
and care to keep it afloat in the heavy seas” (400). As the party in the lifeboat pull away from the
wreck, the voice of a screaming and bewildered man reaches them from the rail of the steamer.
The “little Jew,” thinking himself abandoned calls out to the party, his only chance left for
salvation. The engineer in charge of the lifeboat gives orders: “ 'Give way there!' he commanded
the men; 'there's no more room' ” (400). Desperate for life, the Jew plunges from the railing into
the sea, emerging with deep gasps and grasping wildly for the oars of the lifeboat. Despite the
pleas of some of the members of the party to draw the dying man in, the engineer holds steady.
“'It's too late!' he shouted, partly to the Jew and partly to the boat. ' One more and we are
swamped. Let go there!' ” (400). The argument that ensues between passengers and the engineer
as well as passengers among one another points to a group of people directly encountering a dire
existential battle between deciding the fate of another and possibly themselves:
“But you can't let him drown,” cried Vandover and the others who sat near.
“Oh, take him in anyhow; we must risk it.”
“Risk hell!” thundered the engineer. “Look here, you!” he cried to
Vandover and the rest. “I'm in command here and am responsible for the lives of
all of you. It's a matter of his life or ours; one life or forty. One more and we are
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swamped. Let go there!”
“Yes, yes,” cried some. “It's too late! There's no more room!”
But others still protested. “It's too horrible; don't let him drown; take him
in.” (401)
The initial reaction of Vandover and some others is to help the Jew, who thrashes wildly in the
open water, while the engineer and his cohort resist taking in the drowning man at all costs,
urging his rowers to “[s]hake him off” the oars. While the Jew still holds on to the oar, however,
the dire necessity of Vandover's situation inside the boat sets in for the eponymous character. In
reaction to the engineer's persistence, “Vandover glanced at the fearfully overloaded boat,” the
narrator states, “and saw the necessity of it and held his peace, watching the thing that was being
done” (401). Once the Jew grabs the side of the boat and it careens to his side, we are left to
assume that the rest of the party finally submits to the pragmatic thinking of the engineer and his
mates. Women cry for the preservation of their children, one vociferously making it known that
the only possible solution is to push the man away from the seemingly jeopardized boat. “It was
the animal in them all that had come to the surface in an instant,” writes Norris, “the primal
instinct of the brute striving for its life and for the life of its young” (402). After a few more
moments of tussles and exclamations, the Jew's struggle for survival finally ends as he sinks
beneath the tossing waves. Vandover cries out at the horror of witnessing a man drown and
promptly vomits over the side.
Throughout the night, the party is battered by the waves, rain, sleet, and cold, most of the
women with nothing to protect them from exposure with the exception of their bedtime garments.
Vandover, having the good fortune of being clothed at the time of the ship's misfortune,
apparently provides others in the party with some of his garments as well as a travelling-rug in
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his possession. Looking at his counterparts, “Vandover could do nothing; he had almost stripped
himself to help clothe the others. Nothing more could be done” ([emphasis mine] 404).
Vandover acts nobly, but has he acted enough? “Vandover himself suffered too keenly to take
much thought for the sufferings of the others,” the narrator observes, “while besides that anguish
which he shared with the whole boat, the pain in his broken thumb gnawed incessantly like a rat”
(404). Although he does not act selfishly, at least beyond any normal conception of selfpreservation, the narrative suggests that perhaps it is possible that Vandover could give more. He
almost strips himself to clothe other passengers. Has he done enough? Perhaps he could use his
own body's warmth to help warm others? Or maybe these are moot questions. Maybe Vandover
should have offered his place to the drowning Jew in the first place. Regardless, the point is that
more could be done, despite the defensive projections of Vandover's interior monologue
(“Nothing more could be done”).
Arriving in San Francisco “desperately hungry,” Vandover takes his breakfast at the
Imperial, nearly abandoned, as it is, at that early hour. Inside, he runs into Toby, a waiter from
the night shift with whom Vandover is well-acquainted and who is just now about to leave the
club. Absolutely staggered by Vandover's shabby and disheveled appearance, Toby asks him
what has happened. Immediately upon Vandover's revealing that he has been in a shipwreck
down the coast, Toby exclaims, “The Mazatlan!” Toby soon informs Vandover that twenty-three
died in the sinking and among them was a victim of particular interest: “a little Jew named
Brann, diamond expert; he jumped overboard and – ” (410). Here, Vandover interjects with
revulsion: “ 'Don't!'...'I saw him drown – it was sickening' ” (410). Perhaps talking a bit too
much ahead of himself, Toby excitedly indicts those responsible for Brann's death: “ 'Well, wait
till I tell you,' ” he exclaims, “ 'the authorities here are right after that first engineer with a sharp
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stick, and some of the passengers, too, for not taking him in. A woman in one of the other boats
saw it all and gave the whole thing away. A thing like that is regular murder, you know' ” (411).
Not only has the previously abstract identity of the “little Jew of the plush cap” taken on
an actual name and role (albeit economic: salesman and diamond expert), but Vandover has also
been implicated in murder. The sense of guilt is palpable, but we can also understand the
rationale of those on the overcrowded lifeboat, including Vandover, who may have faced
imminent peril in hauling one of their fellows over the side into the boat. The drowning of Brann
pits guilt and responsibility against a seemingly pragmatic preservation of the group. The
engineer's utilitarian argument possibly saves the entire party aboard, and for this, it is difficult to
fault him as a moral agent. However, we might ask numerous questions about his conduct (as
well as that of others aboard). While an additional oar (Norris makes it clear they have no
spares) could not be offered, could a hand have been extended to the man, allowing him to stick
it out the best he could without risking capsizing the boat? Very risky business, and most likely
improbable at best, but a question worth asking when one's life is at stake. Why did no one in the
boat offer themselves, abdicating their place for that of Brann's? Once again, a most
unreasonable request but one still worth asking? Although Vandover and like-minded others
could not initially ignore the suffering of a fellow, making it clear they have some sort of ethical
capacity and urges, once the reality of Vandover's situation sets in, he cannot easily dismiss his
own preservation, even to the detriment of a man he had just recognized as his fellow and
counterpart in suffering moments before. Obviously, nature seems to reign supreme in the chaos
of the sinking of the Mazatlan, but questions of responsibility and obligation are not left without
substance either.
Vandover's earlier relationship with Ida Wade also raises some key questions in the novel.
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While no prostitute or woman of ill repute by any means, Ida apparently belongs to that class of
women by which the reputation of a promising young man of the middle class might be
compromised at best or perhaps even scandalized at worst:
Ida Wade belonged to a certain type of young girl that was very common in
the city. She was what men, among each other, called “gay,” though that was the
worst that could be said of her. She was virtuous, but the very fact that it was
necessary to say so was enough to cause the statement to be doubted.... She loved
to have a “gay” time, which for her meant to drink California champagne, to
smoke cigarettes, and to kick at the chandelier. She was still virtuous and meant to
stay so.... Only those – like Vandover – who knew her best, knew her for what she
was, for Ida was morbidly careful of appearances, and as jealous of her reputation
as only fast girls are. (338)
Apparently Ida is what some would consider “loose” or “fast,” a girl who makes for a good time
but certainly not one with which any “self-respecting” and relatively leisured man would want to
freely associate. Nonetheless, Vandover spends a good deal of time ducking in and out of
reputable crowds with her as well as some moments in privacy, which results, not surprisingly for
a naturalist novel, in Ida's pregnancy and eventual demise.
The prospect of being seen alongside young Ida Wade nearly obsesses Vandover, and yet
he cannot willingly rid himself of her acquaintance altogether. Neglect seems to be the theme for
the two's relationship, with Vandover constantly failing to communicate with Ida, to take her
needs or situation seriously. Instead, outside of a night's romp, Vandover frequently ignores her
to the point of neglect, most notably in the days after one particular encounter between the two.
Bessie, Ida's good friend, informs Vandover that something is drastically wrong with Ida and that
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she must speak with him immediately; her dire disposition points to the earnestness of Ida's need
to speak with Vandover. Completely aware of the nature of the encounters Ida and he have had in
the last few weeks, Vandover gives no value whatsoever to Bessie's pleas, or to those of Ida, for
that matter. She is merely a far removed object that consumes no more of his time than a petty
dalliance. Frustrated, isolated, abandoned, and altogether fearful for her future and reputation as
a single mother, Ida finally commits suicide. Vandover never once bothers to see what may have
been ailing her. In a hurry to make a downtown appointment, Geary stops by to inform Vandover
that she has killed herself by taking laudanum and that he can learn more about it in the
newspaper. Retreating to the bath, Vandover reemerges to pick up the morning paper and read
more about Ida's death:
At first he could not find it, and then it suddenly jumped into prominence from out
the gray blur of the print on an inside page beside an advertisement of a charity
concert for the benefit of a home for incurable children. There was a picture of
Ida taken from a photograph like one that she had given him, and which even then
was thrust between the frame and glass of his mirror. He read the article through;
it sketched her life and character and the circumstances of her death with the
relentless terseness of the writer cramped for space. According to this view, the
causes of her death were unknown. “It had been remarked that she had of late
been despondent and in ill health.” (369)
Pushed to meet a deadline, the journalist assigned to obituaries apparently weeds through Ida's
entire life, cutting straight to the “important” details. Norris suggests that Ida's individuality is
somehow lost; Ida's life is stuffed into a short and concise narrative for the papers, a framed
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retelling of her life tailored to fit a 2” x 1” box that hardly does it justice. 41 Moreover, despite its
unavoidable flaws, if ever there was an obituary written indirectly to indict another, then Ida's
obituary should suffice.
Vandover is clearly implicated in her death, and the fact that he had a hand in Ida's demise
sets in immediately and weighs heavily upon him. Dropping the paper, Vandover realizes his
guilt:
In a low voice under his breath he said:
“What have I done? What have I done now?”
Like the sudden unrolling of a great scroll he saw his responsibility for her
death and for the ruin of that something in her which was more than life. What
would become of her now? And what would become of him? For a single brief
instant he tried to persuade himself that Ida had consented after all. But he knew
that this was not so. She had consented, but he had forced her consent; he was
none the less guilty. And then in that dreadful moment when he saw things in their
true light, all the screens of conventionality and sophistry torn away, the words
that young Haight had spoken came back to him. No matter if she had consented,
it was his duty to have protected her, even against herself. (370)
The weight of his responsibility sinks in, and this realization is nearly unbearable. Always the
man of a life of comfort, leisure, and ease, Vandover's world has been upturned. It is apparent
that nothing will ever be the same again. Vandover alternates between moments of self-pity,
guilt, compassion, and self-loathing. “At every moment now he saw the different consequences
41 The criticism of the obituary's shortcomings will find affinities with Dos Passos's and West's critiques of mass
discourse as well. Specifically, each author condemns “mass-marketed” language as a stain upon being,
attempting to represent life within the parameters of the market.
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of what he had done,” states the narrator, “Now, it was that his life was ruined.... Now, it was a
furious revolt against his mistake that had led him to such a fearful misunderstanding of Ida....
Now, it was a wave of immense pity for the dead girl that overcame him.... Now, it was a terror
for himself” (370-71). Vandover decides to confess his sins to his father a couple of nights later,
revealing the sordid details of his relationship with Ida and that his seduction and neglect are the
causes of her death. Although Vandover's responsibility may no longer be at question, what
remains unclear here, however, is his motivation for confessing. Norris does not make it
explicitly clear whether or not this confession is the result of guilt and penitence or merely the
product of a young man seeking any form of comfort and solace he may possibly find – in other
words, someone trying to cope with the gravity of his situation.
Whatever the case may be for his confession, Vandover's guilt soon begins to manifest
itself physically, in his pale and deathly appearance, his feverish starts, his nervous trembling.
Most notable are Vandover's repeated episodes of nausea, sickness, hysteria, and paranoia,
however. Hoping to run into someone he knows after his breakfast at the Imperial following his
return from the shipwreck, a relatively smug Vandover chances upon Ida's mother, dressed for
mourning. “It was like a blow between the eyes,” Norris writes; “Vandover caught his breath and
started violently, feeling again for an instant the cold grip of the hysterical terror that had so
nearly overcome him on the morning of Ida's death” (412). Later in the novel, upon learning that
he has spent his entire inheritance, Vandover's waste immediately conjures the visceral sensations
felt in his reactions to Ida's death. “The blow was strong enough, sudden enough to penetrate
even Vandover's clouded and distorted wits,” the narrator observes; “His nerves were gone in a
minute, a sudden stupefying numbness fell upon his brain, and the fear of something unknown,
the immense unreasoning terror that” took hold of “him for the first time the morning after Ida
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Wade's suicide came back upon him, horrible, crushing, so that he had to shut his teeth against a
wild hysterical desire to rush through the streets screaming and waving his arms” (541). The
sensations felt at these particular moments are short-lived but are not without precedent, nor are
they isolated cases as Vandover's feelings of persecution and episodes of nausea and hysteria
occur with regularity throughout the novel, often culminating in his dog “performances,” which
result in his complete debasement and loss of self altogether. In fact, the novel ends with
Vandover's decay as the result, finally, of the imposition of the other. The cruel boy that looks
down at Vandover does not merely point to some sort of pessimistic debasement of the self but,
instead, signals the unbridgeable distance between the self and the other that cannot be
maintained symmetrically nor accounted for. 42 It is a refusal to harmonize the scrutinizing and
commanding gaze of another with what we see as the extreme denigration of humanity in the
form of the servant.
Vandover and the Brute's episodes of trauma and sickness point to a construct of
subjectivity that is radically different from any other projected in nineteenth-century letters.
While Norris's literary predecessors were often more worried about a clearly humanistic notion
of responsibility and agency, whether characters are facing hardship or not, Norris sought a
perspective from which the agent could be viewed as limited by a world of refractory obstacles,
much like the world we are constantly battered with in our own lives – a world that seems to
deter our efforts and which we cannot command, yet one in which we possess responsibility for

42 Sure, Vandover's degradation can be loosely accounted for through his proneness to drink, sex, and other vices,
but this is really just a circuitous account. What sets Vandover apart from any other human being? Is he the only
one given in to vices? Furthermore, and most importantly, what makes Vandover (or anyone for that matter)
prone to these perceived moral flaws? Why do these even have to be moral flaws? In reality, the perception of
Vandover's nature as morally corrupt is probably more the product of historical context and conditioning (on the
part of the reader) than it is anything else. While we can account for Vandover's fall through vice, we cannot
account for the mastery that others wield over him.
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our lives and those of our fellows nonetheless. So much of Norris's writings stress the
inarticulacy of individuals, their inability to communicate with one another as well as to express
themselves and reflect. McTeague's ignorance and stupidity limit his ability to understand the
conditions that determine his life and the lives of those around him. Vandover's loss of physical
and mental functioning, likewise, keeps him from retaining his social position and acting in a
manner that would signal a man not only in control of his self and faculties but also his
relationships with others. What both lack is the capability to give an account of themselves
before their interlocutors. Link thinks that the inarticulate nature of such characters (their
inability to speak or act self-reflexively) underscores the fact of their abject subjectivity. “To
limit self-awareness,” he says, “is to increase the amount of seeming determinism, resulting in
the naturalist 'brute.'” 43 While we may have difficulty in condemning such a figure who lacks
self-control and self-consciousness, from my perspective the inarticulate “brute” is also an image
of ethical inadequacy, his ability to confront relationships through his own liking or on his own
terms completely nullified. In Norris, inarticulate subjectivity cannot explain itself and it cannot
find answers or seek affirmative results but, most importantly, it cannot delimit others no matter
how hard it may try. Dispossessed of the capacity to speak and to act, the inarticulate subject
finds no safe home or ground from which to establish terms that will make the world of others
somehow familiar.
Interestingly, such an approach risks obfuscation. Mary Lawlor thinks that we cannot
justify a definitive ethical reading of Vandover and McTeague because the narrator (in each
novel) seems “lost” and confused, incapable of offering any definitive moral statement. For
instance, as Lawlor claims, in Vandover, the narrator takes “a position separate from that of
43 Lecture given at the University of Tennessee, Feb. 27, 2013.
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Vandover and yet” also shares Vandover's “murky and incoherent way of seeing the world” (62).
Similarly, in the closing sections of McTeague, we see narrative voice frequently merge with
McTeague's sensibility while he also seems to escape the controlling definitions of the narrator
(witnessed earlier in the novel) the further he travels from San Francisco. According to Lawlor,
narrative perspectives in Norris's “Western” novels are not unlike those of Crane, particularly in
“The Blue Hotel,” which finds a narrator “as awkwardly situated as his central characters” (62).
“In these and other ways, then,” Lawlor argues, “the narrators of naturalist Westerns appear
nearly as vulnerable to epistemological and ethical confusion as the characters they describe”
(63). I agree with Lawlor that neither Norris nor Crane, for that matter, offers a definitive ethical
system, one that gives us a guide for moral and self conduct, and much of the confusion she finds
present in narrative voice should point to the recalcitrance of these authors to offer such a
definitive system. Such a refusal, however, does not negate the ethical sincerity of these
novelists, 44 particularly Stephen Crane, whose narrators and characters, while often uncertain
about events, should not be mistaken as evidence for Crane's merely casting human life “under
the bus” of determinism.

44 I do not wish to imply by this that Lawlor thereby denies their sincerity. She acknowledges these concerns on
behalf of the naturalists she mentions as explored very much in earnest. I simply wish to suggest that moral
confusion in these authors should not be conflated with lack of any sort of statement about the nature of ethics,
which is an unfortunate tendency we have had in our critical history.
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V. STEPHEN CRANE AND INDISCRIMINATE JUDGMENT
If ever there was an author to completely dispel our pessimism and general ill will regarding
naturalism, Stephen Crane is the man. To read Crane's works nowadays, especially his fiction,
and to derive no moral substance whatsoever is akin to eating an Oreo, Vienna Fingers, ice cream
sandwich, whatever delicious treat with center filling of your choice, and completely neglecting
the appeal of the middle. The primary task with Crane is not revealing him as an author
concerned about humankind's position in the cosmos or the individual's position in society (these
things should be self-evident in his writing), but in coming to terms with Crane's ethics, which
tend to be harsh and unrelenting. When Crane emerged in the literary market place in the early
1890s, he did so by striking the eyes of the literary world like a mysterious flash in the night:
disruptive, chaotic, and gone before readers ever quite knew for certain what to make of him and
his works, which represented a depiction of contemporary urban American life hitherto without
parallel. Of course, Howells' and Garland's reviews could often be favorable and encouraging, as
well as that of a good deal of other critics who thought The Red Badge of Courage, in particular,
a remarkable achievement. Crane's relatively positive critical reception, however, was not
always met with a similar popular reaction, with poor marketing returns before Red Badge and in
the later part of Crane's short writing career as well. In fact, published in serialization, Red
Badge was Crane's only market success; his fiction largely did not sell well, and his poetry was
commercially disastrous. No matter what his reception at the time, though, Crane's (like Norris's)
certainly marks one of the tragic literary careers in American literature, and today our national
canon no doubt suffers from a life cut short by poor health and marred (at least publicly) through
scandal. Crane's career lasted only six years or so (some of those years spent reporting
internationally for various publications and newspapers), yet he stands as one of the most prolific
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writers we have. Unfortunately, while an amazing and groundbreaking text, we often conflate his
entire oeuvre with one novel: Red Badge. Since that's the case, however, Red Badge serves as an
appropriate starting point for our discussion. The novel may not be Crane's best material for a
Levinasian reading, yet, without a doubt, Red Badge firmly evinces the moral gravity of Crane's
intellectual and aesthetic agenda, signaling Crane's difficulty with accepting any conventional
understanding of the moral agent.
When the war bells toll for young Henry Fleming, he does not gain the reaction from his
mother that he had hoped. “Long despair[ing] of witnessing a Greeklike struggle,” Henry cannot
be any more excited at his departure for the Union army, a day he thought he would never see.
Yet, there she was at his leaving, offering absolutely nothing of what he expects. Although two
tears stream down his mother's face, “she had disappointed him by saying nothing whatever
about returning with his shield or on it” (6). Henry's grasp upon battle here tends far too much
towards the Greek, towards the time of Homer and Achilles, Herodotus and Leonides, a time
unlike his own now that “[m]en were better, or more timid...,” their “throat-grappling instinct”
effaced (5). Instead of offering him a platform upon which to give his heroic departure speech
(the likes of which might not have been seen since Odysseus, we get the sense Henry thinks),
Henry's mother only leaves him with advice and warnings, precautionary measures that she hopes
will return her son to her one day, unharmed and unscathed. Henry, however, is not worried, as
his confidence in his own fighting prowess seems to ensure both his safety and battlefield
excellence.
Henry quickly learns that the actual field of battle inverts every previous estimate he may
have possessed. At the first encounter of his regiment with Confederate soldiers, Henry notes
how the men simply refuse to behave like those who would be conquerors. He looks up and
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down his company's ranks to observe their striking mannerisms and behavior, noting the inability
of his comrades to conform to the heroic and the Greek:
There was a singular absence of heroic poses. The men bending and
surging in their haste and rage were in every impossible attitude. The steel
ramrods clanked and clanged with incessant din as the men pounded them
furiously into the hot rifle barrels. The flaps of the cartridge boxes were all
unfastened, and bobbed idiotically with each movement. The rifles, once loaded,
were jerked to the shoulder and fired without apparent aim into the smoke or at
one of the blurred and shifting forms which upon the field before the regiment had
been growing larger and larger like puppets under a magician's hand.
The officers, at their intervals, rearward, neglected to stand in picturesque
attitudes. (29)
Not one of Henry's fellows acts as those statues of fortitude and strength that he has pictured in
his naïve childhood. Pizer correctly identifies this baptism of fire in Henry's life education: war
serves as a metaphor for the emergence of youth into knowledge, a violent process, which
propels the adolescent into an awareness of the world that is somehow other than what he has
previously known. Instead of the rational, men are controlled by the accidental and the
unheroic. 45 Henry finds himself, unwittingly, somewhere between cognizance (of himself and
his surroundings) and complete ignorance of the world and others. Even nature – that inviting
offering in which humankind often finds recourse to comfort and emotional support – provides
no solace or home for the young Henry. Giving the bloodshed he has witnessed, Henry is simply
astonished at the unwillingness (or inability) of nature to provide some sign of support or even to
45 “Nineteenth-Century American Naturalism: An Essay in Definition.”

113

offer some suggestion of the significance of the events he has just witnessed. “As he gazed
around him the youth felt a flash of astonishment at the blue, pure sky and the sun gleamings on
the trees and the fields,” Crane writes; “It was surprising that Nature had gone tranquilly on with
her golden process in the midst of so much devilment” (31). Henry finds, to his amazement, an
unyielding and callous universe, unsympathetic to the endeavors of “tiny” men lost in its maze.
This first encounter with an obstinate world, however, does not keep him from placing his faith
in a world that can somehow offer him and his fellows with some sort of outlet for comfort and a
seal of guarantee for what it is that they are doing – for whatever goal they are expending their
better years and risking their lives.
As Henry recovers from his initial battle experience and slowly realizes the gravity of his
situation, his company continues on, into that vast, limitless space that exists as unknown yet to
the youthful soldier. Henry has observed nature's indifference, has observed its seemingly
unabashed resistance to those things that would seem meaningful and significant in human lives,
yet he still clings to some ideal that might solidify his quest – provide his endeavor with a
blessing. Turning away from the scene of battle, Henry's company marches on through those
seemingly agitating stretches that, I'd imagine, have to mark the interstices of warfare. “This
landscape gave him assurance. A fair field holding life,” states the narrator. “It was the religion
of peace. It would die if its timid eyes were compelled to see blood. He conceived Nature to be
a woman with a deep aversion to tragedy” (37). Wandering away from the field of battle, Henry
attempts to make sense out of what he has witnessed by placing these images of violence and
suffering within a discourse he understands – one that allows such suffering to bless human
endeavors with meaning. “The youth wended, feeling that Nature was of his mind,” claims the
narrator; “She reenforced his argument with proofs that lived where the sun shone” (38). Feeling
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satisfied with himself, Henry nearly stumbles into the mud and murk of a swamp, paying no great
heed to how his step may be impeded by the mire of that thick and heavy ground which he
encounters:
At length he reached a place where the high, arching boughs made a
chapel. He softly pushed the green doors aside and entered. Pine needles were a
gentle brown carpet. There was a religious half light.
Near the threshold he stopped, horror-stricken at the sight of a thing.
He was being looked at by a dead man who was seated with his back
against a columnlike tree. The corpse was dressed in a uniform that once had been
blue, but was now faded to a melancholy shade of green. The eyes, staring at the
youth, had changed to the dull hue to be seen on the side of a dead fish. The
mouth was open. Its red had changed to an appalling yellow. Over the gray skin
of the face ran little ants. One was trundling some sort of a bundle along the upper
lip. (38)
Moving through the shade of the trees, Henry suddenly finds himself paralyzed by the calcifying
body of a dead Union soldier. Henry has no words for the encounter, which is beyond his limited
field of experience. “The youth gave a shriek as he confronted the thing. He was for moments
turned to stone before it,” Crane writes. “He remained staring into the liquid-looking eyes. The
dead man and the living man exchanged a long look. Then the youth cautiously put one hand
behind him and brought it against a tree. Leaning upon this he retreated, step by step, with his
face still toward the thing” (38). For Henry, an entire world has been revealed, and not one that
he might have expected. Hoping to penetrate into the inner being of nature, he pushes the limbs
aside only to discover the abject wretchedness of the corpse. Crane extends himself here – he
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goes beyond merely describing a shocking encounter that we might think a natural fact of war.
He wants us to notice the abject suffering that is the waste of warfare, yet he also wants us to
identify the manner in which mass suffering often reduces individual pain to inanimate “thing-afi-cation.” The soldier's body lies in repose, far away from the great scenes of battle that would
make conquerors out of men. Yet, his body remains merely a thing, an untouchable object that
neither Henry nor any other soldier can accept as the body of a fellow human being. The thing
imposes itself not only as the morbid object of some sort of summer sci-fi film but as a real
entity, devoid of any sort of markers of human identification. The thing is a thing, and nothing
else can be said for it. And Henry has no mental resources to deal with it, quite literally.
The loss of the dead soldier's identity as a human being should not be mistaken as Crane's
simply imposing upon Henry's misunderstanding of the world and of himself. The inability to
recognize the dead soldier as something human here should signal the extent to which we often
attempt to contain the suffering of individuals in narratives that are somehow larger than their
individual parts, narratives that often take such horror for granted for the sake of nation, ideas, or
any other mass ethic that tends to overlook singular suffering. Regardless of their dissension
over Crane's moral outlook, critics have long noted his disregard for conventional morality in
Red Badge. Taking what were for him erroneous symbolic readings of Red Badge as a “spiritual
crisis...in a pattern of Christian symbolism and reference,” Walcutt argues that such a reading “is
possible only to a reader who does not participate in Crane's passionate idealistic indignation
with the hypocrisies of traditional public morality” (296). Walcutt continues by recognizing the
development of moral relativism not only during the 1890s but even during a relatively
conservative period like the 1950s (as Walcutt was writing). Such relativism, according to
Walcutt, “is color-blind to the bright red flame of Crane's earnestness, and so it can read patterns
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into his work that would never occur to one who felt the immediate shock of his true colors”
(296). No doubt that nature's indifference in the text makes resuscitating any moral
interpretations of Red Badge more difficult, and this indifference cannot be overlooked; 46
however, neither should we commit any oversights by eliding over the often neglectful role of
public morality in the novel. Crane takes to task mass ethics like nationalism, patriotism, and
even the redemptive power of Christianity (when used to rationalize violence), as Walcutt
suggests.
Conder thinks that Crane's condemnation of mass ethics signals the author's recognition
of the social conditions of morality. For Crane, morality is socially-situated rather than given; in
other words, Crane finds morality the product of social conditioning and historical factors rather
than that of any Absolute, a fact that, in Conder's opinion, connects directly with Crane's
determinism (54-55). Referring to Henry's memory of his mother's advice to him before his
departure, Conder writes that “[t]he complex of attitudes that shape Henry's environment become
instrumental factors determining his subsequent behavior, and the flashback is a central element
of the novel's deterministic vision” because it reveals the “chain of causation” in events that lead
from Henry's mother's advice to his panic at running and on to his ultimate guilt over his actions
(54). As Conder offers, Henry's sense of morality, of right and wrong, is both the effect of his

46 The novel's ending, however, appears somewhat ambiguous about the text's previous infatuation with natural
indifference:
He had rid himself of the red sickness of battle. The sultry nightmare was in the past. He had been
an animal blistered and sweating in the heat and pain of war. He turned now with a lover's thirst to images
of tranquil skies, fresh meadows, cool brooks – an existence of soft and eternal peace.
Over the river a golden ray of sun came through the hosts of leaden rain clouds. (104)
While the one ray of golden sunlight breaking through the numbers of dark clouds in the distance does suggest
hope or something like it, the implication also remains that these clouds possess the potential to burst again at
some point in time, probably sooner rather than later (indeed, they had just minutes before). Perhaps the ending
points more towards the continuous cycle of ups and downs that characterizes humankind's perceptive
relationship with nature than to a future with unbridled optimism.
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earlier behavioral training and the cause of his subsequent sense of fear and guilt. Thus, for
Crane, “even morality” must be placed “within a behavioral rather than an ethical framework”
(Conder 55). This ethical outlook in Crane, as Conder finds, cannot be divorced from his
naturalism, a suggestion that would seem to make reading Crane as an ethicist, or Red Badge as a
moral resource, for that matter, even more daunting.
If we cannot make some distinction between morality as an objective set of
commandments and morality as a set of behavioral preconditions, or between acting “ethically”
and acting as a social product, then how can we arrive at any conclusive understanding of proper
conduct or even of human suffering? We might rightfully ask how we can arrive at any notion of
ethics premised upon praise and blame, a category so seemingly essential for millenia of Western
ethical thought. Response to suffering may merely be the enacting of our social roles and our
historically-situated selves, rather than any really meaningful action that can be either validated
or condemned. Donald B. Gibson, who takes a soft approach to Crane's determinism, offers that
our imperfect knowledge of how these intricate processes work, our imperfect understanding of
ourselves in the universe depicted by Red Badge, leads to our inability to gain any control over
our lives or the suffering of others, an insight that directly echoes the moral anxieties of the
earlier Maggie:A Girl of the Streets. This inability to gain control can only mean our lack of
responsibility, Gibson claims; however, Red Badge also demonstrates the earlier optimism of a
text like The Sullivan County Sketches, wherein humans are assumed “to be potentially free,
though limited not by external forces, but by [their] own psychic being which until freed by
conscious activity from the dominance of nature cannot exercise freedom of will” (89). Such a
contradiction in philosophical outlooks quite possibly explains the inability of critics to arrive at
a consensus over Red Badge, “even in the most basic terms” (89), Gibson resolves. The
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challenge encountered here is that we know naturalists take the suffering of individuals very
seriously, but it is far less clear how this necessarily translates into something like ethics, or even
to a system that can inscribe an ethical language with familiar and comforting terms like right
and wrong, praise and blame. Just as there's a real sense of loss and responsibility for the Swede
on the behalf of the Easterner 47 at the ending of “The Blue Hotel,” there remains a sincere regard
for Henry's struggle in a world marked by fear and seemingly no recourse for help. Instead of
dismissing suffering and dismissing ethics as the epiphenomenon of social discourses and
practices, Crane thinks we can do better than what his critics have previously offered.
Furthermore, thinking about Crane's ethics in a conventional language of determinism, or of
accountability as well, is approaching Crane and naturalism in a manner that simply cannot do
their ethics justice. Obligation and responsibility in Crane, as in Levinas, cannot be placed into a
language of criteria or evaluation – a language of praise and blame, so to speak. We can never be
truly “good” or truly fulfill our moral duty; there can be no degrees of moral fulfillment. Rather,
our obligation is unconditional, a precondition of our subjectivity that helps explain naturalism's
inability to separate moral action from non-rational subjectivity. Determinism in Crane does not
limit our duty; however, it helps define our duty. The contradictions Gibson and others rightfully
point out should therefore not limit our approach; instead, these may very well aid it. This
challenge starts with Crane's disruption of Henry's moral self and character, which finds the
disruption of our agency critical in the decentralization of rational selfhood and ethics.
Henry eventually recovers from his shock at witnessing the morbid curiosity inside
nature's chapel, the dead soldier of the “liquid-looking eyes,” and he moves on to experience

47 Despite Gibson's claim that Crane's portrayal of the Swede signals the extent of his contempt for the character
(113-14).
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other battles. While his previous unchecked faith has been shaken to the core by the horrifying
and grisly scenes of battle, Henry still possesses an unwarranted capacity for rationalizing his
fear and shortcomings: “His self-pride was now entirely restored. In the shade of its flourishing
growth he stood with braced and self-confident legs.... He had performed his mistakes in the
dark, so he was still a man” (68). Henry reflects upon his performance in battle and the capacity
in which he left the terrifying scene:
He had been out among the dragons, he said, and he assured himself that they
were not so hideous as he had imagined them. Also, they were inaccurate; they
did not sting with precision. A stout heart often defied, and defying, escaped.
And, furthermore, how could they kill him who was the chosen of gods and
doomed to greatness?
He remembered how some of the men had run from the battle. As he
recalled their terror-struck faces he felt scorn for them. They had surely been
more fleet and more wild than was absolutely necessary. They were weak mortals.
As for himself, he had fled with discretion and dignity. (69)
Henry's inflated self-confidence easily runs hand-in-hand with his extreme fear and, in fact, is the
result of this fear. His self-image does not coincide with his actual experience, no matter how
hard he might try to convince himself otherwise. Mitchell thinks that the actions that change
Henry result from nothing more than an uncontrollable series of disparate desires. “From our
perspective, in fact, he appears fragmented by the very syntax of his presentation, leaving his
emotions, thoughts, and behavior profoundly unaligned,” Mitchell attests. “Crane was aware of
the powerful impulse (of readers as well as characters) to transform those contradictory impulses
called 'Henry Fleming' into a moral agent” (xiv). Obviously, by novel's end, Henry has once
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again returned to his previous self-assurance, although this time he seems much more tempered.
Just as his relationship with nature appears cyclical in terms of whether nature should be
perceived as inviting, indifferent, or even callous, Henry's consciousness follows a cyclical
motion as well: at times he is confident, satisfied, and upbeat; other times he is alert, cautious,
and unsure. No matter what the case may be, Crane spares no effort in demonstrating the role of
fear in each of these cycles – that is, fear seems to influence all perception for Henry, and so it is
difficult to take something like his moments of confidence, for instance, at face value. Rather, as
Mitchell suggests, consciousness in Crane remains relegated to disorder and disarray, hardly the
stuff of which a coherent moral agent should be made and certainly not one that any conventional
systematic ethical approach would tend to construct. “The naturalists...denied any hope
of...release from circumstance,” Mitchell argues, “by excluding the very category of the self, in
the process making all questions of intention and subjectivity seem irrelevant....For them, one
person's moral anguish differed little from another's craving for prunes, since all they needed to
define a character was a certain sequence of actions” (15). According to Mitchell, quite possibly
naturalism's greatest achievement “was to estrange us from the very notion of a self” (32).
Mitchell has the right idea here in that “questions of intention and subjectivity” 48 are
essentially nullified by naturalism. What Mitchell lacks, though, is a proper framework from
which we can work with this nullification yet still understand “one person's moral anguish” as a
far greater matter than “another's craving for prunes.” Levinas provides us with such a
framework, whereby matters of intention or rational selfhood have no bearing really upon ethics
or ethical subjectivity (which, for Levinas, is not rational and is far from a coherent or unitary
state of being). Naturalism's scenes of abjection both challenge and affirm our vulnerability to
48 By “subjectivity,” I interpret Mitchell to mean the self as a coherent, rational agent – the self of realism.
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the power of the other. While other critics (like Mitchell) have noticed the disruption of selfhood
by experience in naturalism, we have as of yet to make a connection with this alterity, its
deconstruction of the self, and the possibility offered here for a new approach. Although Red
Badge may be a difficult place to begin with demonstrating Crane's construct of responsibility
(and how the disruption of our every intention plays a role in this responsibility), other Crane
texts provide us with sufficient grounds for such readings.
The Red Badge of Courage destabilizes conventional subjectivity and public morality,
identifying a world wherein the self is bombarded by chaos, motion, and instability, much like
the world of battles and obstinate nature/matter that Henry observes. We see the origins of these
concerns in the earlier Maggie, where Crane also examines the role of public morality
(particularly Christian discourses and those of bourgeois civility) as well as that of capitalism in
shaping the lives and destinies of his characters. Here too people die, not from wounds sustained
on the field of battle but from the abject conditions located at society's margins and from the
neglect of that same bipolar society that tends to strand lost selves somewhere between Christian
or civil fellowship and consumer desire. Such a position can be found in the slums, somewhere
in that New York Bowery that Crane so intensely describes and to which he feels so intimately
devoted. As early as Hamlin Garland, Crane's affinity for the slums, for the abject and the
outcast, was noted as a decisive trait of the young author's personality and artistic ambition. In
his review for Arena, Garland writes that Maggie
is of more interest to me, both because it is the work of a young man, and also
because it is the work of astonishingly good style. It deals with poverty and vice
and crime also, but it does so, not out of curiosity, not out of salaciousness, but
because of a distinct art impulse, the desire to utter in truthful phrase a certain
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rebellious cry. It is the voice of the slums. It is not written by a dilettante; it is
written by one who has lived the life. The young author, Stephen Crane, is a
native of the city, and has grown up in the very scenes he describes. His book is
the most truthful and unhackneyed study of the slums I have yet read, fragment
though it is. (38)
Garland most likely intentionally exaggerates the exploits of Crane's early years as “one who has
lived the life,” yet his point here does not go without some merit. Although Crane by no means
is the first to speak to the seedy side of life, Garland most certainly gets it right when he claims
that Crane is among the first American authors to take the life of the slums seriously and also
treat his material with an artistic depth and stylistic complexity that moves beyond previous
examples of slum fiction. We know Harding Davis was a pioneer in the genre, examining the
depths of life and the negative consequences under a rapidly developing industrial economy, yet
Crane's fiction represents a step forward, at least in moral complexity, possibly even aesthetically
as well. Keith Gandal claims that the “traditional novel of the poor was centered around a moral
struggle and transformation” (40). According to Gandal, “The slum novel is often elaborate in its
description of moral transformation. The exploration of the experience of sin and remorse is
exhaustive; the lesson is not to be missed” (42). Crane, on the other hand, offers a departure
from what basically amounts to a simplified moral argument in an author like Harding Davis, for
instance (40-41). In Crane, “the aesthetic and ethnographic stake goes beyond the intermittent
pursuit of picturesque and exotic sights and becomes a holistic project” that offers a complexity
that cannot be reduced to any simplistic moral tale (40-41). “The experience of Maggie,” Gandal
argues, “the protagonist of the novel, includes no moments of traditional moral drama or
transformation” (52). For Gandal, the conventional slum novel often tends to be crafted (and
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judged) by middle-class standards that, not coincidentally, eschew the reality of working-class
life, molding the world of the poor and the slums into a narrative that much more seems to fit the
moral universe of those privileged enough to afford things like learning and self-development.
Crane refuses to judge the slums, whether those of the Bowery, or anywhere else for that
matter, by the standards of middle class morality and regenerative social and personal narratives.
At the time that Crane was searching for a publisher for his first novel, conventional slum novels
found the market fairly favorable. The fact that Crane was rejected by some publishers before
Maggie finally found serialization is proof alone, for Gandal, that the predominant aim of Crane
in writing the text was to defy a relatively simplistic middle class worldview and its expectations
(39). “Crane never judges his characters in terms of middle class morality,” Gandal states,
“rather, they are in part defined by their relations to its code” (53). As Gandal claims, characters
in Maggie are not defined by the ethical and social codes of the middle-class but by the
environment of the Bowery, an environment that defines morality in a completely different
manner – an environment, for instance, wherein a girl becomes attracted to a man not so much
for his means or money but for his reputation as a street tough (50-51). Admittedly, the book
opens upon a scene that establishes the trend of the novel, that being the fight of the isolated and
singled out individual for his or her survival in a world that constantly thwarts their every effort
to climb ahead:
A very little boy stood upon a heap of gravel for the honor of Rum Alley. He was
throwing stones at howling urchins from Devil's Row who were circling madly
about the heap and pelting at him....
The little champion of Rum Alley stumbled precipitately down the other
side. His coat had been torn to shreds in a scuffle, and his hat was gone. He had
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bruises on twenty parts of his body, and blood was dripping from a cut in his
head....
From a window of an apartment house that upreared its form from amid
squat, ignorant stables, there leaned a curious woman. Some laborers, unloading a
scow at a dock at the river, paused for a moment and regarded the fight. The
engineer of a passive tugboat hung lazily to a railing and watched. Over on the
Island, a worm of yellow convicts came from the shadow of a grey ominous
building and crawled slowly along the river's bank. (3-4)
As little Jimmie defends his honor and that of his street, the rest of the world stands by idly
watching the spectacle, either passively disinterested or unable to help (though we gather the
impression that it's the former). 49 We also quickly learn how Jimmie has developed his violent
nature from the interpretive signals offered us from his father, who promptly delivers Jimmie a
good swift kick. Following his father home, they “entered into a dark region where, from a
careening building, a dozen gruesome doorways gave up loads of babies to the street and the
gutter” (7). Jimmie was once such a babe, given over to “the street and the gutter,” now enacting
that developmental environment in the violent battles of Bowery childhood. While Gandal's
estimate that Crane's characters are primarily products of the Bowery and its ethical code by no
means strays from the truth, they are, however, also products of society at large – products of
discourses of middle class civility and its attendant culture of bourgeois consumerism. In other
words, Maggie, Jimmie, their mother, Pete, and other denizens of the novel are all creations of
49 Gandal claims that a dynamic of spectacle and spectatorship structures much of the novel. Spectacle works as a
diversion, according to Gandal, for the poor. Whether street or bar fights, or Maggie's fascination with the
theater, the ethics of spectacle and diversion distracts the lower class from its actual situation. Certainly, Gandal
is right that the novel often seems oddly fascinated with voyeurism and exhibitionism, watching and performing.
Gandal calls this an “ethics of excitement.”
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middle class ideals, horribly gone awry of course, but, most importantly, are constantly at the
whim of these same ideals which have been inculcated into the collective cultural unconscious of
the neighborhood.
Maggie takes the street scenes of the day-to-day life of the urban American working class
as the grounds for the exploration of some sort of existential or moral drama, yet the influence of
bourgeois cultural standards and pursuits looms large. The novel mostly uses these standards,
though, as a critique of contemporary mainstream America and its attendant values. Maggie
pokes holes in the logic of these values, exposing both the hypocrisy of these social mores and
their far-reaching effects upon those who somehow fall between the cracks, particularly
regarding sexuality and the regulation of the body. After Pete and Maggie have sex, the entire
neighborhood is alerted to the matter with the cohort of women residing at Maggie's tenement
expressing their beliefs with one another that they knew she would come to this all along: “ 'I
could a' tol' yehs dis two years ago,' said a woman, in a key of triumph. 'Yesir, it was over two
years ago dat I says teh my ol' man, I says, “Dat Johnson girl ain't straight,” I says' ” (47). A
culture of repression ironically creates the very product of castigation, labeling Maggie as
somehow other for enacting human nature. Gandal claims that the novel depicts some elements
of Bowery life that open space for alternative ideas regarding pre-marital sexuality (in which
bodies are not so strictly regulated), yet I would argue that Maggie's “slut-shaming” essentially
manifests the middle class attitudes of respectability in terms of the sexual practices of her
community at large, a fact that cannot be avoided, no matter the outlook of specific sexual
enclaves. Furthermore, her mother's hypocritical remonstrations over the behavior of her
daughter throughout the novel, especially at the realization of her daughter's sexuality,
additionally repeats this pattern. Maggie often seems a character harried by two tensions: the
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necessities of the Bowery and the unrealistic morality of middle class respectability that
somehow seems to render judgment. Ultimately, this cultural attitude determines Maggie's fate
and her identification as a prostitute. The entire community becomes implicated in her struggle
and demise, and Crane's critique of the middle class here directly links cultural repression with
individual alienation.
Crane's invective toward bourgeois morality does not stop with sexual mores and norms,
however. Maggie falls victim to consumer culture in her fascination with popular ideals of
romance and sensibility. While the stage performances we see her attend in the novel, as well as
her popular romantic ideals, may be below the appropriate purview of the middle class, these
certainly do project the influence of bourgeois moral narratives and an expanding market for
consumer “goods,” whether personal possessions or aesthetic products marketed for mass
consumption. Unlike her brother 50 and parents, we learn early on that Maggie is endowed with a
heightened sensitivity, however naïve, to the world around her, as well as an imaginative capacity
that often transcends the degrading reality of her environs. Enraptured by Pete's street charms,
which Maggie mistakes for “aristocratic” and world sophistication, Maggie dreams of Pete as one
would a lover directly from the pages of the nineteenth-century popular romance. “Maggie
perceived that here was the beau ideal of a man,” the narrator observes; “Her dim thoughts were
often searching for far away lands where, as God says, the little hills sing together in the
morning. Under the trees of her dream-gardens there had always walked a lover” (25). For the
girl who “grew up in a mud puddle,” Maggie wants so much more, blissfully ignorant to her

50 Even definitively stating that Jimmie has no aesthetic sensibility, though, is difficult. His by no means is as acute
as Maggie's, yet Crane suggests even one like Jimmie can appreciate something greater than the self and the
degradation of his immediate surroundings: “Nevertheless, he had, on a certain star-lit evening, said wonderingly
and quite reverently: 'Deh moon looks like hell, don't it?' ” (21).

127

world: Maggie knows that the conditions she lives in are not good, yet she thinks herself (and
even others) somehow capable of transcending these conditions. “She reflected upon the collar
and cuff factory. It began to appear to her mind as a dreary place of endless grinding,” Crane
writes. “Pete's elegant occupation brought him, no doubt, into contact with people who had
money and manners. It was probable that he had a large acquaintance of pretty girls. He must
have great sums of money to spend” (27). While her sensibility makes Maggie stand out from
her fellows, causing us to pause, her ignorance and inability to “read” people (which are tied to
her sensibility) make her the product of her environment, of lack of access to education and of
constant exposure to a masculinity that can provide her with no higher moral or personal
examples. Crane stresses Maggie's naivete not for the sake of portraying a girl out of step with
her surroundings but for exposing the significance of such a naivete. No more than a bartender
and a tough, Pete cannot provide her with any of the wealth she envisions him possessing, nor
can he provide her with any emotional substance. Maggie's fantastical sentiments and naivete
position her firmly within the world of the Bowery, as well as that of nineteenth-century
America. As her impossible image of Pete grows even more vivid in her mind, Maggie begins to
despise her dresses and wonder what her potential could be if only she could dress like the
women she sees out on the avenues. “She began to note, with more interest, the well-dressed
women she met on the avenues. She envied elegance and soft palms. She craved those
adornments of person which she saw every day on the street, conceiving them to be allies of vast
importance to women,” the narrator states, “Studying faces, she thought many of the women and
girls she chanced to meet, smiled with serenity as though forever cherished and watched over by
those they loved” (35). Given the consumption-minded cultural products offered her (and her
peers), as well as an expanding marketplace for consumer goods in the nineteenth century
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directly linked to the emerging urban middle class, it's no wonder that Maggie falls for the latest
fashions and whims of her society, regardless of the limitations of the Bowery.
Before progressing further, I should offer a word of caution. Crane clearly wants us to
sympathize with Maggie and place some of the blame for her circumstances on her cultural and
economic environment. In doing so, Crane risks subverting his own argument – that ethics and
responsibility are unconditional. While we should be sensitive to Maggie's plight as well as her
positive attributes, we cannot confuse her sweet temperament and desirable personal qualities
with her humanity. Crane risks turning Maggie into the “hooker with a heart of gold,” the young
female misfortunate who, despite hard times, retains her good nature and, therefore, proves
worthy of our approval and sympathy. Such a characterization of her humanity proves
contingent on performance, eliciting our judgment rather than our obligation. By performing a
role we might find culturally recognizable and morally desirable (troubled woman with dark past
but of outstanding virtue), Crane turns Maggie's humanity into a concept rather than a product of
our fundamental obligation. As with Levinas, we cannot distinguish between the deserving and
the undeserving, or the virtuous poor and the wicked poor in this case. Each and everyone is
deserving – a product of obligation rather than cultural production, sympathy, or even rational
intention. To this extent, Crane weakens his own argument, but this should not negate his
emphasis upon our complicity in Maggie's plight or in that of others. Indeed, one of Crane's
primary objectives is to force us into a recognition of our guilt regardless of how far removed
from a specific moral dilemma we may seem. For Crane, this guilt resides in our participation in
society – an inescapable fact.
Consumerism, as just one example of this guilt, shapes much of Maggie's understanding
of romantic relationships and gender roles in the novel; it also greatly determines much of her
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moral outlook and worldview. Throughout the novel, Maggie and Pete attend several popular
stage performances. As noted by a few critics of the era, most notably the British intellectual
A.R. Orage, these mass theater productions often served mostly as a diversion for the working
class, rather than providing them with anything mentally stimulating or meaningful, which, for
Orage, meant disrupting the class system and the capitalist class ownership of artistic
production. 51 In Maggie, these productions inculcate a feel-good sentimentality and bourgeois
moral ideals regarding the relationship between wealth and human character: 52
Evenings during the week he [Pete] took her to see plays in which the
brain-clutching heroine was rescued from the palatial home of her guardian, who
is cruelly after her bonds, by the hero with the beautiful sentiments. The latter
spent most of his time out at soak in pale-green snow storms, busy with a nickelplated revolver, rescuing aged strangers from villains.
Maggie lost herself in sympathy with the wanderers swooning in snow
storms beneath happy-hued church windows. And a choir within singing “Joy to
the World.” To Maggie and the rest of the audience this was transcendental
realism....Viewing it, they hugged themselves in ecstatic pity of their imagined or
real condition.
The girl thought the arrogance and granite-heartedness of the magnate of

51 Orage served as the editor for the modernist little magazine The New Age from 1907-1924. Many of his
editorials expounded his ideas about socialist economics as well as railed against mass culture, particularly in
Britain; however, aside from other British artists and intellectuals, like George Bernard Shaw, Ezra Pound served
as one notable American contributor for some time around the pre-war years.
52 The Alger myth may be the best popular example of this relationship. The truly upright and honest, no matter
how destitute their origins, will rise above their situation with hard effort and honorable behavior to ultimately
attain wealth. It is not difficult to see the connection between such a myth and the bogus ideologies of latenineteenth-century sociology and pseudo-science, which placed class, ethnicity, and race in direct corrolation
with morality and behavior.

130

the play was very accurately drawn. She echoed the maledictions that the
occupants of the gallery showered on this individual when his lines compelled him
to expose his extreme selfishness. (37-38)
The sweeping moral drama enacted before the audience's eyes, including Maggie, takes them out
of the banality of their day-to-day lives and offers them a picture of the universe supposedly at
harmony within itself – a world capable of setting wrongs right. Significantly, the performance
invokes bourgeois economic and moral ideals in the embodiment of its hero. No matter how hard
his path (in fact, the harder the path, the better), the hero's moral integrity leads him to riches and
social prominence. “In the hero's erratic march from poverty in the first act, to wealth and
triumph in the final one, in which he forgives all the enemies that he has left,” writes Crane, “he
was assisted by the gallery, which applauded his generous and noble sentiments and confounded
the speeches of his opponents by making irrelevant but very sharp remarks” (38). In the path of
the virtuous hero from poverty to wealth, the (otherwise poor) audience participates in the
triumph of industriousness over indolence, of good over evil. They are reminded of the gains to
be had from the sweat of their brow and the callouses of their hands. The performances paint
such an illustrious picture of good work ethic as to make Maggie contented with the possibilities
of the world of right and wrong, possibly even contented with her own world provided she can
find a way to get ahead:
Maggie always departed with raised spirits from the showing places of
melodrama. She rejoiced at the way in which the poor and the virtuous eventually
surmounted the wealthy and wicked. The theater made her think. She wondered
if the culture and refinement she had seen imitated, perhaps grotesquely, by the
heroine on the stage, could be acquired by a girl who lived in a tenement house
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and worked in a shirt factory. (38)
Maggie realizes that there must be some difficulty in a woman of her stature achieving the status
of the play's heroine. Even so, such a world as the one offered by the stage appears within the
realm of attainment, and wealth even seems desirable (although the poor are to be sympathized
with) – if only one works hard enough or feels sensitively enough the depth of human emotion, if
only one proves his or her human worth, he or she can ultimately find a social status unparalleled
by his or her peers. The sense is that moral uprightness, allied with mental fortitude and rich
emotional faculty, can achieve wealth, happiness, and security. Maggie's capacity for
imagination, her sense of self, and her limited awareness of the world, set her apart from the
others who inhabit her community, and while these set her apart from her fellows, these also
often appear at odds with the conditions of her poverty.
Even the final scene of the novel – wherein Maggie's mother performs what essentially
amounts to a role straight from popular sentimentalism to impress her fellow tenants (and,
typically, what would be an act to impress the reader) with the depth of her grief – inverts the
conventions of melodrama. We witness the falsity of the performance as a mere spectacle, and
Crane gives yet another statement on the sensational, on art that does not serve any useful
sociopolitical purpose. In Maggie, people participate in mass culture not so much to be
enlightened, educated, or even entertained; instead, they tend to participate because consumer art
offers them a diversion from the suffering of their daily lives, from the negative effects of class
relations, labor, misogyny, and violence. According to Gandal, Maggie is one of the first novels
depicting people stupefied by mass culture and its formulaic entertainment offerings. “Crane is
of course sardonic about the rabid pleasure-seeking of his Bowery characters,” he writes, “and
Maggie might be described as one of the first novelistic renditions of individuals essentially
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stupefied by mass-culture entertainments” (84). Crane may not be as critical of his characters,
like Maggie, in their pursuits of entertainment options as Gandal suggests, though; instead, his
invective appears more directed towards the options that these individuals are left with, options
that ironically may aid in repeating the cycle of violence and suffering these people endure
because of a refusal to confront these realities, opting, instead, for diversionary stupefaction. In
Maggie, Crane takes on the brunt of mass culture and its reification of human relationships and
society, determined to expose the inanity of art provided to those of little options, without heed to
the adverse effects this could have for his publishing career.
The critique of bourgeois culture and morality also provides an outlet into Crane's
examination of other conventional forms of public morality and social attitudes. Before he
becomes a truck driver, in charge of a team of horses (perhaps one of his sole labor
responsibilities transcribed in the text), adult Jimmie exists mostly as a street idler,
contemptuously observing the ways of men and women, of privileged life passing him by:
On the corners he was in life and of life. The world was going on and he
was there to perceive it.
He maintained a belligerent attitude toward all well-dressed men. To him
fine raiment was allied to weakness, and all good coats covered faint hearts. He
and his order were kings, to a certain extent, over the men of untarnished clothes,
because these latter dreaded, perhaps, to be either killed or laughed at.
Above all things he despised obvious Christians and ciphers with the
chrysanthemums of aristocracy in their button-holes. He considered himself
above both of these classes. He was afraid of neither the devil nor the leader of
society. (18)
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Capitalism, consumer culture, and Christianity all appear aligned in this passage. In nineteenthcentury American culture, we know that class frequently tends to be aligned with Christianity, at
least in the giving of charity and other public religious displays. Public religious functions often
provided a means for the middle class and those above to not only establish themselves in society
but also to ingratiate themselves with the masses as well as demonstrate their relative wealth and
ability to give monetary sums to those less fortunate. As Jimmie loafs about the street corners of
the world, he observes such figures and, while Jimmie's worldview appears much more jaded and
bitter than that of Maggie's, we should not take his observations for granted.
Crane takes fairly substantial measures to critique conventional forms of mass religion,
especially taking aim at the moral hypocrisy and insubstantial moral rationalizing, 53 that some
forms of Christianity can sometimes perpetuate. Early in the novel, Jimmie, an atheistic figure, 54
happens “hilariously in at a mission church where a man composed his sermons of 'yous' ” (17).
Most of the patrons are there only for the warmth provided by the mission's stoves and the
physical nourishment provided by its dollars, not spiritual nourishment or proselytizing. The
mission preacher, however, admonishes the downtrodden patrons that there is a higher calling,
one in which they currently fall short: “While they got warm at the stove, he told his hearers just
where he calculated they stood with the Lord. Many of the sinners were impatient over the
pictured depths of their degradation. They were waiting for soup-tickets” (17). “ 'Where's our
soup?' ” is the only response they can muster under their breaths when the preacher reminds them
they are damned (17). The preacher acts as moral arbiter, in a sense, almost as God, decidedly

53 By moral rationalizing, I mean to suggest some versions of what amount to “God's will” arguments: something
bad or good happens; therefore, God has shown his presence (his will) in the world.
54 “He studied human nature in the gutter, and found it no worse than he thought he had reason to believe it. He
never conceived a respect for the world, because he had begun with no idols that it had smashed” (17).
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assure of who among them has garnered the Lord's favor. Unwilling to concede to the needs of
the flesh, like hunger or warmth, the preacher thinks the needs of the spirit are what they really
need and what they should focus upon. In this case, charity cannot come without an ulterior
motive; giving cannot come without conversion and the reciprocation of others – the people
giving back. A certain reciprocity is required out of the whole game, and we might even say that
the ethical subject (in this case, the preacher) refuses to meet the masses on their own terms,
instead establishing what will only be his.
Elsewhere in the novel, the language of religious moral rhetoric comes under fire. Turned
out of her home by her own mother, Maggie wanders the streets in search of help. She finds a
kindly-looking man, well-dressed, and who she quickly feels confident can help. “The girl had
heard of the Grace of God and she decided to approach this man....,” the narrator states, “But as
the girl timidly accosted him, he gave a convulsive movement and saved his respectability by a
vigorous side-step” (74). The gentleman cannot place his reputation on the line for another; the
social backlash might be stigmatizing at best, ruinous at worst: “He did not risk it to save a soul.
For how was he to know that there was a soul before him that needed saving?” (74). In yet
another scene after Maggie's apparent death, Mary (Maggie's mother), encouraged by others,
deigns to forgive her lost child in a language bathed in corrupt religious principles and moral
hypocrisy. Although Mary has consistently neglected her maternal duties throughout her
children's lives, Maggie's sins are portrayed as spiritually deleterious by Mary and those around
her:
The woman in black came forward and again besought the mourner.
“Yeh'll fergive her, Mary! Yeh'll fergive yer bad, bad chil”! Her life was a
curse an' her days were black an' yeh'll fergive yer bad girl? She's gone where her
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sins will be judged.”
“She's gone where her sins will be judged,” cried the other women, like a
choir at a funeral.
“Deh Lord gives and deh Lord takes away,” responded the others.
“Yeh'll fergive her, Mary!” pleaded the woman in black. The mourner
essayed to speak but her voice gave way. She shook her great shoulders
frantically, in an agony of grief....Finally her voice came and arose like a scream
of pain.
“Oh, yes, I'll fergive her! I'll fergive her!” (85-86)
Crane indicts Mary and those around her as nothing but hypocrites; furthermore, their beliefs are
found morally incomprehensible, incapable of applying for each and every one of us, assuming
we're even able to fully live up to these moral standards. Mary and her fellow tenants manipulate
a religious narrative that utilizes ideals of fate and forgiveness, still placing Mary in the position
of the injured (or abandoned) party. Only Mary looms as the one capable of forgiveness to a
perceived injury committed upon her by Maggie. Perhaps the only other soul in the tenement
capable of something like solidarity or fellowship (despite her obvious flaws 55) is one of
Maggie's neighbors, an aging woman who possesses a music box: “ 'So,' she cried, ' 'ere yehs are
back again, are yehs? An' dey've kicked yehs out? Well, come in an' stay wid me teh-night. I
ain' got no moral standin' ” (70).
Crane raises some very important questions about class and public morality in Maggie.
Quite often, class position and moral perspective run hand-in-hand, delimiting one's ethical

55 Although the old woman has no moral qualms, she is by no means representative of right action. One scene
depicts her stealing.
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options through trite, formulaic cultural productions (whether these be bourgeois sentimentalism,
for instance, or something like conventional forms of middle-class Christianity). Crane
condemns any form of public morality in the novel while he also inquires into personal
responsibility. Aside from Maggie (and whether or not she has any control over her own fate),
perhaps the best characters by which to evaluate Crane's stance on the individual and his or her
moral responsibility come in the figures of Jimmie and Pete. Even broke and without social
options (for mobility), Jimmie carouses about town, taking up the company of women of
misfortune. Once it comes to his attention that his sister might also be one of these women,
Jimmie has to pause and consider how he would feel knowing that one of “his” women might
also be a sister to another man like himself. “Again he wondered vaguely if some of the women
of his acquaintance had brothers,” writes Crane. “Nevertheless, his mind did not for an instant
confuse himself with those brothers nor his sister with theirs” (59). Although a moment of
revelation seems briefly possible, Jimmie proves himself incapable of sympathizing with his
peers (who commit similar acts) and his sister. Instead, Jimmie opts to condemn his sister,
dissociating himself from her perceived sins:
Of course Jimmie publicly damned his sister that he might appear on a
higher social plane. But, arguing with himself, stumbling about in ways that he
knew not, he, once, almost came to a conclusion that his sister would have been
more firmly good had she better known why. However, he felt that he could not
hold such a view. He threw it hastily aside. (60)
Jimmie comes very close to understanding the grave situation his sister is in; however, this
cognitive moment of aid (one of his few, at least in relating to others) lasts only briefly. We
gather, also, that Jimmie's treatment of Hattie does not stray at all from Pete's treatment of
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Maggie, something Jimmie heavily criticizes. Following him, wondering how he might help,
Hattie falls upon Jimmie like a ghost from the past. Jimmie, unwilling to help, only dismisses
her pleas. “Jimmie turned upon her fiercely,” Crane writes, “as if resolved to make a last stand
for comfort and peace” (68). Jimmie wants to live only in the present; he does not wish to
remember the past. Similarly, Pete treats Maggie as a simple object of possession, one that can
easily be cast aside, provided Pete might have other interests or pursuits. “Pete did not consider
that he had ruined Maggie,” observes the narrator; “If he had thought that her soul could never
smile again, he would have believed the mother and brother, who were pyrotechnic over the
affair, to be responsible for it” (71). In a scene similar (perhaps not coincidentally) to that
involving Jimmie and Hattie, Maggie attempts to gain Pete's respect and help; Pete can only
defer. When Maggie asks Pete what her options are now that he and her family have abandoned
her, Pete can only respond angrily. “The question exasperated Pete beyond the powers of
endurance,” writes Crane; “It was a direct attempt to give him some responsibility in a matter
that did not concern him. In his indignation, he volunteered information. 'Oh, go teh hell,' cried
he. He slammed the door furiously and returned, with an air of relief, to his respectability” (73).
Although lacking in social dignity and class position, Pete acts very much like the “respectable”
middle-class man of “chaste black coat,” who parries Maggie's requests directly after her
encounter with Pete. Neither Jimmie nor Pete can totally distance themselves from the troubling
reminders of their past and of their present obligations in Hattie and Maggie.
One of the most striking features of Maggie is Crane's refusal to lend individual need to
discursive structures that would consume particularity. Even so, numerous questions remain
concerning our ability as readers to render any type of judgment upon individuals here. Conder
admits that the novel often parodies the conventions of melodrama, yet refuses to submit to its
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morality; instead, only the environment can be judged morally in Crane. “He [Crane] suggests
that people are so much a part of their environment,” writes Conder, “that only the environment,
not the individual, can be judged morally. His determinism does not destroy a moral vision of a
corrupt environment” (45). According to Conder, Crane does not necessarily prohibit free will in
the novel; however, while Maggie may largely appear the product of her environment, relieving
her of our moral judgment, the novel does allow us, Conder claims, to condemn those who
constitute Maggie's environment and deny her any other alternative. Gibson, likewise, thinks that
Crane does not want us to judge Maggie but her fellows instead. Unlike Conder, however,
Gibson does not see free will present in Maggie and, for this reason, any kind of moral judgment
fails in the novel. According to Gibson, Crane falls into his own trap by abnegating Maggie's
responsibility and transferring all guilt to those around her, an unfair move, in his mind. In
making his characters products of their environment and nature, Crane “relinquishes his
prerogative as author to judge them,” Gibson argues. “If Maggie is simply a victim of her
environment, then so are all of the other characters and so is the rest of society. Nobody is to
blame for anything and we cannot help but cringe when Crane attempts with irony to condemn
Maggie's fellow victims” (27). Admittedly, Gibson has a point: if we are to sympathize with
Maggie's plight as a product of her environment, then we cannot possibly exclude her
responsibility from our condemnation of those around her; they are equally products of this same
environment. For this reason, we might rightfully agree with Gibson in his claim that the novel
is an imperfect and inadequate tale. Perhaps the key here, however, is not to delineate between
environment and individual; maybe we should conflate the two. Obviously, Conder and Gibson
acknowledge the social conditions of subjectivity in Crane, but neither acknowledges how such
conditions may bestow obligation rather than erase it. In Crane, there really is no distinction
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between one's milieu and one's own self. Contrary to absolving individuals of their
responsibility, however, Crane thinks our responsibility a product of our subjectivity, which is
indelibly linked to our social relations with others. We cannot have society without
responsibility; therefore, to distinguish between the two (society/environment and individual)
seems absurd and useless. Likewise, questions of free will and praise and blame are also
misdirected. For Crane, there is no graduated scale for evaluating moral behavior; instead, there
is only a supererogatory obligation that we cannot divorce from our being, whether we wish to or
not.
If Crane's novels provide numerous dilemmas for readers, his short stories certainly add
on as well, yet these also offer useful points from which to attempt to come to terms with these
questions as well as Crane's Levinasian construct of responsibility. Crane's short stories are some
of the finest in our American tradition, especially in describing the often dire situation of the
individual amid a world where nature and society tend to be indifferent. “The Open Boat,” in
particular, may very well be Crane's widest-read short story, as well as his greatest commentary
upon the capability of community in times of need. Published in 1898, the story begins in media
res, the four survivors from the steamer Commodore afloat upon the turbulent seas of the midAtlantic. We don't know what happened; we have no backstory that helps explain what went
wrong and how these men got here. All we know is that the men are thrown into a situation that
requires of them a suppression of their sense of self-importance and an acknowledgement of their
unconditional obligation to their fellows aboard the lifeboat, which threatens to sink at any wrong
step or hasty judgment. Every movement within the cramped boat becomes a world and a
lifetime within itself. The bond the men (the cook, the oiler, the correspondent, and the captain)
forge with one another under their common duress goes beyond simple self-interest, or even a
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sense of common interest, for that matter. Their bond is a sincere bond, and it is one that
recognizes the humanity and specificity of every other human being:
It was more than a mere recognition of what was best for the common safety.
There was surely in it a quality that was personal and heart-felt. And after this
devotion to the commander of the boat, there was this comradeship, that the
correspondent, for instance, who had been taught to be cynical of men, knew even
at the time was the best experience of his life. But no one said that it was so. No
one mentioned it. (727)
Even the correspondent, who has been taught by his profession to mistrust the self-presentation
of others, cannot help but recognize the gravity of the moment and the sincerity of his fellows in
the small boat. Outside of society and its numerous forms of propriety, the men encounter one
another as they really are: humans with needs, with life – individuals with faces that call out for
recognition. The face-to-face encounter of these men with one another, however, does not
diminish the danger of their situation. “It is fair to say here that there was not a life-saving
station within twenty miles in either direction,” the narrator offers, “but the men did not know
this fact, and in consequence made dark and opprobrious remarks concerning the eyesight of the
nation's lifesavers” (729). Nonetheless, we might say that in Crane even the fact of our limitation
squares soundly with our unique being, our incomparable particularity. The men's limited
knowledge of their situation as well as the world around them coincides with their recognition of
one another as “faces,” as their isolation and singularity within the cosmos becomes even more
evident, leading them (whether unconsciously or not) to a greater sense of the worth of each man.
As in other works of Crane's, this is not necessarily a bad thing; in fact, our “aloneness” in Crane
often signals our individuality and particularity, our existence as one who cannot be appropriated
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through narrative and discourse, or even by the larger world that threatens us.
“The Open Boat” does not, however, construct individuality as infallible or preeminent to
our communal obligations. Instead, individuals are highly limited and very much out of tune
with the actual workings of the world around them. The inability of the men at sea to
communicate with the man on shore at the island resort, the assurance of a safe harbor – that
someone will be looking for them – over every horizon, the mystery of the sea creature that
seems to stalk them for a while, all these things point to the limitations of our being and the
inadequacy of consciousness. While the individual may be limited, his responsibility for and
dependency upon others are not. As the story moves forward, the crew increasingly recognizes
these limitations and how these command them forward to action on the part of their compatriots:
in a personal moment that defies the anxieties of self-preservation, the cook asks Billie, the oiler,
“ 'what kind of pie do you like best?'”; the correspondent thinks back to his childhood and his
inability to truly identify with the hypothetical Legionnaire who lay dying in Algiers, something
he now seems capable of in a mournful note, especially given the current state of him and his
fellows; and the captain instructs them all onward, fully aware of the disastrous implications of
his potential missteps, yet remaining confident in his men. “ 'Billie! - Billie, will you spell me?',”
asks the cook. “ 'Sure,' said the oiler” (736). All finally make it ashore alive with the exception
of the oiler, who drowns in the crew's great attempt to overcome the breakers that risk capsizing
the boat as it approaches shore. The individual is limited and alone, but he is also very much a
part of a significant community, one that requires his absolute suffering and his unconditional
giving, even at his own expense.
In The Monster, published one year after “The Open Boat,” the unconditional giving of
the self results in individual isolation, a fact that disallows any attempt to neatly convey personal
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suffering into some sort of utilitarian argument or other ameliorative narrative. The
consequences of our actions are not weighed according to the overall health of a community;
instead, these are weighed according to our relationships with others, as individuals who are
somehow obligated to one another and according to the needs of others. Henry Johnson, the
Trescotts' black stable hand ostensibly escapes race limitations temporarily in his conversion into
a “gentleman,” a faux position for sure, yet one that reconceives social parameters and
expectations of the relationship between race and class, if only in terms of outward appearance.
Nonetheless, Henry's class “pretensions” (in fact, he simply wants to look nice for his sweetheart)
only help isolate his racial otherness for the townspeople of Whilomville who ridicule him and
his attire, reducing him to a mere cipher. “ 'Hello, Henry!,'” say members of one of the town's
more profane groups, “ 'Going to walk for a cake tonight?' ” (434). Henry may take himself
seriously, but it is clear that his fellow citizens do not.
Although Henry's social position stands as a precarious one in his community, he proves
his mettle and his dedication to his employers in the fire at the Trescotts' home. While Dr.
Trescott is temporarily away, his house catches fire, taking his wife and Jimmie, their son who is
trapped in his bedroom upstairs, by surprise. Henry, among some other neighbors, is around to
offer aid, a call to which he responds quickly. Mrs. Trescott calls for him to rescue Jimmie, and
Henry responds by fighting his way upstairs to continue the search for the child. “Henry pawed
awkwardly through the smoke in the upper halls,” writes Crane; “He had attempted to guide
himself by the walls, but they were too hot. The paper was crimpling, and he expected at any
moment to have flame burst under his hands” (440). Calling for the child, Henry finally finds
him in his room, unconscious from the smoke of the conflagration. The fire, however, traps him
and Jimmie from an easy escape back down the same route he took in arriving. Instead, Henry
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must carry Jimmie down a private backstairs escape that he happens to remember belonging
there: “He had been perfectly familiar with it, but his confusion had destroyed the memory of it”
(441). Henry and Jimmie peer down the backstairs towards safety only to find this exit as nearly
fraught with peril as the other. Smoke immediately meets Henry when he descends the
passageway, further disorienting his senses and burning his lungs. “Johnson halted for a moment
on the threshold,” the narrator observes. “He cried out again in the negro wail that had in it the
sadness of the swamps. Then he rushed across the room” (442). The private passageway is
revealed to be Dr. Trescott's laboratory and there are numerous chemicals obviously stored. A
vial explodes in the encroaching fire, releasing what must be some type of acid; Henry falls to the
floor unconsciously as the fire overwhelms his exit:
Johnson had fallen with his head at the base of an old-fashioned desk.
There was a row of jars upon the top of his desk. For the most part, they were
silent amid this rioting, but there was one which seemed to hold a scintillant and
writhing serpent.
Suddenly the glass splintered, and a ruby-red snake-like thing poured its
thick length out upon the top of the old desk. It coiled and hesitated, and then
began to swim a languorous way down the mahogany slant. At the angle it waved
its sizzling molten head to and fro over the closed eyes of the man beneath it.
Then, in a moment, with a mystic impulse, it moved again, and the red snake
flowed directly down into Johnson's upturned face. (442)
Somehow, Henry and Jimmie are pulled from the house; both live, yet Henry emerges
grotesquely disfigured, presumably from the acid that dropped upon his face as he lay there in the
laboratory: “[A] young man who was a brakeman on the railway, and lived in one of the rear
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streets near the Trescotts, had gone into the laboratory and brought forth a thing which he laid on
the grass” (444). Henry, the thing, has lost his selfhood – he has been de-faced, quite literally.
There is a very odd communal process involved in this whole ordeal. For one,
Whilomville's racism taints the tragedy in its interpretation among the locals. Throughout the
fire, townspeople gather to witness the event, some of them referencing Henry's race as a factor
in the incident. Perhaps he has inadvertently caused the fire due to the natural clumsiness of his
race, or so some think. Even the narrator clothes his observations in racist terminology, a fact
that complicates how we read Crane. 56 Racism is both perpetuated and enabled by the tragedy; it
offers a route for race to determine blame, at least from the distorted perspective of Whilomville
society. The tragedy, in a sense, almost seems to enable communal fraction while it also binds
diverse individuals together; it points to the underlying rifts present in an otherwise healthy
community. Delighting in the spectacle of the fire, boys from around the town gather outside the
Trescott home, each defending the honor of his neighborhood's fire station. The rivalry spills
over, even among the firefighters themselves, who seem to realize that the situation puts their
company and neighborhood pride on the line. Regardless of Whilomville's racism and
competitive neighborhood rivalries, the townspeople still unify behind Henry (who emerges as a
“posthumous” hero, if you will) while it is thought among the crowd outside that he has died in
the fire. “In the breasts of many people was the regret that they had not known enough to give
him a hand and a lift when he was alive, and they judged themselves stupid and ungenerous for
this failure” (446), writes Crane. While the community mourns the tragedy, Bella Farragut also

56 Crane, like any author of his time, cannot escape the cultural discourses of a racist society. The amount of
attention given, however, to the matter of race and how a judgmental and often caddish white society responds
should give us pause before we rush to judgments about Crane as a writer and human being. The Monster
appears to take racism to task, although there are understandably questions that remain concerning the narrator.
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reveals later on that day that she and Henry had been engaged. In fact, even though it is soon
discovered that he is still very much alive, Henry's remaining residence in the community is as
one who has ceased to exist as a human being, as one no longer alive.
Henry's existence as the thing places numerous burdens upon Dr. Trescott, not to mention
others. The bandages on Henry's face allow only one unblinking eye to be viewed, a certain
visual candidness that seems to “speak” to Judge Hagenthorpe when he pays a visit to Trescott,
transforming the original intent of his business there (to convince Trescott of the need to do
something about Henry's situation, involving possibly moving him outside the town or even
euthanasia). Speaking to Trescott about Henry's condition, the judge immediately appears
uncertain. “Afterward he evidently had something further to say,” the narrator suggests, “but he
seemed to be kept from it by the scrutiny of the unwinking eye, at which he furtively glanced
from time to time” (447). Later, after Henry is temporarily moved to the judge's, Hagenthorpe
feels compelled to confide in the doctor his serious anxieties about and aversion to keeping the
disfigured man for too long. “At dinner, and away from the magic of the unwinking eye, the
judge said, suddenly, 'Trescott, do you think it is – …. No one wants to advance such ideas, but
somehow I think that that poor fellow ought to die' ” (447). Away from the presence of the eye,
the judge can speak to Trescott of such dire matters, yet Trescott remains vehemently opposed to
such suggestions:
The doctor made a weary gesture. “He saved my boy's life.”
“Yes,” said the judge, swiftly – “yes, I know!”
“And what am I to do?” said Trescott, his eyes suddenly lighting like an
outburst from smoldering peat. “What am I to do? He gave himself for – for
Jimmie. What am I to do for him?”
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The judge abased himself completely before these words. He lowered his
eyes for a moment. He picked at his cucumbers....
“He will be your creation, you understand. He is purely your creation.
Nature has very evidently given him up....”
“He will be what you like Judge,” cried Trescott.... “He will be anything,
but, by God! he saved my boy.” (448)
Trescott refuses to give up Henry's life; he feels obligated to a debt that, in some regards, he
cannot repay: Henry risked his own life and health in order to save his son, while Trescott only
risks some money and social image. And so he keeps Henry on, whether or not the decision is a
humane one from our individual perspectives: 57 “ 'Well,” said the judge, ultimately, “it is hard for
a man to know what to do” (449). Trescott clearly faces the ultimate humanitarian dilemma in
whether or not to allow a man to die quickly with dignity or to keep him alive as a monstrosity.
The rest of the community obviously feels the weight of this dilemma, albeit for different
reasons and motivations. Alek Williams, Henry's proposed black caretaker (the white community
in Whilomville, not surprisingly, appears resistant to permanently taking in a black man,
especially a grossly disfigured one) reacts in horror when he first sees Henry. Deciding that
Henry's repulsive figure and agonizing wailing may require of him and his family more
emotional and mental resources than anticipated, Alek asks for more money to act as Henry's
caretaker. Alek is not the only one to treat Henry as an object of appropriation or even one of
pecuniary gain. After Trescott has a new house built, inviting Henry back into his home, even
Jimmie offers Henry as an “odd” spectacle for the amusement of his friends and for his own
57 Obviously, the humane decision here can take either side. According to one view, the humane decision would be
to let Henry pass, while another view would posit the human act as any that allows Henry to live out his days,
only subsiding in the natural course of death.
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social standing among his peers. Not long after, Henry temporarily escapes the Trescott grounds,
inadvertently startling his community, almost to the point of something akin to DEFCON 3.
Winter, a man in town, even decides Trescott is responsible for his daughter's recent sickness, 58 a
result of her having to witness the odious offense of Henry's ambulation about town. He and
Trescott exchange heated words over the matter. Elsewhere in Whilomville, the men at the
barbershop discuss Trescott's dilemma, mostly sympathizing with his current state of affairs in
regards to Henry's well-being, yet unable to really communicate to one another what the other
means. While one man suggests that perhaps the doctor may be sorry for making Henry live,
another responds that they should all put themselves into Trescott's shoes – a point to which the
others present agree:
“You would do anything on earth for him. You'd take all the trouble in the
world for him. And spend your last dollar on him. Well, then?”
“I wonder how it feels to be without a face?” said Reifsnyder, musingly.
The man who had previously spoken, feeling that he had expressed himself
well, repeated the whole thing. “You would do anything on earth for him. You'd
take all the trouble in the world for him. And spend your last dollar on him. Well,
then?”
“No, but look,” said Reifsnyder; “supposing you don't got a face!” (456)
The men in the barbershop are most likely well-intentioned, but the fact remains that none of
these men can place himself in either Trescott's or Henry's respective positions. In fact, there
may even be some rhetorical posturing and back-and-forth (rather than a sincere response to the

58 There is, however, some doubt thrown upon this claim. According to Martha, a neighbor, Winter's daughter has
been communing to school every morning since the supposed incident that sparked Winter's ire.

148

question at hand) going on here between these men, each trying to prove a point, yet none
honestly listening to the other.
Finally, the judge, accompanied by other local men, visit Trescott in order to talk with
him, hoping a definitive conclusion can be resolved on Henry's fate. The men attempt to
convince him that it is time to move Henry to a secluded cabin away from town. Trescott's
business has taken a severe hit, patients refusing to visit his home and his practice; even so,
Trescott does not budge. The story ends with Trescott returning home in the snow, entering the
house to find fifteen cups placed around the table positioned near the stove, a sign that the
townspeople have most likely completely ostracized the Trescotts. Trescott himself cannot stop
counting the cups over and over, silently in his head. Perhaps he is having second thoughts? Has
he made the right decision to keep Henry here with him and his family? Was it right to preserve
the life of a man who has become a thing and a monstrous obstruction to his community? On the
other hand, how could he have acted otherwise, any other way? Trescott must answer not only to
Henry but to the community at large – he has obligations to both sides. We don't really know the
answers to the problems posed by the story, but Trescott's dilemma does give some glimpse into
the hard questions that must be asked when we consider such notions as duty, obligation, and
responsibility. These concepts are far more complex than most conventional narratives often
allow.
Like The Monster, “The Blue Hotel” 59 isolates the responsibility of individual actors amid
a culture of deference (one that consistently deflects responsibility unless it can directly, or even
legally, be proven) while also aligning social environment and individual duty together (similar
to Maggie). Although the individual is a product of society, we cannot necessarily defer
59 “The Blue Hotel” first appeared in 1899 in The Monster and Other Stories.
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individual responsibility and place it solely on environment; instead, it is precisely the
individual's emergence into and residence within society that bestows his or her unique
responsibility and further perpetuates this obligation, which by no means weakens or lessens its
individual significance in one's life, especially from a Levinasian standpoint. Residing in society,
according to Levinas, is like residing in a home that is no home, no refuge, a place of residence
but one which dissembles every notion we have of something like home. In “The Blue Hotel,” in
particular, we see how such a notion of social residency reflects our inability to inscribe
responsibility into a reductive line of causality. In Crane, as in Levinas, linear constructions of
causality and obligation (“this happened because of this alone,” a formula often simplifying the
ethical relationship) eschew the culpability of moral agents and society at large.
Patrick K. Dooley offers one of the more insightful readings, I think, of “The Blue Hotel”
in his The Pluralistic Philosophy of Stephen Crane. According to Dooley, the Swede is the cause
of much of his downfall in the story; this does not, however, detract from the obligation the
others at the hotel possess. “The fact that the manic Swede is himself the cause of much of his
own trouble makes the lack of response from Johnnie, the cowboy, and the easterner
understandable,” Dooley argues, “but it does not change the nature of their moral obligation to
respond to another human being's needs” (90). For the others, the Swede is just far too strange,
and they do not know exactly what to make of him or his half-crazed, paranoid antics; instead,
they find comfort and stability by solely paying heed to the rules of the card game. “The Swede
is strange enough that other human beings avoid interacting with him on a personal, moral level,”
Dooley continues. “They play games with him instead of responding to his human needs” (91).
Admittedly, Scully does claim some responsibility for the Swede's viewpoint and condition, yet
he also allows his son, Johnnie, to resort to fisticuffs with the young Swede after the latter has
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accused him (and rightfully so it turns out) of cheating at cards. For Dooley, “The Blue Hotel”
invokes similar conclusions as The Red Badge of Courage. The group at the Palace Hotel refuses
to acknowledge and address the psychological suffering of another just as Henry refuses to
submit aid to the tattered man who suffers from physical trauma. In each case, significant human
needs are selfishly and unjustly ignored (Dooley 92).
While offering significant insights, Dooley thinks Crane's ethics largely hackneyed and
orthodox. The greatest feature of Crane's thought that does, however, set him apart is his
reluctance to offer a firm consensus on what is good or bad, right or wrong. “Crane's depictions
of human excellence embrace a transcendent moral character,” writes Dooley; “Although his
ethical norm, the unselfish response to a human need, is orthodox and unoriginal, his firm grasp
of the ethical dimension of situations is a significant contribution” (93). This “firm grasp” comes
in Crane's ability to recognize ethical action as contextual rather than dogmatic or universal.
According to Dooley, “[A] rational and defensible process involving evaluative calculation is
involved” rather than adhering to any definitive, pre-ordained answers (95). Dooley certainly
understands Crane's non-universalist morality – Crane refuses to systematize the ethical
relationship. However, I'm not so positive that Crane permits us the privilege of
“rational...evaluative calculation,” which still often undercuts the particularity of an individual in
need. Furthermore, while astute, it's not clear from Dooley's argument how exactly we are
obligated in Crane. Certainly, reason cannot be what binds us together, for ethics in Crane are
visceral and often tend to work on an authentic emotional level as well. Even negating such a
point, though, would still not answer the question of obligation in Crane. This, then, is why
Levinas proves so useful in reading the fiction of Crane.
Unlike, say the community of Whilomville in “The Monster,” which allows
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discrimination and biases to determine its worldview, moral responsibility and judgment are
without bias and without discrimination from Crane's point of view. Not only are the individuals
who have some direct stakes in the lives and destinies of others placed under conviction but the
society that creates such individuals and their victims is as well. Crane refuses to think of
obligation or duty as many of his nineteenth-century peers did; instead, he opts for a notion of
responsibility that refuses simple linearity and chronology. Even if my obligation to the other
cannot be traced along reductive lines of cause and effect, this makes me no less responsible for
his outcome. Being a part of society in Crane is a coming-to-terms – it is subjectivity as a
reckoning. We must realize that we play some part, often larger than we may think, in the
outcome of individual lives, despite our inability to always account for ourselves and the neat
linearity of our responsibility and guilt. Like Levinas, Crane finds the social site of interaction as
the space where justice and responsibility are made possible, not through fulfillment of our duty
unto the other, but through the call to commune with my fellow and my recognition of his
irrevocable imposition upon me. To be a part of a community (however one desires to define
such a term) automatically means obligation from such a perspective. It is precisely these terms
that the Easterner finally comes to grip with at the end of “The Blue Hotel.” If we expect to find
justice (that can account for all parties involved) in a court, or in some other notion of rational
aggregation, then we are looking in the wrong place. Instead, justice comes not only in
fellowship but in our recognition of the “stacked deck,” of the failure of subjectivity to fulfill its
obligation to the other – to walk with him, greet him, and account for our shortcomings before
him.
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VI. SURFIN' U.S.A: JOHN DOS PASSOS, PROMISCUOUS DISCOURSE, AND THE
WAR ON TOTALITY
In the closing pages of John Dos Passos's U.S.A trilogy, a young vagrant journeys down a stretch
of highway, the road itself a sign of American economic progress and advancement. “The vag,”
as Dos Passos calls him, obviously stands as an ironic figure in this landscape, a walking
contradiction in the land of the American Dream. As his “[e]yes seek the driver's eyes” of each
vehicle speeding past him, the young man's “[h]ead swims, belly tightens,” and “wants crawl
over his skin like ants” (448). No amount of patriotic rhetoric, tales of American exceptionalism,
or political wordplay can take into account exactly why this young man has fallen from the
graces of the American middle class, of comfort and success. For Dos Passos, the vag indicts
middle class comfort and success and exposes the inadequacies of the American system, but,
most importantly, he exposes the inadequacies of codified ethics, of thinking that we can
somehow understand this man and address exactly what he needs. In a world that would
otherwise erase this man's identity into a narrative of moral or economic failure (“Why don't you
just get a job, you bum” thinking), the vag asserts a strong, undeniable claim upon us. The young
man's eyes search for recognition from others and, in this search, we sense the guilt weighing
upon all of us for his condition. And at 55 mph, we flee desperately.
For some reason, our discussion of naturalism seems to take quite a turn when looking at
authors arriving after the turn of the century. We tend to recognize certain authors as “naturalist”
or “naturalistic” in nature. John Steinbeck has certainly been read in such a manner, most
notably by Pizer. 60 James T. Farrell, 61 Norman Mailer, 62 Don DeLillo, 63 and Cormac McCarthy64

60 Twentieth-Century American Literary Naturalism.
61 See above footnote.
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have also been read in terms of naturalist fiction and criticism, but the glaring problem remains, it
seems to me at least, of how exactly these authors fit into a naturalist literary framework beyond
mere perceived pessimism or deterministic philosophical outlooks. Certainly, these factors have
tended to draw literary scrutiny for the sins of naturalism, and a determinist vision of the universe
generally stands as a good indicator of naturalist tendencies. Regardless, there are several ways
we can connect the work of some of those naturalists writing outside the 1890s, and the 1930s
fiction of John Dos Passos is a very good place to begin that task, particularly if we think about
its confrontation with the effects of mass rhetorical forms upon individual lives.
One immediate characteristic that distinguishes the naturalist authorship of the Thirties
from that of Crane, Dreiser, Norris, and London is the political leanings of many of these writers.
Indeed, Pizer thinks that the main factor setting the naturalism of the 1930s apart from that of the
first generation naturalists is an invested political interest, especially one that is left-centric and
even Communistic. Moreover, although 1890s naturalism retains a circular narrative pattern (e.g.
McTeague returns to the mountains and his animality), according to Pizer, that of the 1930s
moves to understanding and a promise for the future. This is a valid observation: certainly both
the arrival of Tom Joad as folk hero and activist, along with the maturing existential and social
awareness of the anonymous first-person “Camera Eye” narrator demonstrate Pizer's point
(Twentieth-Century American Literary Naturalism 16). Authors like Steinbeck and Dos Passos
may realize the revolutionary potential (beyond a generalized critique of capitalism, as in the
1890s) of what is thought of as a failing American society more than their predecessors, attacking
62 See above footnote; Yarnoff, Charles Samuel. Norman Mailer and American Literary Naturalism. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern UP, 1977; and Berg, Odean Ellsworth. Naturalism in the Novels of Norman Mailer. Mankato,
MN: Mankato State College (Minnesota State University), 1966.
63 See Civello, Paul. American Literary Naturalism and Its Twentieth-Century Transformations. Athens: U of
Georgia P, 1994.
64 See the work of James R. Giles.
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those conditions of a capitalist society that have not only worked against the workingman and
woman but have also set them up for failure, yet Pizer's inquiry leaves us with some crucial
questions. While Dos Passos does appear more politically motivated than previous naturalists in
his early support of socialist economics, I think that Pizer's distinction can be further tailored. As
I pointed out earlier in the first chapter, critiques of capitalism seem integral to naturalist fiction,
though I suppose that capitalism and naturalist critique don't necessarily need to go hand-in-hand.
What is distinctive about the naturalist authorship of the 1930s, however, is not only political
interests but a growing concern with mass forms of public morality and communication,
especially given the developments in radio and cinema after the First World War. Obviously,
both Norris and Crane were concerned about public and conventional forms of rhetoric as well,
namely forms of public morality like sentimentalism, simplified examples of Christianity, and
other bourgeois ethics and civics. Nonetheless, the emergence of radio and provocative forms of
mass communication and advertising in the post-WWI period make the naturalism of the 1930s
much more preoccupied with how forms of public discourse and rhetoric may affect moral
behavior and beliefs as well as erase specific, individual needs. In Dos Passos, especially, we
find a writer who seeks to preserve our awareness of the unique tragedy of individual lives
against the threat of “massification,” or reification. Dos Passos is concerned not only with
politics but the moral distortion propagated by the mass media. Locating an ethics for Dos
Passos, then, proves a matter of preserving the particularity of individual existence and, perhaps
even more importantly, the particularity of individual relationships (in all their nuances and
diverse needs and inquiries) against the effacement of particularity within the “market” of mass
cultural discourse. Such an approach will take us directly to the thinking of Levinas, especially
his thoughts about language and rhetoric (much of which has previously been discussed in
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Chapter Two). Before we arrive there, however, we must understand how Dos Passos's approach
points us towards a traumatic (or anti-universalist) 65 concept of ethical relations.
There are three notable theoretical and philosophical influences upon the naturalist fiction
of John Dos Passos, from my perspective, and these include modernist filmmaking, socialism,
and a somewhat distinct form of individualism (due to its confluence of liberalism and what
might be considered, appropriately, an “American” ideal). 66 While film may influence Dos
Passos's aesthetics far more conspicuously than the other two, it's crucial that we mark the
tension between his socialism and individualism. The montage elements of his aesthetics, along
with his individualism, parry the systematizing tendencies of socialism. As has been noted, Dos
Passos's modernism stands in stark contrast to socialism's desire for political and historical
totality. Clearly, he is a artist grappling with the deficiencies of his own politics. In the works of
Sergei Eisenstein, the Soviet filmmaker that Dos Passos was privileged to meet while in the
Soviet Union, he learned the art of montage and fragmented form – the ability to reconfigure
conventional notions of time and space that would help disrupt the totalizing effects of systems

65 By “anti-universalist,” I suggest those ethical relations that avoid universal conception (or obfuscation).
Particularity is meant to invoke those relationships that bypass our preconceived notions of how to act or
proceed. Instead, these are relationships that defeat our previous understanding and demand of us something that
we are unsure of quite how to deliver. By these means, if not used in a cosmopolitan sense, one can make the
argument that anti-universalism naturally entails some form of “trauma,” though that understanding might be
different from one like Levinas's.
66 By “liberalism,” I mean to suggest those Enlightenment (and even post-Enlightenment) democratic ideals that
cite the individual as the center of the political universe. In my estimation, Dos Passos unites such an ideal with
an American ideal of “unfettered” individualism, which romanticizes the individual who, against all odds, refuses
to surrender his or her individual ethos to a group ideal that would otherwise ruin its independence.
On another note, I do not use the term “rugged individualism” due to its connotations of free market capitalism
and self-reliance. The Dos Passos of U.S.A. is certainly in favor of a governmental system that seeks to help the
downtrodden through a reorganized market approach (although by no means should this be considered wanton
welfare), while preserving their individuality (perhaps something similar to Jack London's “superman socialism,”
at least in principle, if not in philosophy) amid the waste of 1930s economic decay and encroaching mass
discourses; however, by the end of the trilogy, we witness a Dos Passos who is increasingly skeptical of any
political system in maintaining the individuality of its constituents. And perhaps this is the most “American”
characteristic of the trilogy.
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like capitalism and socialism. 67 In “Figuring the Financier: Dos Passos and Pierpontifex
Maximus,” Michael Wainwright states that Dos Passos's “The House of Morgan” section
“work[s] toward a major aim of montage: a physiological reaction from the reader. This is the
distinctly Pavlovian essence of Eisenstein's theory.... To produce revulsion in the face of
unbridled greed” (88). Justin Edwards also discusses the influence of filmmaking upon Dos
Passos's narrative, identifying the significance of not only an Eisensteinian approach upon his
work but also that of another Soviet in Dziga Vertov as well as the rather notorious American,
D.W. Griffith. Edwards' article, “The Man with a Camera Eye: Cinematic Form and Hollywood
Malediction in John Dos Passos's The Big Money,” like that of Wainwright, identifies the
significance of montage and depictions of time in Dos Passos. Given Dos Passos's spatial and
temporal maneuvering in U.S.A, with characters' narratives frequently bumping and colliding, we
see the significance of his friendships with 1920s-30s Soviet filmmakers along with the
importance of early cinematic developments.
Although the influence of film in the trilogy may not be immediately discernible,
certainly no one reading U.S.A., even for the first time, can deflect its investment in socialism or
its passion for capitalist critique. Much has been written on Dos Passos's socialism, so I do not
wish to dwell upon the topic too long; however, any study that seeks to make a statement on Dos
Passos's ethical approach cannot ignore the subject. The novelist's ethics clearly stand at odds
with the theory of Marxism popular in Dos Passos's day; rather than a codification of ethics and
politics, such as Marxism seems to require, Dos Passos wants a politics that is also capable of

67 Pizer reserves two terms for describing Dos Passos's narrative techniques in U.S.A. “Interlacing” refers to the
appearance of characters in other characters' narratives, while “cross-stitching” signals the specific historical
events that connect individual narratives. According to Pizer, these devices allow for a form that emphasizes the
inseparability of individuals lives in one nation - in other words, the unity of national life (Twentieth-Century 42).
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recognizing individual needs rather than that of an abstract worker. As a young journalist for the
left periodical New Masses, Dos Passos became more despondent over the living and labor
conditions of America's working class. In fact, his stint at New Masses gives us some of the
earliest extant examples of Dos Passos's socialist writings, wherein he envisions a socialism that
is not so indebted to Communist or party dogma, a view that engendered considerable animosity
between Dos Passos and the periodical's editor, Mike Gold (Nanney 171). Such an approach
would soon become integrated into Dos Passos's fiction, setting him apart from other so-called
proletarian fiction. Leo Gurko thinks that, while Dos Passos and the authors of proletarian
fiction share a similar social vision, their artistic approach is much different, Dos Passos's being
far more pessimistic and far less supportive of his fiction acting as a form of propaganda. For the
proletarian authors, according to Gurko, “art for art's sake” was a motto of decadence and
bourgeois elitism; art must serve as a vehicle of social reform. However, Dos Passos's approach
is much different. “Dos Passos, even at the height of his social consciousness,” Gurko writes,
“never equated art and propaganda, nor did he ever waiver in his conviction that his writing
should express his vision of things, not the state's, not the party's, or the revolution's” (47). The
regard Dos Passos gives to the individual defines much of his work and, not surprisingly, leads to
a difference in ideology between himself and conventional socialist thinking. Upon visiting the
Soviet Union, Dos Passos began to realize the inadequacies of the socialist project that had
informed his philosophical vision as a left-leaning young author during the Twenties and early
Thirties. Either the unwillingness or the inability of conventional socialist approaches to enable
individuality (and real ethical encounter – an ethics of the dyad, or the face-to-face) led to an
ideological conflict with the party establishment that could not be resolved for Dos Passos, and
this conflict is eventually revealed in U.S.A. as the novels move from a celebratory (but perhaps
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cautious) tone to one of pessimism regarding socialism.
Obviously Dos Passos's socialism clashes strongly with the robust sense of individualism
that permeates the trilogy. For Dos Passos, democratic systems, whether they be socialistic or
capitalistic, have not currently enabled an authentic understanding of human ethical encounter.
Where American democracy has gone wrong, according to Dos Passos, is in abandoning its
democratic ideal that allows the individual to flourish through his or her own labor and rational
decision-making in favor of a capitalist model that actually suppresses the individual through
market control and the language of consumerism, making the democratic self an inauthentic one
instead of free and independent. 68 Lisa Nanney offers that such a desire to preserve the
individual acts as “the deep concern from which the trilogy emanates” (177). “[H]ow can the
common individual,” she asks, “prevail against the massive systems of industrial capitalism that
have turned the promises of the American dream into a lie?” (177).
Perhaps the most influential event in shaping Dos Passos's emphasis upon the individual
in U.S.A. was the much publicized 1926-1927 trial of Sacco and Vanzetti. 69 Like many other
left-leaning writers and intellectuals of the day, Dos Passos found in Sacco and Vanzetti's plight a
direct threat to the viability of American idealism and democracy. Dos Passos covered the trial
for New Masses, actually meeting with the two men while on assignment. For Dos Passos, the
treatment received by the two immigrant anarchists was a direct result of negative cultural
discourses (like nationalism and nativism) colluding, unfairly crowding out freedom of thought
and the particularity of each man in the process, thereby creating bias in their trial. Dos Passos

68 I will speak more on this subject below.
69 According to Pizer in Dos Passos' U.S.A., the years of 1926 and 1927 were highly formative in Dos Passos's
plans for writing the trilogy. These were the years when the idea for the novels was first starting to come
together for him (Pizer 27).
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wrote several essays appearing in New Masses, including “The Pit and the Pendulum” and
“Sacco and Vanzetti,” depicting the trial as not only prejudiced but also a struggle for the survival
of the individual and justice. 70 The jury's verdict of guilt and the subsequent execution surely
served as a crushing blow for the young journalist and no doubt acted as a major impetus in
shaping the philosophical direction of his later ambitious literary project in the trilogy where
defending the individual against the lingering prospect of systematization may have became Dos
Passos's greatest goal.
Examining Dos Passos's journalistic history seems to aid us in understanding how his
notion of individuality informs both his naturalism and ethical project. As pointed to earlier,
growing pessimism (probably largely the result of the Sacco and Vanzetti trial and Dos Passos's
socialist disenchantment) characterizes the movement of the trilogy as characters appear to lose
the capacity of self-determination and social forces gather to prohibit freedom and democracy. 71
Furthermore, many of the narratives in U.S.A. follow a plot of degeneration when concerning the
lives of individual characters (although Mary French's growing ethical awareness seems to offer
some moral alternative coming into being). Unlike his naturalist predecessors, however, the
focus on those larger forces that control and shape human beings shifts more to a questioning of
language and rhetoric rather than biological determinism (although this does not mean that both

70 “Any man, I suppose, is capable of any crime, but having talked to Sacco and Vanzetti themselves it's impossible
for me to believe they could have committed that particular crime” (from Dos Passos's The Theme is Freedom;
rpt. in Landsberg 136).
71 Even his good friend Edmund Wilson criticized Dos Passos for his determinist approach, finding U.S.A. lacking
due to what Wilson perceives as their speaking mostly in cliches (Ludington 37-38).
Concerning Dos Passos's determinism, Townsend Ludington claims that, while characters such as Mac and
Charlie Anderson seem the products of “forces beyond their control,” other characters and biographical subjects
like Moorehouse, Morgan, Hearst, and even the sympathetic Debs and Wright “are forces in a nation moving
toward monopoly capitalism, not merely victims of the times” (39). While Ludington's statements may be
somewhat reductive, in my estimation, in their elision of those forces that make such historical movement
possible, I do agree with his overarching approach that places Dos Passos into the conversation of romanticism,
which posits the individual in a struggle against inscrutable forces.
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the earlier naturalists and Dos Passos are not concerned about these other forces). As in the case
of Norris and Crane, however, Dos Passos's obsession with these particular forces that seem to
control human action and movement should not be mistaken for moral abdication.
In fact, Dos Passos finds in the spaces where conventional cultural and moral discourses
fall apart the possibility of a new moral language, one that can acknowledge the specificity of
individual need. To what extent this ethical alternative may be possible amid a culture of decay
is certainly debatable, but the need for such an approach is not lost on Dos Passos. Referring to
specific passages from “The Pit and the Pendulum,” Thomas Strychacz discusses the significance
of language in Dos Passos's universe:
Systems of words signifying systems of power infiltrate every aspect of this
society [a society capable of convicting Sacco and Vanzetti], forming interlocking
hierarchies of wealth and class: an Anglo-Saxon supremacy whose members
enunciate with a “broad A” lest they lose their status to “men who spoke broken
English”...; anarchists who lie losing out to the police who lie about them more
powerfully; witnesses who swear they saw Vanzetti elsewhere at the time of the
robbery but whose testimony is discounted by the judge because of their alien
culture and language.... Language, as much as people, must be annexed,
regulated, and controlled according to the “lexicon” by those in power. (118)
Although morality doesn't specifically concern Strychacz, his analysis naturally lends itself to an
approach that seeks to address such questions, especially through the relationship between the
individual and language that Dos Passos sees in need of repair in American society. Strychacz
thinks Dos Passos lacking in a definitive social outlook that offers one solution as preeminent
over the other. And rightfully so. However, for Strychacz, Dos Passos's indecision leads to
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conclusive readings on the part of his critics that may detract from the author's intent. “Oddly,
Dos Passos's refusal to offer final and authoritative statements in U.S.A. works to make critical
readings of it all the more certain and secure” (144), claims Strychacz. I think Strychacz's
reading valuable; however, I cannot agree with this particular view. Furthermore, Dos Passos's
refusal to definitively support one social or moral viewpoint only lends itself further to a
construct of Dos Passos as an anti-universalist, a man who cannot think of morality as a product
of systematic thought or dogma. As an overwhelming number of critics point out, Dos Passos
objects to institutional forms of discourse, particularly in capitalism and socialism. Each one of
these possesses a language that – when used to make assumptions about the nature of the world
and the self – breaks down in the estimate of Dos Passos. Systematic thought, be it of a
capitalist, socialist, or other brand, cannot provide us with the answers we need in a society that
is constantly and relentlessly changing. Strychacz may be right in his assessment of Dos Passos,
and his argument points to our agreement in the need for an approach that seeks reinvention and
reorganization in our moral language, but the author's refusal to offer a definitive critique should
not be construed as closing the discussion, as Strychacz seems to suggest. Instead, Dos Passos's
refusal to offer a clear critique or response points to his hope. Hope, for Dos Passos, as it turns
out, means a deflection of any systematic or conventional thinking (capitalist, communist,
socialist, or any other institutionalization of democracy, politics, or ethics) that deflects the
ethical relation of a you-and-I, that relationship that basically amounts to the face-to-face in
Levinas.
As with other 1930s naturalists (West included), for Dos Passos, locating such an ethics is
a matter of interrogating language. Before we look at how the interrogation of language and
discourse works specifically in U.S.A., I would like first to briefly revisit Levinas. Earlier, I
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referred to his conception of language as working in two capacities: the said and the saying. For
Levinas, the said not only institutes language as an entity foreign to our humanity, but it also
besmirches ethics in the process – it robs us of a moral language, if you will. Instead, ethical
encounter occurs in the saying, that space that attempts to recognize the humanity of each
speaker. This dyadic concept of language runs counter to those discourses that essentially
attempt to pervert ethics into a triad like nationalism, for instance. So, getting to the human,
approaching the other as a person with needs that demand a response, is a question of diverting
the interests of a third party; it is to recognize the particular individual that cannot be de-faced by
language or third-party appeals.
The general movement of U.S.A. is characterized by a questioning of public and mass
forms of rhetoric, politics, and morality – third party discourses. By the end of the trilogy, even
socialism, in its harm to interpersonal relationships and individuals (it possesses the same
abstracting force of capitalism, for instance), does not escape unscathed from Dos Passos's
critique. In examining these texts, I would like to first look at The 42nd Parallel (1930) and 1919
(1932). Each of these serves the critique of the nationalist, racist, and popular forms of 1930s
capitalist discourse that is finalized in The Big Money (1936). While the earlier novels offer an
introduction to such a critique, the final novel serves as Dos Passos's most emphatic statement on
the nature of discourse and ethics. In The Big Money, Dos Passos gives us a more thorough
depiction of his moral outlook, although the previous novels certainly aid his conclusions. For
this reason, I would like to focus primarily on the last novel, although examining the earlier texts
first helps us position our approach and see how Dos Passos's inquiry here extends itself
throughout the collective works.
In The 42nd Parallel, the characters of Mac, Janey, Joe, Ward, Eleanor, Eveline, and
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Charley make their first appearances, although Joe and Eveline do not take preeminence until the
next installment of the trilogy, where we meet such characters as Dick, Daughter, and Ben as
well. While these novels introduce us to a good deal of Dos Passos's kaleidoscope of characters
and his innovative four narrative modes, they most importantly introduce us to a world ruled by
systematic (and often non-negotiable) forms of thought, limiting civic and political participation
and producing what Dos Passos thinks is an inauthentic or delimited form of selfhood. Such a
world smothers the socialist impulse of the earlier novels, and Dos Passos is keenly aware of this.
As I see it, the socialist vision of the author is limited primarily by two forms of cultural
discourse and social rhetoric in the novel, which Dos Passos points to as so common as to be
sublimated into national life and interiorized: nationalism/patriotism and
racism/ethnocentrism/nativism. The two distinctions are actually fairly congruous, and each
essentializes selfhood and identity; however, I am making this distinction for the following
reason. Although nationalism and racism/nativism, for instance, can go hand-in-hand, this
doesn't necessarily need to be the case – racism does not require nationalism and, indeed, in
U.S.A. Dos Passos often draws a distinction between the two (although not always). Similarly,
nationalism does not require a racist component, and America (with its racial and ethnic
diversity) stands as a perfect example of a nation that would suggest this. Also, nativism
generally carries connotations of nationalism but, for our purposes here, I am associating
nativism mostly with a construct of the world in terms of race, ethnicity, genealogy, and even
social class. This last distinction may be somewhat arbitrary, but I suppose the notion of “blood”
and lineage is just as significant to nativist discourse as any other motivation and, certainly,
nativism carries with it ideas of Old World lineage (i.e., Anglo-Saxon racial identity). So, it is
with these two rhetorical branches in mind that I would like to start examining both The 42nd
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Parallel and 1919 with attention not only to how these parry Dos Passos's hopes for a unifying
socialism but also his understanding of morality and moral duty. 72 Like his naturalist cohort, Dos
Passos thinks a reexamination of conventional ethics and discourse necessary if we are to locate
an appropriate alternative that can meet the demands of increasingly diverse modern societies.
Understanding how nationalism functions as an impediment to progress proves most
essential to the socialist and moral arguments of the author; however, I would like to start first
with the issue of racism in the novels. Admittedly, racism seems secondary to nationalism by far
in the the trilogy, but Dos Passos sees it as quite an obstacle to social action nonetheless. Racial
identity itself is not a problem for the novelist; what is troublesome is the capacity in which we
place racial identity into words and actions. For example, the young Janey of The 42nd Parallel
is scolded by her mother for bringing home a black friend:
“Jane, I want to talk to you about something. That little colored girl you brought
in this afternoon...” Janey's heart was dropping. She had a sick feeling and felt
herself blushing, she hardly knew why. “Now, don't misunderstand me; I like and
respect the colored people; some of them are fine self-respecting people in their
place... But you mustn't bring that little colored girl in the house again. Treating
colored people kindly and with respect is one of the signs of good breeding....
[B]ut you must never associate with colored people on an equal basis. Living in
this neighborhood it's all the more important to be careful about those things...
Neither the whites nor the blacks respect those who do.” (107)
The remonstrances of Janey's mother may seem like the racialist banter of a woman whose social

72
These two forms of popular social discourse and their relationship to socialism, in Dos Passos's thinking,
will also play a role in my analysis of The Big Money.
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position is confirmed by her racial identity and, indeed, it is. But there is far more here. Dos
Passos thinks that participation in such discourse denies any in-roads into worker's rights that
may be gained for a multiracial society (like America) through the cooperation of the entire
working class, black, white, or otherwise. Later, in 1919, Janey's brother, Joe, refuses the advice
of fellow bar patrons to join the I.W.W. if he truly is fed up with his state of affairs as a sailor.:
“Joe said that stuff was only for foreigners, but if somebody started a white man's party to fight
the profiteers and the goddam bankers he'd be with 'em” (132). The conversation about worker's
rights quickly escalates to a heated exchange, nearly reaching fisticuffs. Joe expresses the
opinion that only Caucasians can be good Americans, and good Americans, in his mind, should
not associate with foreigners, communists, or the like. In fact, much of Joe's tale is that of a man
whose socioeconomic position stifles his intellectual capabilities and social conscience, keeping
him from understanding the similarities between his own frequently detestable living conditions
and those of other members of the working class. Joe cannot peer through the cloud of racism
that subjects him and others like him to systemic control, and he cannot even begin to realize
how cooperation with other members of his class, regardless of race, may help his situation. He
is not exceptional by any means; Dos Passos uses him as a representative figure of the white
lower class, a laborer suckered by the racist rhetoric that is determined by the white social elite
and perpetuated by a white working class that will do anything within its capacity to gain some
sense of social mobility and privilege, some sense of social superiority, albeit illusory and
completely detrimental to their economic and political advancement.
Racialist thinking can be witnessed in all three novels and, as with Joe's narrative, we get
the overwhelming impression that such discourse comes at the expense of the poor and the
powerless. One figure that provides some hope in this regard, however, is Ben Compton. His
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narrative seems to offer some sort of route out of conventional racialist thinking. On the one
hand, a character like Joe would have his suspicions confirmed by a labor advocate like Ben,
which would associate the labor movement with a Jew – a perceived “foreigner” and outsider,
from the perspective of nativist thinking. On the other hand, the association of a Jew with the
labor movement, on Dos Passos's part, would seem to defy conventional racist stereotypes, ones,
for instance, that associate Jews with finance and the control of capital. In fact, Ben's class
consciousness supersedes his racial and ethnic identity. “ 'I'm not a kike any more'n you are...I'm
an American born...and I'm goin' to stick with my class, you dirty crook,' ” Ben says in response
to a boss's insult that a Jew striking “with a lot of wops” was perhaps the silliest thing he had
ever heard (343). Throughout his narrative, Ben proves that neither lineage nor ancestry,
stereotype nor generalization, can account for his actions. He is involved in people and believes
in his work. Although Dos Passos wants us to see Ben as American, defying our nativist
concepts of origins and values, Ben stands as a figure who transcends national identification as
well. In his investment in Russian politics and the labor movement in Europe, Ben finds
something of value that extends itself beyond national borders. His identity as a Jew, a
“notorious” transnational figure, may also solidify this consummation, enabling identification
with others beyond reductive national markers. 73 Most importantly, however, Ben is a figure –
regardless of his background – who can look beyond and disrupt simplistic identity boundaries,
like race and nationality.
All four narrative modes in U.S.A. interrogate nationalist rhetoric in some capacity.
Nationalism often tends to be aligned with the current condition of American democracy in Dos

73 By this statement, I do not wish to imply that Jewish (or any other) identity is essential to a transnational project;
however, Ben's Jewish identity not only defies racist conceptions in the novel but also carries a symbolic history.
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Passos, and nationalist discourse frequently attempts to define the nature of democracy. Rather
than enable democracy, however, nationalism only works towards its demise, according to the
author. Nationalism not only serves to subjugate the working class in his estimate, thereby truly
curtailing the possibilities of American democracy, but it also acts as a powerful and coercive
barrier against morality. Even the speeches of Woodrow Wilson that would seem to promote
world peace and international cooperation are seen as mere political posturing in the interests of
capitalism, the wealthy, and an increasingly nationalist construct of democracy. Wilson's brand
of nationalist rhetoric is not one of vitriol or virulence in the novel but one that comes in the
guise of American exceptionalism 74 following the legacy of John Winthrop's “City Upon a Hill,”
an illusion to American right action emulated by other presidents (including Reagan) throughout
the years.
Wilson's hypocrisy in 1919 extends from his broken promises for peace and strict pacifist
policy to his rhetoric of brotherhood in championing the cause of the League of Nations. “We are
witnessing a renaissance of public spirit, a reawakening of sober public opinion, a revival of the
power of the people the beginning of an age of thoughtful reconstruction...,” he claims in a prewar speech (194). The pressures of finance (and not the voice of the common person) motivate
Wilson's final decision to draw the U.S. into war:
First it was neutrality in thought and deed, then too proud to fight when the
Lusitania sinking and the danger to the Morgan loans and the stories of the British
and French propagandists set all the financial centers in the East bawling for war,
74 This is a complicated subject when approaching the Wilson presidency as well as 1920s isolationist America.
Obviously, Wilson initially sought a policy of neutrality for much of the war; however, Dos Passos points out that
once Wilson commits himself and his country to the Allied effort (under the influence of American financial
pressure), he immediately assumes the role of American liberator, a man who will help restore democracy in
Europe and free those enslaved by the tyranny of Axis monarchical rule. In the opinion of Dos Passos, this role
influences much of Wilson's approach to the League of Nations.
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but the suction of the drumbeat and the guns was too strong; the best people took
their fashions form [sic] Paris and their broad “a's” from London, and T.R. and the
House of Morgan. (194)
Only five months after running a reelection campaign promising to keep America out of the war,
Wilson “pushed the Armed Ship Bill through congress,” declaring the U.S. now at war with the
Central powers: “Force without stint or limit, force to the utmost” (194). Political and economic
pressure aside, Wilson fails to deliver on his initial promises to the American people, instead
forcing millions of American men to a foreign battlefield in a war that was largely seen among
the left as an elitist one to determine who would ultimately consolidate political and economic
power and control access to particular resources for capitalist growth.
Dos Passos masterfully dissects Wilson's own use of language, creating a narrative in
“Meester Veelson” that moves from the promise of Wilson's ministerial upbringing to the out-oftouch grandiosity of a trained politician. Later in the novel, a Newsreel section includes what can
be inferred only as a montage of the culture of Wilsonian “intelligence”:
declares wisdom of people alone can guide the nation in such an enterprise
SAYS U.S. MUST HAVE WORLD'S GREATEST FLEET when I was in
Italy a little limping group of wounded Italian soldiers sought an interview with
me. I could not conjecture what they were going to say to me, and with the
greatest simplicity, with a touching simplicity they presented me with a petition in
favor of the League of Nations. (321)
The excerpt concerning the League of Nations is taken directly from a presidential address
relating Wilson's time in Europe as he was attempting to garner support for the international
organization. Although Dos Passos does not include more of the address in 1919, I think it worth
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while to consult the text in its entirety. Wilson continues, claiming, “Their wounded limbs, their
impaired vitality were the only argument they brought with them. It was a simple request that I
lend all the influence that I might happen to have to relieve future generations of the sacrifices
that they had been obliged to make” (Swindler 243). A language of sympathy and humility
marks his encounter with the Italian soldiers, not an unsurprising step for twenty-first century
readers familiar with contemporary presidential debate “shout-outs” to, say, Edna in Ohio (who
has lost her job at the steel plant and whose luck has taken a turn for the worst) in order to create
an emotional connection with the audience. What's truly striking, however, is the willingness of
the once isolationist Wilson to align the cause of these wounded men and the cause of the League
with an American imperative. “God give us the strength and vision to do it wisely!,” he
exclaims, “God give us the privilege of knowing that we did it without counting the cost and
because we are true Americans, lovers of liberty and of the right!” (Swindler 244). The
isolationist, the pacifist, the man who had once run for and won the position of the President of
the United States of America on a platform of keeping America uninvolved in affairs that did not
immediately concern it, had now become an unabashed participant in America's self-proclaimed
project to guide the world to a better and brighter day. 75 Unfortunately for Wilson, U.S.
membership in the League never came to fruition, mainly due to congressional refusal to ratify
the Treaty of Versailles and the official return to an isolationist policy shortly after the war.
Nonetheless, Wilson's vision stands as a precarious alignment of American nationalism with a
sense of international brotherhood and moral obligation. Such a pairing sounds odd, but it is not

75 I think it would be foolhardy on my part not to acknowledge that Wilson's desire here has some legitimate and
useful aims. Where Wilson goes awry, according to Dos Passos, is in the negation of his former promises to the
American people and in his perceived service to the capitalist class and elite. From Dos Passos's perspective,
moral action cannot be guided by such motives.
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the last time that Dos Passos interrogates such a notion of ethical duty in U.S.A.
Numerous examples of the language of nationalism limiting worker solidarity and
American advancement, from Dos Passos's perspective, abound in the earlier novels of the
trilogy; however, as witnessed with Wilson, actual historical figures appearing in the novel often
provide outlets for the most intensive critiques of nationalism. Eugene Debs' biographical
sketch, for instance, may serve as the most morally significant in this regard. “Lover of
Mankind” portrays the socialist thinker and campaigner as a true man of the people, a man that
Dos Passos thinks perhaps the closest example we have possessed of a political idealist whose
words and actions actually served his fellows. Debs' story in the novel basically follows the
history of America and the workingman, from immigrant origins to hard labor in the service of an
industrializing nation and on to the maturity of political empowerment and knowledge of those
conditions that seem to determine the lives of the working class. Born into an immigrant family
from humble origins, Debs moves from the “weatherboarded shack” of his youth in Terre Haute,
Indiana, to a life of the workingman, serving as machinist, locomotive fireman, and clerk. As
eventual secretary for the local chapter of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, Debs made
his entrance into politics and “traveled all over the country as organizer,” using “a sort of gusty
rhetoric that set on fire the railroad workers in their pineboarded halls” (19). While Debs may
have been a sharp-witted politician and rhetorician, Dos Passos thinks that his words are not
those of the manipulator or an authority; rather, Debs' words demonstrate that he wanted the
world of the people, “a world brothers might own/where everybody would split even” (19). 76

76 Obviously, even the system that Debs advocates distorts the reality of human relations; however, the Dos Passos
of The 42nd Parallel is not quite ready to admit this potential completely yet, although some suspicion lurks.
Nonetheless, Debs is certainly a sympathetic figure in the trilogy, and I don't think Dos Passos's final conclusions
and disenchantment with socialism would necessarily dispute that.
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Dos Passos relates some of Debs' words:
I am not a labor leader. I don't want you to follow me or anyone else. If
you are looking for a Moses to lead you out of the capitalist wilderness you will
stay right where you are. I would not lead you into the promised land if I could,
because if I could lead you in, someone else would lead you out. (20)
Debs' words are significant here and his reference to Moses particularly fascinating. Debs
desires not to institutionalize his leadership, or that of anyone else, for that matter. Instead, his
vision is non-hierarchical, limiting the centralization of power and opening up participation and
input from all workers. Moreover, Moses ushered in the era of Mosaic law and the Torah – what
can be construed as the institutionalization of Jewish law, morality, and culture. While Debs is
most likely not critiquing the Judeo-Christian tradition, his words do have significant
implications. Unlike Moses, Debs does not wish to translate politics and morality into a dogma
that may avoid actual needs and, if he were to gain them the promised land, “someone else”
would emerge to lead the people out, be it a Debs who has neglected his idealistic approach or
someone else who surely would. Debs appears as a politician and thinker capable of adjusting to
people's needs rather than the other way around. In the vision of worker solidarity and nonhierarchical political participation 77 espoused by Debs, Dos Passos points to the potential for
organizing all workers and not just the railroadmen, from whom Debs came – something
fundamentally different from the reality of turn of the century America. All workers should
organize and gain some say in the socialist project as well as those decisions that directly affect
their wages and their lives. In trade unionism, Debs apparently saw a discrepancy in his vision
77 Admittedly, given his candidacy for president on the Socialist Party of America ticket several times, such a
notion of non-hierarchical politics becomes a bit complicated; however, that should not necessarily discredit this
notion.
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for a worker's state. Instead, workers should unite across crafts, trades, and guilds in a particular
industry.
Significantly, Dos Passos uses this project in order to magnify Debs' loss and isolation
when his language of fellowship was spurned by the very people whom he had sought so
vigorously to help and unite. “But where were Gene Debs' brothers in nineteen eighteen when
Woodrow Wilson had him locked up in Atlanta for speaking against war?,” Dos Passos writes
(20). “Lover of Mankind” portrays an entire nation, working-class and those in power alike, that
has turned its back on a compassionate friend who could have changed its destiny and, for Dos
Passos, this nullification can be directly traced to the deleterious nationalist rhetoric that had
gained hold of America during and immediately after the war. Now brought back home to Terre
Haute as an old man, eliminated from the politics game and therefore rendered harmless, the
people think fondly of Debs “as an old kindly uncle who loved them, and wanted to be with him
and to have him give them candy” (21). But they are also terrified of him, “afraid of him as if he
had contracted a social disease, syphilis or leprosy, and thought it was too bad,
but on account of the flag
and prosperity
and making the world safe for democracy,
they were afraid to be with him,
or to think much about him for fear they might believe him.” (21)
According to Dos Passos, Debs is essentially a figure of anti-totality. He represents Dos Passos's
attempt to circumvent the systematizing effects of nationalism, capitalism, and even socialism,
and to locate the individual. This, however, cannot work according to the powers that be. For
the sake of a fabricated and overbearing notion of nationhood and American cultural existence,
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an ethics like that of Debs', one that requires the diminution of the self in the presence of even the
feeblest workingman or woman, doesn't seem desirable. Instead, the nation must project an
image of strength, and such notions as “international solidarity” and non-hierarchical politics are
found harmful if these stand in the way of national interests and that of our leaders in whom we
place our faith.
While national identity may play a key part in our current moral and political outlooks,
ethics and nationalism cannot be confused in Dos Passos's mind. 78 A world where commitment
to our national identity (or racial, for that matter) determines our moral outlook is not only
undesirable, it potentially negates that which makes the preservation of all human life possible.
Whether influencing our sense of international duty (Wilson) or circumscribing such obligations
(reaction against Debs), nationalism risks something like moral turpitude. It places an immediate
stain upon our relationships with others, that is, if we approach communion as a thinker like
Levinas does. Language as mass discourse (nationalism and racism, for instance), language
which makes assumptions about the world (the said and rhetoric in Levinas), according to Dos
Passos, represents that which does not speak and is incapable of speaking – it is dead and refuses
to allow both self and others to live and commune. It is indeed a barrier to communication, to
our ability to commune with others as speaking subjects, to attempt to gather and meet their
actual needs and demands, no matter how mightily we may fail.
Communication seems a primary theme in U.S.A. From the author's point of view, we
tend to lack the ability to understand what makes us human. Dos Passos often goes out of his
way to isolate and scrutinize our inability to talk with one another. Quite often, Dos Passos's

78 This helps explain the sympathetic portrayals of the transnationalism of Randolph Bourne and Paxton Hibben in
the novels.
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characters have difficulty in forming coherent and sustainable relationships. Dick Savage
admires Daughter's beauty and youthful exuberance, yet he abandons her and his unborn child.
Joe and Janey attempt a conversation, yet fail miserably:
Sundays he played baseball in Maryland. Janey would sit up for him, but when he
came she'd ask him how things were going where he worked and he'd say “Fine”
and he'd ask her how things were going at school and she'd say “Fine” and then
they'd both go off to bed. Once in a while she'd ask if he'd seen Alec and he'd say
“Yes” with a scrap of a smile and she'd ask how Alec was and he'd say “Fine.”
(42nd Parallel 114)
Joe and Janey's inability to converse can be traced to our empty language, according to Dos
Passos. As with nationalist and racist language, there are no linguistic resources beyond
platitudes that the two can pull from. Both Joe and Janey seem a part of a society wherein
language and the need for open and honest communication has gone dead. Continuing with the
theme of communication, Mac is refused by his fellow workingmen, even though he desires to
help. “ 'You blokes'll keep quiet with that kinder talk if you know what's 'ealthy for ye' ” (42nd
Parallel 56), they tell him in response to his socialist agenda. Dos Passos's emphasis on the
inability to speak to and understand one another proves just one part of his concern with
inauthentic relationships, and it also introduces us to his construct of the self. For Dos Passos,
the self is a production of social relationships. Acculturated in an early twentieth-century
American society lacking the lexicon capable of a moral language, the self, in Dos Passos's
estimate, is a product of consumer culture and desire.
The questioning of the relationship between culture and selfhood continues in The Big
Money, where I think Dos Passos really places his moral stakes as a matured author. The sense
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that we gain from this novel, as with the previous two, is that the self is a construct, battered
around by cultural discourse and expectations. However, Dos Passos's narrative here offers more
avenues for exploring the key moral questions he introduces in the previous novels but doesn't
address as thoroughly within the course of narrative action. For certain, the questioning of our
cultural discourses and moral language preoccupy him here as it does throughout the trilogy (and
I will address this in due turn); however, perhaps a question that is introduced in the earlier
novels, but examined to a far lesser extent, is that of the nature of the self's existence under
capitalism as we experience our relationships with and engage with others. Specifically, because
Dos Passos isolates capitalist selfhood largely as a social construct (clearly he believes in some
core, however, or else he would not champion individuality), the self functions as a veritable
performance piece. In The Big Money, role-playing, identity shifting, and performativity 79
function as nearly impregnable barriers that protect the self in order to avoid the exposure
received from radical otherness. In the lives of characters like Charley Anderson and Margo
Dowling, for instance, we see role-playing as a means to extract the self from the precarious
encounters that one might face, therefore insulating and protecting the self from unwanted
intrusion or otherwise uncomfortable interactions. Essentially, such an act is a method of coping,
and while ethics in Levinas is risky business, requiring the self to be made vulnerable, coping is
precisely the existential approach to the world that Levinas warns us against as harmful to
finding an appropriate approach to morality.
Role-playing and performance take precedence in Margo's narrative, notably in her
79 I use the term “performativity” to designate the condition of selfhood as performance. This has numerous
connotations of gender, race, class, ethnicity, and other cultural factors/conditions. Dos Passos also uses this
concept of the self – one that performs its socially-determined roles, although often Dos Passos places many of
these performances (whether erroneously or not) under the umbrella of capitalism and consumer culture (i.e.,
Hollywood).
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history of stage acting and her experiences and travails in Los Angeles; however, there are other
suggestions that Dos Passos sees performativity as antithetical to ethics. Charley, for one,
experiences a myriad of dysfunctional romantic and sexual relationships, which is certainly not
unexceptional for a good deal of the characters in the trilogy. His relationship with Doris
Humphries, for example, whose sexual abstinence and recalcitrance frustrates Charley, drives
him to seek the carnal comforts of a prostitute as a surrogate. In the encounter, Charley forces
the prostitute to assume the identity of Doris, while he takes her as he wishes to take Doris,
finally consummating their relationship (at least in his mind, as long as this performance
continues):
“Hello, dearie.” He hardly looked at the girl. “Put out the light,” he said.
“Remember your name's Doris. Go in the bathroom and take your clothes
off and don't forget to put on lipstick, plenty lipstick.... Now come in here,
goddam you. I love you, you bitch Doris.” The girl was trembling. When he
grabbed her to him she burst out crying. (163)
Charley attempts to settle the girl down by offering her liquor, but this only “started him off
again” (163). Mrs. Darling, the brothel madame visits with Charley the following day,
convincing him to seek the prostitute in question for company again. “When she came he tried to
explain to her that he wasn't crazy,” the narrator observes; “He woke up alone in the bed feeling
sober and disgusted” (164). The prostitute is explicitly made to act a performance she finds
disturbing (but perhaps necessary if she is to be retained). Yet Charley also assumes an identity
that is not authentic in that his role as Doris's sexual and physical conqueror is clearly the stuff of
fantasy. In a sense, both are made actors in a sexual game that becomes highly uncomfortable for
the prostitute and unsatisfying for Charley. The act is obviously a sham and a disappointing one
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at that, but Charley finds (at least temporarily) in the act an outlet that helps direct his frustrations
and angst – an outlet that allows him to avoid momentarily the reality of his relationship with
Doris, although the reality of their relationship remains present and rudely intrudes upon the
performance.
Charley's marriage to Gladys later in the novel also proves unsatisfactory, ultimately
ending in divorce after Charley's significant losses in the market. Initially, it seems that his
romance with Margo will offer him some escape and maybe even the personal validation he has
sought in his relationships but not found. Interestingly, their chance encounter in a Florida
“lunchroom” soon devolves into another game of pseudonymous role-play outside, albeit the
seemingly silly flirtation that might mark the first meeting of a woman and man mutually
attracted to one another. As they step into Charley's car for their departure to Miami, the two
(still) strangers joke: “She wouldn't say what her name was. 'Call me Mme. X,' she said. 'Then
you'll have to call me Mr. A,' said Charley” (255). The playful game continues as they make
their way down the Atlantic coastline. In Daytona Beach, they stop momentarily for a swim.
“'And me thinkin' you was an elderly sugardaddy in the drugstore there,' ” Margo retorts to
Charley's protestation that his leg will heal in due time and that he is no less a man (despite the
shame he feels at his limp, pale skin, and noticeable belly). “ 'I think you're a humdinger, Mme.
X” (255), he replies. After dinner, the two continue the last leg of their journey south, Margo
resting her head on Charley's shoulder, and Charley feeling profound satisfaction at his sense of
resurrected vitality. Charley asks Margo, whose identity is still unknown to him, where he might
find her when he calls again:
“Sure, you can see me any night at the Palms,” she says, “I'm an entertainer
there.”
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“Honest...I knew you were an entertainer but I didn't know you were a
professional.”
“You sure did me a good turn, Mr. A. Now it can be told...I was flat broke
with exactly the price of that ham sandwich....”
“Tell me your name. I'd like to call you up.”
“You tell me yours.”
“Charles Anderson. I'll be staying bored to death at the Miami-Biltmore.”
“So you really are Mr. A.... Well, goodby, Mr. A., and thanks a million
times.” (255-56)
As Charley claims earlier, Mme. X is a “professional,” evincing the sense in which their
communication thus far has been at least somewhat of an act rather than innocently casual or
honest. While Margo doesn't reveal her name, she has made it clear where she may be found,
and her final statement here proves more than ironic: Mr. A may be Charley Anderson, but he is
not the same “person” as Charley Anderson. The two are not the same, contrary to appearance.
Mr. A is an assumed identity that – by its very nature of anonymity – already projects a
communicative barrier. The pseudonym each offers the other establishes a false sense of identity,
obviously, but the real intrigue of this performative foreplay, in a sense, is how this episode of
role-playing establishes the tone of their relationship, which requires each partner's investment in
his or her own security. “Mr. A, as she called him, kept offering to set Margo up in an apartment
on Park Avenue,” writes Dos Passos, “but she always said nothing doing, what did he think she
was, a kept woman?” (261). In fact, Charley even becomes Mr. A from the ironic perspective of
the narrator at times: “Mr. A sat down grouchily on a dusty velvet modelstand”; “Mr. A had let
his cigar go out”; “Mr. A said...” (265). Clearly, Margo seeks her independence but at times still
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acts mercenary. Charley, on the other hand, seeks a woman he hopes he can keep through his
charms and money. Each seeks a means by which a good firm grasp on his or her life and the
surrounding world can be maintained. Meanwhile, as we see above, the narrator is witness to
this act, and he does not let it slide by our attention.
The relationship sputters on for a while but, like most of Dos Passos's depictions of
romance, comes to an untimely (and unsurprising) demise. Coincidentally, on one of Margo's
and Charley's more notable outings, Charley commissions a young photographer, named Sam
Margolies (whose surname is interesting, if taken literally), to take some fashion photos of the
aspiring actress. This meeting later proves pivotal, but before addressing its implications, I
would like to move back just a bit in order to discuss Margo and her acting history. Questions
about selfhood mark much of Margo's narrative, and performativity is inextricably linked to this
inquiry. Although he still desires an authentic form of self-identification, Dos Passos anticipates
a poststructural notion of selfhood in the “emptying” out of any authentic core under capitalism,
and while his construct of the self may be historically contextualized (as opposed to Levinas's
ahistorical self), he shares with Levinas the position that the self cannot be the locus for either
rational or ethical decision-making. Keeping this in mind, Margo's narrative offers some very
critical steps in the direction of deciphering a Dos Passosian self further.
Margo's narrative begins with a sense of her guilt. Agnes reminds Margo of her mother's
death in childbirth, a fact that never appears completely lost upon the young girl and perhaps
explains some of her susceptibility to adult pressures (like Frank's advances). Similar to the Kid
from McCarthy's Blood Meridian, Margo almost appears born under a bad sign, a self with
origins in guilt and suffering (or, in the Kid's case, mostly just suffering). And like the Kid,
Margo adopts a role suitable to coping with the society she must inherit, and no other role but
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that of an actor could be more appropriate to coping in twentieth century America. Early in her
narrative, Margo performs with The Musical Mandevilles, a New York City troupe composed of
herself and her adoptive parents, Frank and Agnes Mandeville. It is partially from this
experience that she learns to act so well as a social front, but what might be even more striking is
the relationship between performativity and sexuality that her time with the Mandevilles seems to
build (a fact that, as already mentioned, informs her relationship with Charley). One day, an
adolescent Margo and Frank are left in the house alone. Desperate for work, Frank has just
signed what he considers a contract beneath himself and one sure to relegate the troupe to
burlesque in his mind. Margo attempts to provide some solace to the nearly disconsolate Frank.
She sits by his side, joking with him and stroking the hair off his forehead. The older man soon
takes her into his arms, kissing her relentlessly and demanding she give herself over despite her
protests. Forcing her down on the bed, Frank rapes the girl. While she attempts to fight him off,
lashing out with fists and nails, she is no match for the much stronger man, and “[s]he didn't dare
yell for fear the people in the house might come” (144), the narrator offers. Margo is made
helpless not just because inferior physical strength against her attacker, but perhaps also because
of social norms that unfairly dictate attitudes towards women who are sexualized outside of
marriage or acceptable cultural parameters. “When it was over,” the narrator continues, “she
wasn't crying. She didn't care” (144). To cover up his indiscretion and crime, Frank threatens
Margo and concocts an alibi for Agnes, who has just returned home, explaining their frenzied
state by his having to punish Margo for reading “trashy magazines.” Understandably, Margo has
a visceral reaction to her frightening ordeal and to Frank's accusation: “Margie was trembly like
jelly inside. She felt herself breaking out in a cold sweat. She ran upstairs to the bathroom and
doublelocked the door and stumbled to the toilet and threw up” (145).
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With this experience, Margo adopts the persona of the slut or fallen woman (an act akin to
bad faith), and she performs this socially-determined (and arbitrary) role decidedly well. 80 At
Christmastime, “She almost got caught with the boy who played the Knight doing it behind some
old flats when the theater was dark during a rehearsal” (145), Dos Passos writes. Later in the
winter, she takes up with a man professing in Eastern medicines and healing, who offers free
treatments to Margo, although she only kids him. “Then one day,” states the narrator, “she went
into the office when there were no patients and sat down on his knee without saying a word”
(145). However, the narrator informs us that “the boy she liked best in the house was a Cuban
named Tony Garrido” (145), whom Margo later marries and absconds with to Cuba for a brief
time before their unmalleable differences make their relationship itself a mere sham, ending
ultimately with Tony's death. 81 Ironically, in order to gain Garrido's hand in marriage, Margo
resorts back to an appearance of virginal innocence, claiming that she “wouldn't let him [the
Eastern quack] touch her not if he was the last man in the world” (146) and refusing Tony's
premarital sexual advances so as not to risk compromising her image in his eyes (as a fallen
woman) and to obtain his hand.
In Hollywood, the association of performance with selfhood persists, although the role of
sexuality in this game is not immediately transparent. Out West, Margo and Agnes happen upon
Sam Margolies again, now a Hollywood big shot of sorts who has acquired “a strong foreign
accent of some kind” in the interim and is looking for a fresh face for an upcoming film project.
80 Clearly nothing should be wrong with the expression of female sexuality. We know, however, that such
expressions (particularly in the wake of Victorian sexual mores) would not be socially approbated.
81 Garrido serves as an interesting figure in this discussion as well; the man is feminized in the narrative at times
and, as the novel implies (not too subtly), possesses some form of non-heteronormative sexuality. Nonetheless,
Tony must serve a heteronormative role in their relationship (we know that not many other options were available
to alternative sexualities at the time), obviously a primary factor in its demise. For criticism of misogyny and
homophobia in Dos Passos, consult Nanney, p. 181-88.
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Margo soon believes that the chance occurrence may reactivate her stale acting career and spends
considerable time with Sam and his Hollywood cohort, among the celluloid backdrop of lavish
offices and apartments decorated with Chinese paintings, gothic furnishings, and zebra and lion
skins, for instance. Sam offers her a role in a period film as the jaded daughter of “a French or
perhaps a Spanish general” who seeks escape from “the giddy whirl of the European capitals”
and falls in love with a young American off to the foreign legion, who later risks it all through the
blockade to save her father's life (329). Even Sam admits the nonsensical nature of the role and
the artificiality of their surrounding social environment, yet the narrative seems to suggest that
his casting her may be another performance piece:
When Margolies put her wrap around her he let his hands rest for a
moment on her shoulders. “There's another thing I want you to let sink into your
heart...not your intelligence...your heart.... Don't answer me now. Talk it over
with your charming companion. A little later, when we have this picture done I
want you to marry me. I am free. Years ago in another world I had a wife as men
have wives but we agree to misunderstand and went our ways. Now I shall be too
busy. You have no conception of the intense detailed work involved. When I am
directing a picture I can think of nothing else, but when the creative labor is over,
in three months' time perhaps, I want you to marry me.... Don't reply now.” (32930)
The romantic advance seems perfunctory, witty, and almost routine, perhaps merely a satiric
expression of social expectations (dare we even say media expectations) that would develop from
the inability to fight mutual attraction between a man in a position of power and a woman he
employs. Their relationship reads something like another Hollywood plot, and this segment of
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Margo's narrative is a conspicuous commentary upon the American culture of celebrity that has
made figures like Margo, void of real talent (beyond the visual) and the product of “a shift in the
American economy” (252), as Justin Edwards writes, that refuses to recognize critical potential
in favor of mindless diversions and wonders. The reader may rightfully wonder what remains of
the core self in the trilogy given the synthetic culture of contemporary America. Dos Passos
defines not only aesthetic taste but even selfhood as a product of mass manipulation, a self that is
subject to the oscillation of the marketplace, and if we cannot access a comprehensible self, then
numerous moral questions must be raised.
With such a definition, it is obviously difficult to critique moral behavior. How can we
condemn action that may be the product of metaphysical forces beyond our control? Dos Passos
clearly depicts humans as subject to culture and societal influence, so much so that even a
notions like free will or rational action seem contestable. Why, then, should we give serious
consideration to ideas such as accountability or blame? Admittedly, Dos Passos gives us a
conflicting view of subjectivity. We are but mere pawns in a world that transcends our
imagination and mental grasp, yet we should find the ability somehow to take control of those
forces which shape our political destiny as desirable, the latter a central concept for Dos Passos's
unwaning individualism. Such a political goal is hardly achievable given this bifurcated
construct of humanity, however. (After all, any good classical communist desires the workers'
revolution, which is forged in the willingness of the working class to drive historical change and
socioeconomic transformation.) We can justifiably call Dos Passos out here.
Yet, even given Dos Passos's dyadic representation of the self, we find that escape from
bifurcated constructs of being are necessary to a moral vision that would seek an individualized
approach to every question and address – in other words, a Levinasian move that posits moral
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action as decidedly indecisive. The “Mary French” section, for example, implores for the need
for escape from a polarized understanding of human relations and politics. As previously
discussed, Dos Passos once thought socialism a political panacea to the ills of capitalism, the
latter seeming to proscribe selfhood and nature, for instance (i.e., Dos Passos's notion of
performativity); however, we see even in his grappling with socialism, Dos Passos's disgust with
any vision that would determine the world so easily through universal moral lenses. Real ethical
potential resides in Mary French's and Ben Compton's (who also appears in her narrative as both
lover and colleague) struggle with socialism and their increasing sensitivity to the distortion of
the lived social world resulting from the dogmatism of their peers and the moral language that
narrates their worlds. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the novel ends with the two's
disenchantment with the socialist power structure, the narrative's political heterodoxy challenging
such threats to an alternative ethics as rigid authority, systematization, and a perverted public
moral language (e.g., nationalism). Moreover, in the character of Mary French we find an ethical
conscience that can no longer cope with trauma or the extreme corporeality emanating from the
presence of the other in the facile manner that conventional morality and language might offer. 82
Ben's fractious relationship with the party establishment and subsequent alienation from
the party line serves as one of the novel's primary turning points in a growing dissatisfaction with
socialism as a sociopolitical and moral ideology. Throughout the trilogy, Ben is an idealistic
socialist, believing in Marxist doctrine and expressing faith in the soviet projects in Russia, for
instance. Attempting to put principles into action, it is Ben's ambition to act as a leader in a strike
of rayonworkers in Bayonne, New Jersey. Before the strike, however, AFL leaders from

82 We will see coping and extreme corporeality (or particularity) emerge as highly significant themes in West's
fiction, which makes the Levinasian affinities of both Dos Passos and West quite striking.
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Washington, dressed “in expensive overcoats and silk mufflers” (360), take its organization out
of his hands. Understandably, Ben is upset with this development, one that he thinks the result of
inefficacy on the part of the left, and he expresses his frustration to Mary later that night. “He
was cold and bitter and desperate. He sat for hours on the edge of her bed,” the narrator informs
us, “telling her in a sharp monotonous voice about the sellout and the wrangles between the
leftwingers and the oldtime socialists and laborleaders” (360). He also expresses disappointment
that these same leaders will be seeking workers' dues (which Ben has previously expressed as
often difficult to collect due to low wages and harsh living conditions) to hire attorneys for his
defense against contempt of court, the hope being that these same workers' wages will help free
other labor activists should Ben's defense prove successful, yet he consents almost as if it is but
historical necessity:
“I feel so bad about spending the workers' money on my defense.... I'd as soon go
to jail as not...but it's the precedent.... We've got to fight every case and it's the
one

way we can use the liberal lawyers, the lousy fakers.... And it costs so much and
the union's broke and I don't like to have them spend the money on me...but they
say that if we win my case then the cases against the other boys will all be
dropped....” (360)

While Ben's language appears to express some sincere doubt about the labor movement (it
certainly reveals rifts in the relationship between the establishment and its constituents), it also
possesses a consolatory and apologetic tone, one counter to that of the narrator, who is already
beyond displeased with party leadership as is evident in his negative descriptors regarding the
labor establishment. Ben has become disillusioned by the left, by the dogmatism and interests of
its various factions that deflect the rightful project of helping those at the bottom of the economic
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base, but, unlike the narrator, he has not (as of yet) perpetrated any actions that would suggest he
is willing to assault this dogmatism. His expulsion from the party later in the novel, however,
suggests that his willingness to do so arrived soon after.
Like Ben, Mary also questions the party line and the direction of the labor movement, its
real motivations and aims:
“It's funny, Don,” she was saying, “I always go to sleep when you talk
about party discipline. I guess it's because I don't want to hear about it.” “No use
being sentimental about it,” said Don savagely. “But is it sentimental to be more
interested in saving the miners' unions?” she said, suddenly feeling wide awake
again. “Of course that's what we all believe but we have to follow the party line.
A lot of those boys...Goldfarb's one of them...Ben Compton's another...think this is
a debatingsociety. If they're not careful indeed they'll find themselves out on their
ear...You just watch.” (428)
While Don Stevens' retorts elide the import of Mary's questions, her inquiry suggests a desire for
real answers, and this behavior is by no means out of character for her. At Eveline's party later in
the novel, Mary is interrogated by George Barrow about the motives and practicality of the
movement, Mary emphasizing that she is “ 'not a partymember.' ” “ 'I know...,' ” he says, “ 'but
you work with them.... Why should you think you know better what's good for the miners than
their own tried and true leaders? ' ” (441). “If the miners ever had a chance to vote in their
unions you'd find out how much they trust your sellout crowd” (441), she replies.
Despite the protests of her leisured mother, from childhood Mary seeks the best interests
of the poor, be they immigrant miners or urban laborers. When she moves east, she directs her
charitable ambitions towards labor activism and journalism, dealing on a daily basis with union
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organizers, strikers, workers, and activists. The inability of the socialist project, in her mind, or
any available moral language for that matter, to accommodate individual needs rather than
sublate them into abstract ideas (like “the struggle” or the “worker's state”), eventually becomes
apparent, though. In that same encounter with Don, the two lovers return to their apartment.
Exhausted, Don falls upon the bed and drifts immediately into sleep; equally fatigued by the
day's events, Mary cannot. Lacking an interlocutor, she takes off Don's shoes, places a blanket
over him, and climbs into bed. Mary experiences a restless night, thinking of all those she must
help:
She was staring wide awake, she was counting old pairs of trousers, torn
suits of woolly underwear, old armyshirts with the sleeves cut off, socks with
holes in them that didn't match. She was seeing the rickety children with puffy
bellies showing through their rags, the scrawny women with uncombed hair and
hands distorted with work, the boys with their heads battered and bleeding from
the clubs of the Coal and Iron Police, the photograph of a miner's body shot
through with machinegun bullets. She got up and took two or three swigs from a
bottle of gin she kept in the medicinecloset in the bathroom. The gin burned her
throat. Coughing she went back to bed and went off into a hot dreamless sleep.
(428)
For her cohort, the lives of the working class are the stuff of political narrative, and their needs
are of no demanding consequence beyond the goals of the party or labor movement at large. For
Mary, though, those whom she has encountered in her work have needs that exceed ideology;
they also have needs that must be met in a face-to-face encounter – a meeting that requires more
than a standard act of charity or aid. These people refuse to be forgotten and to have their needs
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subsumed by institutionalized language or deflection. Mary's agonizing thoughts are full of
highly corporeal images, the imagery of clothing and injury reanimating those who might
otherwise be lost (or abstracted) through “the struggle.” Although perhaps silent or silenced,
those who demand her help find voice in Mary's haunted subjectivity, which cannot escape the
presence of another that begs for more than she is able to give. In a narrative ploy that will ring
loudly when we arrive at West's Miss Lonelyhearts, Mary realizes her abject inadequacies, and so
the bottle proves a useful measure in assuaging her concerns, at least for the night. 83 Mary
French may be the novel's redeemer, but even she is woefully inept. Most importantly, though,
with the “Mary French” narrative, we find the disruption of binarism and absolutist thought, a
narrative that disrupts the authority of discourse and language.
The vag wanders the American wasteland in the closets of the trilogy. Mary's thoughts
and suffering weigh immediately upon our mind. The materialist language of her tortured reverie
buffers the isolation of this man:
The young man waits at the edge of the concrete, with one hand he grips a
rubbed suitcase of phony leather, the other hand almost making a fist, thumb up
that moves in ever so slight an arc when a car slithers past, a truck roars
clatters; the wind of cars passing ruffles his hair, slaps grit in his face.
Head swims, hunger has twisted the belly tight,
he has skinned a heel through the torn sock, feet ache in the broken shoes,
under the threadbare suit carefully brushed off with the hand, the torn drawers
have a crummy feel, the feel of having slept in your clothes; in the nostrils lingers
the staleness of discouraged carcasses crowded into a transient camp, the carbolic
83 My intention is for the discussion of coping in West to elucidate this particular example of coping.
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stench of the jail, on the taut cheeks the shamed flush from the boring eyes of cops
and deputies. (446)
The language describing the vagrant as he walks the highways of America sounds quite similar to
that articulating Mary's thoughts, terms drawing our attention to his body, pain, hunger, and
clothing. Above him, a transcontinental flight passes over head, its passengers preoccupied with
finance, transactions, and luxury. Cars zoom by on the road, headed to countless destinations,
their drivers speeding past the raised thumb:
Eyes seek the driver's eyes. A hundred miles down the road. Head swims, belly
tightens, wants crawl over his skin like ants:
went to school, books said opportunity, ads promised speed, own your
home, shine bigger than your neighbor, the radiocrooner whispered girls, ghosts of
platinum girls coaxed from the screen, millions in winnings were chalked up on
the boards in the offices, paychecks were for hands willing to work, the cleared
desk of an executive with three telephones on it. (448)
As with the unknown soldier, this is one of Dos Passos's more remarkable and unique
biographies. If the marketplace of 1930s America has produced incoherent and performative
subjects, incapable of allowing us to think of the self as the rational locus of ethical action, it has
also produced figures like the vag. We are all implicated in his wandering, his wants and needs.
Ethical action cannot be rational (or at least possess a fully rational base) under such conditions
because a de-centered self expands our responsibility beyond linear causality (ex.: I did this only,
therefore I am responsible for this action only). For both thinkers, the self is thought of as far
distinct from the one of Enlightenment liberalism, for instance, and should not be thought of
necessarily as a rational moral agent, although Dos Passos is clearly more reluctant to annihilate
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conventional selfhood than his moral successor in Levinas.
Dos Passos's montage presentation is often jumbled and, as I have enumerated above,
many critics have claimed various motivations for this approach in his fiction. We should now
add moral motivations as well. Like Dos Passos's style, his understanding of morality refutes
clear, concise definitions and responses to suffering. Tuning in and out of numerous narratives,
Dos Passos escapes conventional notions of time and space and refuses standard representations
of such notions, his novel defying not so much coherence but systematization and scheme.
Similarly, morality in Dos Passos and Levinas escapes reification at the hands of authoritative
structures, whether these be binarist (like Dos Passos's understanding of nationalism and racism)
or normative discourses. Each thinker obviously believes ethical interaction cannot occur
through universal or systematized responses, and this accounts for their attack on rhetoric and the
need for ethics to occupy the interstices where rhetoric falls apart and no longer works.
In the closing pages of 1919, “The Body of an American” biography tells of an unknown
soldier brought back in the aftermath of the war to be commemorated at Arlington before an
audience of Washington politicians and national media. “John Doe” is picked from countless
other anonymous soldiers and unclaimed body parts, but a “body” must be located, and it might
as well be an “American” one: “Make sure he aint a dinge, boys, / make sure he aint a guinea or a
kike” (375). Both the media and President Harding co-opt the story of “John Doe” into a
national narrative of sacrifice and democratic tribulation. “The day withal was too meaningful
and tragic for applause,” writes one reporter. “Silence, tears, songs and prayer, muffled drums
and soft music were the instrumentalities [sic] today of national approbation” (376). Similarly,
the president talks of the patriotic mission of “John Doe.” “[A]s a typical soldier of this
representative democracy,” Harding says, “he fought and died believing in the indisputable
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justice of his country's cause” (377). Harding and the media want “John Doe's” death to buttress
(and compensate for) the expenses, especially in lives, of the war. According to them, somehow
these losses all make sense and, regardless of whether or not they currently do, most certainly
will in due time.
“John Doe,” however, refuses the gross generalization of national powerbrokers that
would otherwise obfuscate the deaths of numerous unidentified American men. Instead of
abstract universality that can be easily relayed in a speech or broadcast, “John Doe” possesses
specificity and multiplicity simultaneously:
John Doe was born (thudding din of blood in love into the shuddering soar
of a man and a woman alone indeed together lurching into
and ninemonths sick drowse waking into scared agony and the pain and
blood and mess of birth). John Doe was born
and raised in Brooklyn, in Memphis, near the lakefront in Cleveland, Ohio,
in the stench of the stockyards in Chi, on Beacon Hill, in an old brick house in
Alexandria, Virginia, on Telegraph Hill, in a halftimbered Tudor cottage in
Portland the city of roses.... (376)
Multiplicity in Dos Passos escapes rationalization and signals the refusal of customized narrative.
It repudiates centralization (troublesome to Dos Passos in both capitalism and socialism) with a
multiplicity of selves as well as a social diversity in which disparate members do not facilitate
nationalist engineering. Similar to the manifestations of Mary's inner conflicts and the vag's
physical suffering, “John Doe,” whoever he may have been, claims back a body that would
otherwise be lost in the president's speech. “John Doe had a head / for twentyodd years intensely
the nerves of the eyes the ears the palate the tongue the fingers the toes the armpits, the nerves
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warmfeeling under the skin charged the coiled brain with hurt....,” the narrator writes. “John
Doe's / heart pumped blood: / alive thudding silence of blood in your ears” (378). If we were to
speak in Levinasian terms, “John Doe” is the other who possesses his own body and refuses
narrative. Harding attempts to draft him into a story, while the narrator suggests the multiplicity
of “John Doe's” identity, not authoritatively, but in a manner that might offer the proverbial
“wiggle-room.” Dos Passos realizes the inability to speak the particularity of individual
existence into being; instead, it goes unspoken, and this refusal of language might be his most
identifiable legacy for the mid twentieth century that writers and intellectuals like Levinas would
inhabit.
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VII. THE TRAUMA OF ADDRESS: NATHANAEL WEST'S MISS LONELYHEARTS
AND WRITER'S BLOCK
Although it should be pointed out that Nathanael West often doggedly retains a perspective of
political apathy in his texts, 84 both he and Dos Passos are sincerely concerned with the
interpersonal implications of capitalism and 1930s commodity culture. This concurrent stream of
inquiry runs through both authors' works and obviously informs their respective ethical projects.
For West, in particular, not only does Miss Lonelyhearts (1933) address this culture of
degradation and complacency, but so too do later novels like The Day of the Locust (1939). As
with The Big Money, Locust imagines a Depression-era Hollywood producing exchangeable
selves, ones that achieve higher exchange value on the marketplace through their ability to
perform multiple roles which might make them more desirable, whether to the film industry or to
others. In the process, we see an image of destabilized subjectivity, wherein autonomy and
rational decision-making are questioned. If selfhood is free-floating and largely a product of
unstable social signifiers, then, certainly, we must wonder what prospects are reserved for social
cohesion beyond mere facade. Further, the novel also points to the tensions between our moral
character and violent nature in Tod Hackett, who fantasizes about empowerment through rape 85
yet is also one of the few characters in the novel who attempts to communicate with those around
him. Locust asks if ethics will inevitably end in violence, which persists as a common concern
on the part of West and advances the ethical preoccupations of the earlier Miss Lonelyhearts,
84 West was not completely apolitical in his personal life, however. He was known to attend socialist rallies from
time to time. Unlike Dos Passos and Steinbeck, though, he largely keeps these interests out of his fiction.
85 In “Nationalist Ideologies and New Deal Regionalism in The Day of the Locust,” Geneva M. Gano cites Tod's
rape fantasies and “misogyny as a symptom of antimodernist nostalgia for the good old days that may be detected
in much of the period's regionalist writing” (45). Gano continues by claiming that the novel “offers a compelling
critique of the regional mode as it appeared in the era of the New Deal, indicating that it was undergirded by a
seductive nationalist appeal that championed the simple, insular, and narrow in a world that was complex and
fundamentally expansive” (45).
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which is where I would like to devote the attention of this chapter. Admittedly, a more expansive
inquiry should examine The Day of the Locust in far greater detail but, for the purposes of this
project, I am reserving my primary concern to Miss Lonelyhearts, which stands as West's most
compelling case for an alternative morality.
If ever there was a naturalist text tailored for a Levinasian critique, it is Miss
Lonelyhearts. As with Dos Passos's refusal to abstract the unknown soldier's identity into
national or sentimental narratives, his contemporary's eponymous advice columnist experiences
frequent bouts of writer's block in attempting to respond to the countless abject masses who read
his column. A heretofore pathological hack, Lonelyhearts can either continue writing his column,
offering his readers the cliches and trite combinations of a morally defunct mass language (like
that found in popular sentimentalism), or he can claim his obligations to his readership by
attempting to give them something new and inspiring that actually addresses their needs and
individual tragedies. Lonelyhearts desperately wants to help his readers but finds this task more
of a challenge than he is capable of meeting, often reverting back to the language of
sentimentalism, Shrikean irony, or religious fanaticism, all of which West constructs as
consolatory mechanisms meant to insulate and protect the self from the world of engaged
relationships – in other words, a world like that found in Levinas. In fact, Lonelyhearts's struggle
is avoiding the insularity and comfort offered by coping and engaging the trauma of interaction
with others. While we often think of coping as a positive strategy for gaining better
psychological health both in the fields of medicine and popular pseudo-science, neither West nor
Levinas thinks of moral interaction as a therapeutic process. This would be to ignore the
demands that are placed upon us by the other who instills obligation in our subjectivity. We must
embrace the trauma of our obligation and, for West's flawed protagonist, this mission begins with
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avoiding coping strategies and overcoming the threat of moral egoism. Lonelyhearts never finds
the answers when called to address, but it is within those moments when language breaks down
and he loses his conventional moral orientation – in those moments of writer's block (both
figuratively and literally) – that we find something meaningful and the grounds for a radical reimagining of ethical responsibility.
When we first encounter Lonelyhearts, he sits at his desk, pondering how to answer his
correspondents' various problems just minutes before his deadline. So far, all he has managed is
yet another form of mass-marketed feel-good sentimentality. “ 'Life is worthwhile,' ” he writes,
“'for it is full of dreams and peace, gentleness and ecstasy, and faith that burns like a clear white
flame on a grim dark altar' ” (59). Stumped by this particular batch of letters, Lonelyhearts can
initially only resort to what he knows – a conventionalized public rhetoric that has become so
entrenched in our moral language, both because of its simplicity and its ability to gratify the ego
of the moral agent and perhaps even the addressee as well. In addressing his correspondents, he
has offered an abstract solution to real, concrete needs. And it is hard to ignore the sincerity and
morbid suffering of his readers in their letters, all of whose identities are mediated through pennames. “Sick-of-it-all” writes Lonelyhearts about her husband's callous persistence she keep
having children although her bodily pain and failing health suggests that another childbirth may
kill her. What should she do?:
“I am in such pain I don’t know what to do sometimes I think I will kill
myself my kidneys hurt so much. My husband thinks no woman can be a good
catholic and not have children irregardless of the pain. I was married honorable
from our church but I never knew what married life meant as I never was told
about man and wife.... I have 7 children in 12 yrs and ever since the last 2 I have
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been so sick. I was operatored on twice and my husband promised no more
children on the doctors advice as he said I might die but when I got back from the
hospital he broke his promise and now I am going to have a baby and I dont think
I can stand it my kidneys hurt so much. I am so sick and scared because I cant
have an abortion on account of being a catholic and my husband so religious. I
cry all the time it hurts so much and I don’t know what to do.” (59-60)
“Desperate” also consults the advice columnist, a teenage girl with a congenital physical defect
and wondering how she might have a normal, fulfilling life like any other girl her age:
“What did I do to deserve such a terrible bad fate? Even if I did do some
bad things I didn’t do any before I was a year old and I was born this way. I asked
Papa and he says he doesnt know, but that maybe I did something in the other
world before I was born or that maybe I was being punished for his sins. I dont
believe that because he is a very nice man. Ought I commit suicide? (60)
Neither “Sick-of-it-all's” nor “Desperate's” respective morality seems capable of addressing her
specific problems and, indeed, faced with such a dilemma, what prospects do they have, to what may
they look forward? While many readers have apparently found some sort of consolation in
Lonelyhearts's institutionalized forms of emotional support, he no longer finds his approach viable.
About to “bless” his correspondents with another rhetorical sleight-of-hand, Lonelyhearts

cannot persist in his trivialization of the letters any longer: “[H]e found it impossible to continue.
The letters were no longer funny. He could not go on finding the same joke funny thirty times a
day for months on end” (59). His difficulty in meeting this particular deadline is the result of his
growing concern for the letters but, most importantly, the people and faces behind them; he now
takes these letters seriously and cannot continue using them as the subject of office jokes like his
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editor, Shrike, who takes pleasure in effacing the letters and mocking their authors as pathetic
examples of “humanity.” Unlike Shrike's enablement through his sense of irony, Lonelyhearts
finds dissatisfaction with the letters since they are unable to provide him with any sort of egoistic
sustenance or parodic games for fun. “Miss Lonelyhearts no longer finds the letters funny,”
states Jeffrey L. Duncan, “because he refuses to consent to this displacement, to bless this
annihilation with a laugh. He looks over or through their words to their writers, as he imagines
them: profoundly humble, genuinely suffering, terribly real” (120). Shrike's game now spurs
Lonelyhearts to move beyond laughter to a sincere recognition of suffering and, since we know
he has participated in this game, we also understand how he can now approach the other only
with a relentless sense of guilt and persecution as he stares blankly at his unfinished column. For
Lonelyhearts, suffering and guilt are two indissociable experiences.
As he pauses within this moment of writer's block, Lonelyhearts experiences his guilt and
shame in what Levinas would describe as his “egoist enjoyment,” which only defaces the other
that stands before him (through the letters). Lonelyhearts's writer's block disables language and
cognition, breaking down his capacity for conceptualizing his audience and moral response in the
process. His experience of moral conscience, as Levinas suggests, gives a glimpse into an ethical
subjectivity rejecting its insularity, comfort, and irresponsibility. According to Levinas, our
shame and guilt experienced as an ethical subjectivity intimates the presence of the other who
initiates our obligation and is already present within our selfhood as we come into consciousness.
Similarly, for West, the experience of ethical subjectivity is the refusal to resist or efface the other
who possesses infinite demands and calls us to address our guilt and sense of responsibility. In
this light, then, we see Lonelyhearts's shame as a recognition of not only the suffering of others
but his own complicity in that suffering and the demands this places upon him. Writer's block
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indicates a guilt that simply cannot be assuaged and an obligation that seems beyond satiation; it
also draws attention to language and institutionalized practices of sympathy like what we find in
the language of the advice column, practices that are incapable of acknowledging the gross
particularity of individual suffering.
I have already discussed in some detail with Dos Passos how rhetorical publicity
functioned as a form of traditional community-reparation in modernity. Mass discourses, like
nationalism and sentimentalism, for instance, function to cohere communities (from the local to
the national) that seemed increasingly slipping into ethnic, racial, or moral differences. Here,
more to the point, popular sentimentalism works to fill the vacuum of advice that might be
created by the economic, cultural, and familial turmoil of the Depression. The newspaper's
rhetoric of sentimentality, its network of commodified and “branded” terms, however, vanquishes
the specific needs of its individual readers, consuming their individualized suffering and its
complexity into a tidy, concise narrative that seemingly makes good sense. Although,
unfortunately, he will persistently grapple with sentimental rhetoric and its ego-gratification
(particularly in his Christ-performance), Lonelyhearts confronts the potential for violence against
the other in the very nature of “ethical” response. The moral language endowed us simply will
not work. As Justus Nieland writes, “[W]hile each letter-writer's pain in Miss Lonelyhearts is
'singular' and material in its extreme physicality, these pains are only legible through the specific
conventions of the advice column to which the sufferers submit” (68). Nieland continues by
claiming that using this language, “subjects access through processes of self-abstraction and
disembodiment – the signatories...abandon their marked particularity and effectively name their
typicality,” oscillating between “affective particularity and embracing putative universals” (68).
Mass publicity and sentimentalized language annihilate the nature of real suffering and, as
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Nieland would most likely agree, are antithetical to Westian ethical responsibility. Nieland
continues, “Given his thorough cynicism about the possibility and desirability of such totalizing
feeling, West's gambit is to maximize the particularity of the social as it suggests itself in the”
pleas for help jumping off the page of his correspondents' letters, “epistles that bear witness to
suffering of such a freakish degree that Lonelyhearts's sentimental project can only fail” (67).
Correspondents like “Sick-of-it-all” and “Desperate” frustrate every capacity for what Rita
Barnhard characterizes as “a kind of pseudo-spiritual feel-good poetry” (53) to come up with the
answers and truly address their needs. Indeed, it is this “feel-good poetry” that Lonelyhearts
must continually reject if he is to embrace the fleshy particularity, the down-and-dirty needs of
his readers. For this reason, West forces him out of the comfort zone established by the
dissociated environs of the newspaper office and into a grotesque world inhabited by others, a
world inhabited by people just like Lonelyhearts's readers.
In physically encountering his readership, Lonelyhearts plunges into the midst of Shrike's
“pathetic humanity,” and the encounters prove traumatic, painful, and even horrifying. Although
the letters place the same ethical demands upon Lonelyhearts, the one-on-one encountering of the
public invokes a radical materiality that cannot be so easily disembodied or deferred through any
available moral catalog or language (like sentimentalism). Lonelyhearts's experience of the
public's overwhelming “fleshiness,” its grotesque singularity, makes him “dangerously”
uncomfortable and places him on a track that will reveal the supererogatory character of
obligation, constantly upsetting his capacity to behave as ethically responsible.
Everything about Lonelyhearts's material encounters with others is disorienting. When he
meets Fay Doyle, for instance, Lonelyhearts is overcome by what Nieland describes as “her
corporeal thingliness” (70). Her voluptuous ham hocks, as we are informed, overwhelm his
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conceptual understanding, and their sexual encounter is marked by something akin to the
moaning of a great, dying beast. While not characterized by nearly as many markedly corporeal
terms as Fay, Betty also lays siege to Lonelyhearts's consciousness. In “Miss Lonelyhearts and
the Fat Thumb,” the increasingly paranoid advice columnist thinks Betty is laughing at him, so he
searches her face and actions for the typical signs of cultural familiarity:
On the defense, he examined her laugh for “bitterness,” “sour-grapes,” “a-brokenheart,” “the devil-may-care.” But to his confusion, he found nothing at which to
laugh back. Her smile had opened naturally, not like an umbrella, and while he
watched her laugh folded and became a smile again, a smile that was neither
“wry,” “ironical” nor “mysterious.” (71)
Lonelyhearts can search Betty's face all he desires, but she will yield nothing. Her laugh, smile,
and gestures all confound those cultural signifiers that enable the newspaper business. In a sense,
Lonelyhearts wants his cake and wants to eat it too. “Lonelyhearts's quest to love the whole
world with an all-embracing love,” according to Nieland, “is thus comically confounded by both
the uncertain ontological status of reified matter itself and by the affective particularities of the
social – the eaches and everys of feeling” (67). Therefore, it is “precisely these moments of
emotional uncertainty, interruption, or incompletion,” when Miss Lonelyhearts is suspended
between emotional particularity and the abstraction of his readers and social interactions, “where
West frustrates sympathy's violence towards the affective complexity of the social” (74).
Lonelyhearts finds the complexity of the lived social world standing fast against his previous
ability to assimilate this world into sympathy, phrases, and cliches. The encounter with flesh
reveals a Lonelyhearts deluded by a sense of ego mastery, a Levinasian ego at work, desperately
attempting to curtail alterity's control upon its consciousness. Still, even though Lonelyhearts
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finds himself much more comfortable with abstractions, it is clear that he wants to break through
to the flesh, to the face (what Levinas calls the finite manifestation of the Infinite) that expresses
beyond form.
The encounter with the Doyles in “Miss Lonelyhearts and the Cripple” and “Miss
Lonelyhearts Pays a Visit” prove to be among the novel's most revealing and violent,
deracinating Lonelyhearts from the comfort of the ego and chez soi with the apparition of the
face that infinitely demands. Power-tripping on his great sense of humility and moral pride at
this point (Lonelyhearts has begun adopting a pious Christ-persona), Lonelyhearts sits inside
Delehanty's bar alongside his newspaper cohort. Lonelyhearts is in fact so enraptured by his own
humility that he creates a barrier between himself and Shrike's ironic diffidence that mocks his
advice columnist's new-found piety. Soon, however, a customer unfamiliar to the group
approaches them at the bar. He possesses a displeasing countenance, a clubbed foot that drags
painfully, and a diminutive stature. The cripple, Peter Doyle, appears as a pathetic form of
humanity, and the group is taken aback by this grotesque manifestation of the paper's readership.
“He [Doyle] used a cane and dragged one of his feet behind him in a box-shaped shoe with a
four-inch sole,” the narrator observes, “As he hobbled along, he made many waste motions, like
those of a partially destroyed insect” (109). Attempting to ingratiate himself with the group as a
comrade-in-arms, Doyle jokes and participates in their games; Shrike, on the other hand, sees
Doyle as cannon fodder. Once it is clear, though, that Doyle can survive Shrike's ironic game
and is not necessarily reducible to a pathetic piece of humanity, 86 Shrike departs, denied his fun.
Shrike views Doyle and his wretched appearance as the kind he can easily victimize, while

86 Doyle, a meter inspector, jokes that it is the meter men of the world who have overtaken “the iceman in the
stories” (109).
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Lonelyhearts thinks Doyle deserves his sympathy and pity.
Doyle presents quite a challenge to Lonelyhearts's moral egoism. His initial reaction is to
respond to Doyle's appearance with revulsion; however, Lonelyhearts quickly composes himself
in order to make an attempt at sympathetic identification with the cripple. The hope is that
extending Doyle pity will show solidarity with a social underling as a comrade but also somehow
negotiate Doyle's extreme otherness. After Shrike's departure, a clearly agitated and confused
Doyle turns to Lonelyhearts:
The cripple was confused and angry. “Your friend is a nut,” he said. Miss
Lonelyhearts was still smiling, but the character of his smile had changed. It had
become full of sympathy and a little sad.
The new smile was for Doyle and he knew it. He smiled back gratefully.
(109-10)
Lonelyhearts pities Doyle and hopes that he can offer him friendship and camaraderie, yet, while
his smile may be touching, it is markedly apparent that he has not humbled his ego. As James F.
Light claims, “Though Miss Lonelyhearts 'wants to lick lepers'..., he finds it difficult to attain
sufficient humility. Rather than uniting himself to the unfortunate, he pities them” (92). West
seems to suggest that neither the newspaper's approach nor the language of religious hystericism
that Lonelyhearts has recently adopted offers a sympathy that is a non-voluntary giving.
Lonelyhearts's expression of sympathy here does not involve him with Doyle; instead, his
sympathy appears condescending and distant, allowing Lonelyhearts to feel comradeship with
Doyle but not be fully embroiled in his struggles. His sympathy appoints Lonelyhearts to a
position of distance that still offers him comfort, neglecting the asymmetry of this ethical
relationship.
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Shortly, thereafter, Doyle informs Lonelyhearts of his and his wife's intentions to have the
columnist over for dinner that evening. “Miss Lonelyhearts was busy with his smile,” claims the
narrator, “and accepted without thinking of the evening he had spent with Mrs. Doyle. The
cripple felt honored and shook hands for a third time. It was evidently his only social gesture”
(110). The two relocate to a table in the back room, Doyle feeling blessed and Lonelyhearts
tremendously pleased with himself. Something happens, however, to Lonelyhearts's pious
power-trip while in the back room of Delehanty's: his egoistic “self-mastery” begins to unravel
before the presence of Doyle, once again forcing him into a chaotic and unfamiliar world (quite
similar to his attempt at locating Betty's “laugh”). Lonelyhearts sits staring into Doyle's face
across the table:
The cripple had a very strange face. His eyes failed to balance; his mouth
was not under his nose; his forehead was square and bony; and his round chin was
like a forehead in miniature. He looked like one of those composite photographs
used by screen magazines in guessing contests. (110)
Doyle appears as an inverted image, disorienting and the stuff of guesses. Lonelyhearts appeals
to familiar cultural images to help him interpret Doyle's face (miniature and composite
photographs), yet even these don't lend him complete understanding or control over the
encounter. Doyle's radical materiality, his grotesque otherness, further unsettles Lonelyhearts:
They sat staring at each other until the strain of wordless communication
began to excite them both. Doyle made vague, needless adjustments to his
clothing. Miss Lonelyhearts found it very difficult to keep his smile steady.
When the cripple finally labored into speech, Miss Lonelyhearts was
unable to understand him. He listened hard for a few minutes and realized that
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Doyle was making no attempt to be understood. He was giving birth to groups of
words that lived inside of him as things, a jumble of the retorts he had meant to
make when insulted and the private curses against fate that experience had taught
him to swallow. (110)
Lonelyhearts finds it difficult to maintain his smile while the awkward silence initially seems to
demand someone say or do something. When Doyle does, however, language (at least as a
communicative process) completely breaks down, only “giving birth to...a jumble of...retorts.”
Doyle reveals his ugliness, as well as all the pain and frustration that has perhaps brought him
here to Lonelyhearts; he also reveals his nakedness. Both souls sitting at the back room table are
miserable, suffering, and vulnerable. Doyle spills forth his guts, compromising and unveiling
himself before Lonelyhearts but simultaneously challenging his none-too-loquacious interlocutor,
who cannot so easily pause and recollect as he would before his typewriter.
What Lonelyhearts has just experienced is the revelation of the face before which he
possesses no precedent; he possesses no knowledge, concept, or pretense of understanding that
may assist him in confronting Doyle. As Levinas argues, the face does not only belong to the
Infinite in its infinity, in its incomprehensibility, but also expresses the Infinite as a finite
manifestation. 87 The face is beyond flesh and beyond finite comprehension, incapable of
subjective delineation; it stands over and eludes, transcending every intellectual or sensual
faculty we may possess for knowing the multiplicity behind it. The face belongs to something
that recalls an infinite series of historical processes, conscious impressions, and emotional states
87 Although born into a Jewish family, by most accounts, West was non-practicing. Certainly, an atheistic strain
seems to run through much of his literature, although the loss of religion seems to weigh heavily upon his
respective narrative worlds. In Miss Lonelyhearts, religion appears incapable of delivering a message that might
heal the modern masses. Regardless, when I speak of Infinity here, it is not to place any religious affiliations
upon West or to connect him to Levinas's idiosyncratic Judaism; rather, Infinity (or infinity) for West is the
multiplicity and incomprehensibility of the other that transcends all of our intellectual and sensual faculties.

205

of being, an ontological nebulousness in which no single part can be truly understood (let alone
this entire series), yet it also reinstates the materiality of the other, the flesh. The face is
transcendent as a metaphysical revelation, but it also belongs to the material world of the senses,
where it emanates before the self as a demand. Both Levinas and West think of the other's
particularity, their singular and irreplaceable existence, as the expression of the face – the
uncomfortably “human” that cannot be eluded by simplistic, half-hearted responses. West
portrays Doyle's physical and emotional states as repugnant and monstrous, adjectives that
attempt to describe the grotesque and overwhelming character of subjectivity and ethics,
respectively. Ethics is gut-wrenching, intolerable, and anything but pleasant or fulfilling; to put it
another way, if ethics were a mythological character, it would be some sort of bizarre Prometheus
and Tantalus lovechild – one man who would be hero and steal fire (and be eviscerated daily),
coupled with another who must constantly keep in pursuit of his unattainable goal.
Lonelyhearts's viewing of Doyle is an experience of revulsion but so too is the experience of
ethics, which places demands upon us that cannot be avoided, much like Doyle's repulsive mug.
As Levinas argues, the face testifies beyond any capacity I possess towards proving otherwise; it
signifies above and beyond what is knowable – in other words, what might be reified being. The
face roots the I up, out of its interiority, and takes it to a mystifying locus that transcends the
desire for comfort and satiation. Ethics is a taking of the bread out of one's own mouth for
offering to the other; it is self-deprivation multiplied by infinity. We might justifiably ask at this
point how one might ever respond to another in a responsible capacity. Furthermore, if fulfilling
ethical duty exceeds our ability, what is the value of ethics? As Lonelyhearts's experience
suggests, the answers to these questions are not readily available, if they are at all.
Immediately after Doyle's jumbled utterances, he presents a letter addressed to
206

Lonelyhearts. Suddenly, much to our relief, we seem to stumble upon familiar territory once
again – a letter. Lonelyhearts has read numerous letters and, despite horrors that are sure to
abound, perhaps this letter will be like the rest, allowing Lonelyhearts some distance in a moment
wherein Doyle is becoming unbearably close. Perhaps the language of Shrike, or art, or religious
hysteria, or any other countless modern pseudo-spiritual ideal can work? Something about
Doyle's letter, however, is different from the others. Doyle presents his letter in person, and he
also signs it “Peter Doyle.” He is an inarticulate subject, much like those Norris writes about, but
he is willing to face his existential and spiritual needs head-to-head, without guile, anonymity, or
irony. Struggling mightily to rearticulate the inarticulate, the letter posits an honest inquiry, not
concerned with what actions he or Lonelyhearts might take to mitigate his suffering but, instead,
asking what value he can find in his own suffering? What is it all for?
“What I want to no is what in hell is the use day after day with a foot like mine
when you have to go around pulling and scrambling for a lousy three squares with
a toothache in it that comes from using the foot so much. The doctor told me I
ought to rest it for six months but who will pay me when I am resting it. But that
aint what I mean either because you might tell me to change my job and where
could I get another one I am lucky to have one at all. It aint the job that I am
complaining about but what I want to no is what is the whole stinking business
for.” (111)
Although he may not be the most intelligent individual Lonelyhearts has come across, Doyle
makes it a point to avoid those questions which might elicit simplistic responses (get a new job,
for instance); instead, his question requires an address that cannot so easily elide the problem at
hand – what is the point of his suffering? What is the significance of his life? As John Keyes
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argues in “ 'Inarticulate Expressions of Genuine Suffering?': A Reply to the Correspondence in
Miss Lonelyhearts,” Doyle's letter does not seek simple solutions to personal problems or
predicaments but, rather, seeks existential value. “Doyle is not searching for solutions –
economic, political, domestic,” Keyes writes; “he is asking Miss Lonelyhearts 'what is the whole
stinking business for.' The focus is existential” (20). In reading Doyle's letter, the crippled meter
man becomes human for Lonelyhearts and for West's reader; he is no longer merely the bizarre
molecular collection of “waste motions.” As Lonelyhearts sits in Doyle's presence, “puzzling out
the crabbed writing” (111), his shield of moral egoism begins to weaken:
Doyle's damp hand accidentally touched his under the table. He jerked away, but
then drove his hand back and forced it to clasp the cripple's. After finishing the
letter, he did not let it go, but pressed it firmly with all the love he could manage.
At first the cripple covered his embarrassment by disguising the meaning of the
clasp with a handshake, but he soon gave in to it and they sat silently, hand in
hand. (111-12)
Doyle's “damp hand” points to a man in complete distress, the anxiety of his denuding before
Lonelyhearts obviously making him excited and frustrated. Lonelyhearts's clasp upon his hand is
initially humiliating. Likewise, Lonelyhearts feels the embarrassment of the moment, quickly
withdrawing his own hand from the accidental encounter with Doyle's beneath the table. His
initial revulsion to Doyle resurfaces, yet he overcomes this repugnance and reaches back out.
The experience of suffering in the flesh has humbled Lonelyhearts's ego; he has experienced the
face-to-face.
The advice columnist's humility quickly goes, however. Doyle and Lonelyhearts leave
the speakeasy together, “both very drunk and very busy; Doyle with the wrongs he had suffered
208

and Miss Lonelyhearts with the triumphant thing that his humility had become” (113). The irony
is thick and heavy: Lonelyhearts takes egotistical pride in avoiding the ego, moral pride in
overcoming the immoral. In fact, both characters seem to have already reverted to a previous
stage of their relationship, Doyle preoccupied once again with the personal “wrongs he ha[s]
suffered” rather than the much larger question of suffering. Regardless, the crisis encountered in
the Doyle household will once again shake the two men to the core.
Preparing for dinner at the home, Lonelyhearts sits reticently at the dining table while
Faye's flirtatious knees wonder beneath the table, at work upon him. Lonelyhearts, however, is in
no mood for romantic dalliance; he sits there desperately trying to recover that unique, ineffable
sensation he experienced in locking hands with Doyle at Delehanty's. The fact that he cannot,
though, troubles him greatly. Agitated and perplexed, but also realizing the chance for assuaging
the pain of others this dinner at the Doyle's has afforded him, Lonelyhearts wonders if he can
offer some sort of message. “Miss Lonelyhearts made no attempt to be sociable,” the narrator
observes, “He was busy trying to find a message. When he did speak it would have to be in the
form of a message” (114). Much like the culture of degradation that exists in the office and at the
bar, however, balking his attempts at sincerity, Faye's provocations and Doyle's self-effacement
challenge Lonelyhearts's attempt. Lonelyhearts's piety and humility come under attack in the
Doyles' degrading games, and he cannot be taken seriously like he so desires:
The cripple started a sigh that ended in a groan and then, as though
ashamed of himself, said, “Ain't I the pimp, to bring home a guy for my wife?”
He darted a quick look at Miss Lonelyhearts and laughed apologetically.
Mrs. Doyle was furious. She rolled a newspaper into a club and struck her
husband on the mouth with it. He surprised her by playing the fool. He growled
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like a dog and caught the paper in his teeth. When she let go of her end, he
dropped to his hands and knees and continued the imitation on the floor.
Miss Lonelyhearts tried to get the cripple to stand up and bent to lift him;
but, as he did so, Doyle tore open Miss Lonelyhearts' fly, then rolled over on his
back, laughing wildly. (114)
Lonelyhearts recovers from Doyle's mockery, and he realizes that now is the time – now is the
time for him to do something. Now is the time for him to act: “He had not yet found his
message, but he had to say something. 'Please don't fight,' he pleaded. 'He loves you, Mrs.
Doyle; that's why he acts like that. Be kind to him' ” (114-15). Strained by the import of the
moment, Lonelyhearts delivers what seems like a sincere, honest response. He pleads for
understanding between the Doyles and for reconciliation in their marriage. In not knowing what
to say, he has actually avoided formulating a “message,” which would only pervert the current
crisis into the language of the advice column. Rather, his cognitive instability enables an entirely
new route here as Lonelyhearts actually attempts to speak to the other, to say instead of
participate in the said.
This experience of ethical response proves ephemeral, unfortunately, and Lonelyhearts
soon regresses to once again being the “Miss Lonelyhearts of the The New York Post-Dispatch.”
After responding to the Doyles' game, Lonelyhearts approaches Peter and takes his hand again.
The two stand together, “smiling and holding hands” (115). The greeting ends, however, upon
Faye's reentrance into the room. She makes light of their embrace and mocks their sexuality,
suggesting the two share a mutual desire. Infuriated by the defamation of his character (and
perhaps that of Lonelyhearts as well), Doyle positions himself threateningly, as if to strike his
wife. His sincere delivery just moments before now held hostage, Lonelyhearts knows that he
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must once again act; his previous response was not enough, and the gravity of the moment calls
for something more:
Miss Lonelyhearts realized that now was the time to give his message. It was now
or never.
“You have a big, strong body, Mrs. Doyle. Holding your husband in your
arms, you can warm him and give him life. You can take the chill out of his
bones. He drags his days out in areaways and cellars, carrying a heavy load of
weariness and pain. You can substitute a dream of yourself for this load. A
buoyant dream that will be like a dynamo in him. You can do this by letting him
conquer you in your bed. He will repay you by flowering and becoming ardent
over you...” (115)
The language of Miss Lonelyhearts is rearing its ugly head in this “message.” Mass publicity
and rhetorical strategy is once more inserting itself in Lonelyhearts's speaking, and he realizes he
must find another route:
With the first few words Miss Lonelyhearts had known that he would be
ridiculous. By avoiding God, he had failed to tap the force in his heart and
had merely written a column for his paper.
He tried again by becoming hysterical. “Christ is love,” he screamed at
them. It was a stage scream, but he kept on. “Christ is the black fruit that hangs
on the crosstree. Man was lost by eating of the forbidden fruit. He shall be saved
by eating of the bidden fruit. The black Christ-fruit, the love fruit...”
This time he had failed still more miserably. He had substituted the
rhetoric of Shrike for that of Miss Lonelyhearts. He felt like an empty bottle,
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shiny and sterile. (115)
Before speaking, he already knows how preposterous his statement will sound, yet it appears as if
there are no other resources available. Lonelyhearts has found his “message,” but it belongs only
to the empty rhetoric of the advice column and the hystericism of his “Christ-complex. In telling
the Doyles to become ardent, to fulfill their marital problems through sexual healing, in the
words of Marvin Gaye, he has reiterated Shrikean irony. In telling them about the “bidden fruit”
of Christ that heals, he has offered the language of hysterical piety, which detaches itself from the
specificity of needs by addressing them all with the same simple solution. West asks his reader
if all we have are empty moral responses. Is empty rhetoric avoidable? Can we address the
needs of the face without escaping into those of the abstract? 88 Even when we attempt the
sincere, we sink into the pretentious. Nonetheless, West makes us painfully aware that
Lonelyhearts has indeed been hurt by his inability to respond to his fellows: “He felt like an
empty bottle, shiny and sterile.”
Lonelyhearts's desire to connect personally with his interlocutors becomes further
complicated when Doyle leaves the house for a bottle of gin. The ensuing action asks of us once

88 The tension between actually involved dialogue and distanced rhetoric is never lost within the text. Several critics
have noted how this tension shapes many of the novel's incidents as well as shapes our understanding of the
world that these characters inhabit. Duncan reads a Lonelyhearts that is constantly battered by speeches rather
than linguistic sincerity:
Miss Lonelyhearts deals primarily not with people, but with letters, with various orders and disorders of
words. In his personal relations he is not engaged in dialogue, the language of spontaneous give and take, nearly
so much as he is confronted with speeches, with words as deliberately composed as those of the letters, if not
more so. (117)
And Lonelyhearts is not capable of abstaining from this rhetorical practice and posture as well. Indeed, he
does not seem capable of ever fully escaping this linguistic malaise as he constantly reverts to speech-making
himself.
Furthermore, this expressive predicament permeates the entire Westian world. As Barnard claims, the
masses lack any sense of dialogic function and expressive potential. She points towards the zombie-esque crowds
of Miss Lonelyhearts's “dreamlike violence” sequence. According to Barnard, “ 'T]he zombie-like crowds…have
torn mouths,' a symbolic detail emphasizing the alienation of the masses even from any expressive capacity”
(49).
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again if ethics and violence seem inextricably linked. After Doyle's departure, Faye attempts to
seduce Lonelyhearts, hoping to rekindle their previous flirtation. Lonelyhearts is taciturn and
uninterested; he is far too preoccupied with his moral failure and with the suffering of his cohort.
He will have none of Faye's advances. When the situation finally reaches a boiling point,
Lonelyhearts strikes out violently. “He struck out blindly and hit her in the face,” states the
narrator. “She screamed and he hit her again and again. He kept hitting her until she stopped
trying to hold him, then he ran out of the house” (116). In attempting to avoid adultery, sin, and
betraying Doyle's trust, Lonelyhearts reacts violently. Ethical frustration replaces ethical
frustration, and the inevitable outcome of moral concern seems to be violence. Indeed, ethics
isn't fair (as Levinas claims), and the ethical relationship proves traumatic and unsettling.
Significantly, we witness Lonelyhearts attempting to cope with ethical reality through his violent
frustration as well. Finding the nature of moral response too demanding and grotesque,
Lonelyhearts flees his inadequacies by resorting to a coping mechanism instead. Finding the
suffering of his readership far too overwhelming, he instinctively lunges out in a futile attempt to
counteract the pain of his burden. In the failure of Lonelyhearts's interaction with the Doyles, we
are made witness to three of the most demanding problems facing each of us in moral response:
how to challenge our own moral pride, put ethics into language and action, and understand ethics
as asymmetrical persecution rather than bilateral justice. West suggests that we may respond to
these ethical imperatives either by coping – that is, ignoring or fleeing the commands of the other
– or by embracing the trauma, confronting ethics as a traumatism rather than a symmetrical
experience of give-and-take. The novel interrogates both of these assumptions in painstaking
detail.
The capacity to cope is precisely what can be fulfilled in Miss Lonelyhearts – it is simple
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and easy. Ethics, on the other hand, is not. Lonelyhearts finds several outlets for his ethical
frustration, not only including the ones we have already observed – the sentimentality of the
letters, violence, and moral egoism – but also physical withdrawal from participation in the
world of others. As suggested above, Lonelyhearts has a severe “Christ-complex.” He takes the
advice of Dostoyevsky's Father Zossima in loving the world and God with an “ 'all-embracing
love' ” (67); however, he misinterprets Zossima and reduces both the advice and the power of
divine love to an egoistic message. “It was excellent advice,” he thinks; “If he followed it, he
would be a big success. His column would be syndicated and the whole world would learn to
love. The Kingdom of Heaven would arrive. He would sit on the right hand of the Lamb” (67).
The ego parries real humility, and it also acts as a protective distance – it is a non-involvement
that desires to be blind and deaf rather than actively alert. Lonelyhearts, through his egoist work,
separates himself from God and others (from the Infinite and its finite manifestation) in
construing himself a divine messenger of the Word. His religious delusions only isolate him
from the world and, in fact, seem mostly an escape mechanism within the “sanctity” of his
apartment. For Janet St. Clair, however, “Miss Lonelyhearts' withdrawal is paradoxically most
nearly complete and most communally and spiritually productive when he takes to his bed to
recover from the shocks of the world” (158). According to St. Clair, “[h]ere he is free to imagine
order, to dream in the living symbols of mythic imagination, to assume a measure of mastery and
control over the chaotic elements that threaten to erode the respect he is determined to accord
human experience” (158). St. Clair is certainly correct in suggesting that Lonelyhearts's
withdrawal gives him some sense of mastery, but this mastery is illusive rather than communally
productive. In his delusion and sickness, Lonelyhearts dreams in cultural symbols that now seem
archaic and out-of-touch; they provide no sustenance for the world portrayed by the novel.
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Instead, his withdrawal isolates him from the contemporary world he inherits and, for this reason,
only diverts his attention from its demands as well as his real ethical project. Further proof that
West's stance against Lonelyhearts's retreat and false mastery comes in Lonelyhearts's inability to
make objects cohere:
For a little while, he seemed to hold his own but one day he found himself
with his back to the wall. On that day all the inanimate things over which he had
tried to obtain control took the field against him....
He fled to the street, but there chaos was multiple. Broken groups of
people hurried past, forming neither stars nor squares. The lamp-posts were badly
spaced and the flagging was of different sizes. Nor could he do anything with the
harsh clanging sound of street cars and the raw shouts of huskers....
He stood quietly against a wall, trying not to see or hear. (70)
Neither ritual nor symbol functions as vectors of social continuity; neither seems capable of
addressing the real needs of the masses as well. “Stars” and “squares” seem a desire for
ritualistic shape in a world that refuses such continuity and coherence. Even the physical world
of objects deconstructs both his sense of subjective mastery and the power of symbol, and the
demands placed upon him by his fellows are even more harsh, as we have seen.
Lonelyhearts, however, is not the only character in the novel who finds resort to a coping
imperative. As we have previously witnessed, Shrike finds therapeutic solace in the comfort of
his irony. Beverly Jones describes Shrike's ironic diffidence and cynicism as a systematic order
he can obtain only through nihilism:
As the modernist antihero, Shrike has his own system of order to shore
against ruin, an uncompromising cynicism made all the more impenetrable by the
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fact that there is nothing arcane about its major tenet. There is no meaning in
anything, especially suffering, and there is no escape from it in this or any other
life. (197)
Unlike Lonelyhearts's seeming antiquated religiosity, Shrike's nihilism appears much more suited
to the turbulence and upheavals of an increasingly secular, capitalist society. Shrike's irony
ensures his psychological survival and wholeness in an inhospitable world that refuses value; in
fact, it too negates the very possibility of value. According to Jones, and other critics who find
Shrike the essential hero of the book, Shrike exposes Lonelyhearts and his religious project as
both hypocritical and hysterical, resulting only in violence, disorder, and death; Shrike's ironic
cynicism, on the other hand, allows him to function in a disenchanted world, making him the
agent of an unassailable order (196). Granted, these critics are certainly entitled to read Miss
Lonelyhearts in such a manner; after all, Shrike's fate seems preferable to that of Lonelyhearts's.
But Shrike's approach is one merely of survival, of coping with his given conditions rather than
confronting them in hopes of improving the lives of those around him – a trait that West clearly
finds reprehensible if still pragmatic. His moral recalcitrance eschews intersubjective
involvement, thereby only adding to the suffering of his fellows, and he resides within a
“promiscuous freedom” that takes no responsibility for itself or for others. Even Shrike's game
with the letters is a conscious, public recognition of private suffering, both his own and that of
others. Unlike the inept Lonelyhearts, though, Shrike chooses to make no attempt at involvement
and no attempt at connecting the cynicism of his game with the suffering of these inarticulate
authors (in fact, it is a similar attitude on the part of those around them that is the source of their
pain).
Betty may not participate in Shrike's game, but she does have her own holistic approach
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to suffering. She escapes the actual world through an idealistic understanding of nature and rural
life, a utopian bucolicism that imagines both the natural world and the countryside as therapeutic
agents, capable of restoring physical and mental health. As Conroy claims, “Betty has already
made a cliché of nature, one which has been parodied by Shrike. Nature as an imagined scene of
plenitude is a figure of cultural fantasy” (15). Betty's imagined world is one of cultural
production, the stuff of mass media and its romanticization of nature as an escape from urban
decay and communal alienation. Out here, in nature, in smalltown America, all troubles –
personal and social – are vanquished. Like Shrike's irony, however, Betty's well-intentioned
naivete ignores the real world inhabited by those around her. Furthermore, Betty is convinced
that conventional medicine can be used to heal sickness and disease. Attributing his
psychosomatic malaise to the ills of urban life as well as his job, Betty recommends a therapeutic
regimen of swimming in ponds in rural Connecticut, dining upon warm soup, and taking quality
doses of aspirin, to which Lonelyhearts can only respond in panicked disbelief. “ 'Wife-torturers,
rapers of small children, according to you they're all sick,' ” he exclaims. “ 'No morality, only
medicine. Well, I'm not sick. I don't need any of your damned aspirin. I've got a Christ
complex. Humanity...I'm a humanity lover' ” (72). Lonelyhearts's illness cannot be defined
through Betty's distorted worldview, nor can her “medications” provide any relief. The root of
his suffering is in his involvement with the world inhabited by those whose excruciating pain
cannot be mollified by the quack rationalizations made by the self concerning their needs.
Inversely, Betty isolates herself from this world and this notion of suffering. “Her world was not
the world and could never include the readers of his column,” the narrator ruminates. “Her
sureness was based on the power to limit experience arbitrarily. Moreover, his confusion was
significant, while her order was not” (71). One can take this as Lonelyhearts making his own
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rationalizations (the narrative voice is ambiguous), but what is evident is that West thinks there is
something unique about his advice columnist's suffering and moral confusion. Betty's holistic
approach obscures the actual demands others place upon us – it cannot account for infinite needs
with natural invigoration or aspirin. According to Light, “For Miss Lonelyhearts, Betty's order is
a false one. It excludes not only suffering but also the spiritual needs of man. It degrades man to
a mere body and assumes that all his ailments can be cured” (88). The chaos of Lonelyhearts's
ethical engagement posits the needs of others as inexorably demanding and meaningful, and a
cure is precisely what cannot be found. Suffering, by its nature, is limitless; we know this from
our observations and our own experiences. Response should therefore be limitless as well.
In West's fiction, the ethical subject finds him or herself stranded between what amounts
to the annihilation of the lived world (that of the other) that coping provides and embracing the
trauma of moral engagement. Lonelyhearts's most tumultuous crises – those moments he feels
personally obliterated and overwhelmed, when he desires retreat – come at the hand of the other
who places a stamp upon his being that cannot be dissociated. His trip to El Gaucho, alongside
Mary Shrike, serves as one of the novel's most pivotal scenes, dispelling any doubts concerning
West's argument. Lonelyhearts, once again riding upon the coattails of his egoistic “victories,” is
immediately made uncomfortable by the restaurant's décor and atmosphere, marked by the stuff
of celluloid cultural fantasy and personal desire:
But the romantic atmosphere only heightened his feeling of icy fatness. He
tried to fight it by telling himself that it was childish. What had happened to his
great understanding heart? Guitars, bright shawls, exotic foods, outlandish
costumes – all these things were part of the business of dreams. He had learned
not to laugh at the advertisements offering to teach writing, cartooning,
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engineering, to add inches to the biceps and to develop the bust. He should
therefore realize that the people who came to El Gaucho were the same as those
who wanted to write and live the life of an artist, wanted to be an engineer and
wear leather puttees, wanted to develop a grip that would impress the boss, wanted
to cushion Raoul's head on their swollen breasts. They were the same people as
those who wrote to Miss Lonelyhearts for help. (83)
The emotional needs of twentieth-century America seem engineered and pathetic, yet
Lonelyhearts is still alert to the suffering that can result from personal inadequacies and the
inability to “fit in.” This misery, no matter how contemptible, produces yet another wave of
sickness and nausea (reminiscent of Vandover) for Lonelyhearts:
“I like this place,” Mary said. “It's a little fakey, I know, but it's gay and I
so want to be gay.”
She thanked him by offering herself in a series of formal, impersonal
gestures. She was wearing a tight, shiny dress that was like glass-covered steel
and there was something cleanly mechanical in her pantomime.
“Why do you want to be gay?”
“Every one wants to be gay – unless they're sick.”
Was he sick? In a great cold wave, the readers of his column crashed over
the music. Over the bright shawls and picturesque waiters, over her shining body.
To save himself, he asked to see the medal. Like a little girl helping an old
man to cross the street, she leaned over for him to look into the neck of her dress.
(83-84)
Mary recognizes the inauthentic nature of the restaurant; still she finds a home (of sorts) here –
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the dream industry of a mass-market culture providing her with some solace for the upheavals of
contemporary life. Her desire to be “gay” is a longing for happiness and pleasure but, even more
so, it is a longing for comfort and escape (a desire manifest in coping). Lonelyhearts may be
masochistic; in fact, he seems to possess an attraction for the uncomfortable and the horrifying.
His conscience is besieged by the overbearing burden of want and need. He is caught up in the
characteristically human, a “lover of humanity,” as he says at another point in the novel. The
memory of his correspondents once again makes him uncomfortable, these individuals
“crashing” against the garnishments of the restaurant. West emphasizes the inability of the self to
stabilize the face-to-face relationship; the self cannot be “gay” in the ethical relationship. Ethical
conscience is equivalent to the experience of illness for Lonelyhearts and, realizing evasion may
be easiest, he wishes to escape the persecution extended from cultural memory. Lonelyhearts is a
man embattled upon multiple fronts – his correspondents “attack” him while his surrounding
social environs pick him apart. Mary simply wants happiness from this experience, but
Lonelyhearts comes under attack: his correspondents will not allow him to enjoy the restaurant's
fabricated joviality, refusing the anonymity offered by the cultural fantasyscape of El Gaucho. In
West's world, to be made “gay” in the ethical relationship is the equivalent of mending fences,
doctoring the structure of protective barriers while refusing to communicate with neighbors.
Lonelyhearts realizes the pressures of avoiding moral gaiety, if you will, and Mary's medallioned
bosom provides a temporary exit.
The harsh extent, however, to which the other persecutes Lonelyhearts and resides like a
plague upon his conscience presents a radical reevaluation of ethical experience and subjectivity.
Later in the novel, in “Miss Lonelyhearts in the Dismal Swamp,” the advice columnist becomes
sick once again and is forced back to his bed. Betty visits him, accompanied by her utopian
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remedies of soup and chicken. As was true earlier, though, what Lonelyhearts has, Betty
possesses no cure for:
He knew that she believed he did not want to get well, yet he followed her
instructions because he realized that his present sickness was unimportant. It was
merely a trick by his body to relieve one more profound.
Whenever he mentioned the letters or Christ, she changed the subject to tell
long stories about life on a farm. She seemed to think that if he never talked about
these things, his body would get well, that if his body got well everything would
be well. (99)
Significantly, Lonelyhearts's sickness appears as the result of the suffering of others. The
manifestation of this obsession into physical form in his present sickness acts only as a symptom
of his “disease,” of an overbearing obligation. His physical ailments merely mask the more
significant moral ailments that burden him. Greenberg suggests that this suffering is “related to,
amplified by, and perhaps even produced from the suffering of those around” Lonelyhearts (594).
Sickness is not only a revealing motif in the novel, emphasizing the harsh reality of ethical
interaction for West, but is also an uncompromising metaphor for subjectivity. Like in sickness,
where the agent of illness, be it viral or bacterial, exists outside the intended host yet penetrates
the body's boundaries to “traumatize” within, the other produces an unparalleled sense of
suffering and guilt in Lonelyhearts. He cannot escape this burden, this illness, and remains
completely powerless to disrupt the demands of ethical trauma.
The role of the other in producing the self's suffering and responsibility strikes an obvious
harmony with Levinas's construct of non-intentional ethics. Moral duty cannot be chosen; rather,
ethics chooses us and permeates our entire being. The self may be “free” to do whatever seems
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pleasing or desirable in both West and Levinas, but this is a negligent illusion. Regarding
Levinasian ethical responsibility and sincerity, Spargo claims that the subject's intentions cannot
be used as measurement; instead, these intentions are anterior to our own choosing:
Ethical sincerity does not designate the choice to abide by an obligation or to
represent oneself straightforwardly or even to do what is best by the other....
Denoted only as an inability to get out of the way of the other, Levinasian sincerity
entails an absence of choice, the impossibility of beginning from any point other
than the self as a site of vulnerability already signified as being-for-the-other. As
soon as one joins sincerity to intention..., one introduces a symbolism that deflects
the ethical meaning of the other. (97-98)
According to Levinas, the subject does not approach the other in a capacity of his own choosing.
Questions regarding intention or the will are irrelevant from this perspective. One no more
chooses his obligation than he does his eye color. For Levinas, responsibility is “a response
answering to a non-thematizable provocation and thus a non-vocation, a trauma” (OB 12). “Theone-for-the-other” directionality of responsibility, Levinas claims, is not commitment, which
presupposes a consciousness that freely consents to come to the other (136-37). Responsibility
then is a negation of voluntary moral subjectivity – it is persecution and oppression, the inability
to decide for oneself what constitutes justice before the presence of the other. In fact, only
through this negation may justice properly be enabled. “To give, to-be-for-another, despite
oneself, but in interrupting the for-oneself,” Levinas argues in a Heideggerian flourish, “is to take
the bread out of one's own mouth, to nourish the hunger of another with one's own fasting” (OB
56).
Similarly, in West, Lonelyhearts simply cannot “get out of the way of the other,” to use
222

Spargo's phrase. “Being-for-the-other” is a form of being that recognizes the other in her
supremacy, as the very constitution of my being; therefore, there is no way around her – her
needs cannot be circumvented no matter my rationalizations. By being exposed to the other in
her suffering, I am already obligated regardless of whether or not I had a direct hand in this
suffering (e.g., I willfully and maliciously stole someone's money). This manner of being, this
exposure, as previously discussed, posits subjectivity as subjugating by its nature. Coming into
moral awareness, to be sure, is an invitation to even further suffering, perhaps explaining
Lonelyhearts's affinity for pain. “Turning back to his desk,” the narrator observes, “he picked up
a bulky letter in a dirty envelope. He read it for the same reason that an animal tears at a
wounded foot: to hurt the pain” (104). If Lonelyhearts is at least willing to embrace this trauma,
and it is obviously an inept attempt, it is a significant ineptitude nonetheless, for West points to
our absolute inability to get ethics right (even if we want).
In “Miss Lonelyhearts and the Party Dress,” Lonelyhearts's ego assumes nearly epic
proportions, his identification with “the rock” inspiring almost impregnable oblivion. As “the
rock,” he thinks he has insulated himself from the guilt of ethical demands. “He did not feel
guilty,” West writes; “He did not feel. The rock was a solidification of his feeling, his
conscience, his sense of reality, his self-knowledge” (123-24). Whereas the disorderly world of
others and objects previously resisted his proclivity for its annihilation through abstraction, it
now seems to lend itself freely to this impulse. Lonelyhearts abstracts himself and Betty in the
midst of what should be a serious confrontation regarding her pregnancy and their future:
When she was quiet, he asked her to marry him.
“No,” she said. “I'm going to have an abortion.”
“Please marry me.” He pleaded just as he had pleaded with her to have a
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soda.
He begged the party dress to marry him, saying all the things it expected to
hear, all the things that went with strawberry sodas and farms in Connecticut. He
was just what the party dress wanted him to be: simple and sweet, whimsical and
poetic, a trifle collegiate yet very masculine. (123)
Lonelyhearts reduces himself to “the rock,” a de-personalized robot who performs the role he
thinks Betty, “the party dress,” expects out of him. In doing so, he attempts a deconstruction of
her being, a reduction of the other and communication to the level of concept and essence. Here,
we are not only witnessing the rejuvenation of the “Miss Lonelyhearts” who makes fodder out of
his correspondents like Shrike but are peering in on conventional morality at work. In his
comfort and command of the confrontation, Lonelyhearts establishes his freedom by usurping the
supremacy of the other. Just as the forms of conventional morality we have examined thus far
(sentimentalism, utilitarianism, etc.) institute the self as the center of moral arbitration (although
the motivation may be different), Lonelyhearts decides which of Betty's needs must be addressed.
When we arrive at the final chapter, “Miss Lonelyhearts Has a Religious Experience,”
Lonelyhearts becomes so insulated in his egoist enjoyment that he identifies with God – he
speaks for God in a delusion that might bring stable value to his world. “He immediately began
to plan a new life and his future conduct as Miss Lonelyhearts,” the narrator claims. “He
submitted drafts of his column to God and God approved them. God approved his every
thought” (123). When Lonelyhearts finally has to account for his violent reaction to Faye's
sexual advances, he mistakenly believes Doyle has come to him as a result of God's grace;
Lonelyhearts thinks he now has the opportunity to perform a great miracle. Unfortunately for the
erratic Miss Lonelyhearts, he misinterprets Doyle's shout and conflates it with the voices of all
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his correspondents: “He did not understand the cripple's shout and heard it as a cry for help from
Desperate, Harold S., Catholic-mother, Broken-hearted, Broad-shoulders, Sick-of-it-all,
Disillusioned-with-tubercular-husband. He was running to succor them with love” (126).
Lonelyhearts cannot break with his egoist participation and finds it entirely too difficult to escape
the abstracting impulse of interpersonal interaction. The absolute particularity necessitated by
the ethical relationship proves an impossible demand. For Lonelyhearts, ethics is destructive,
even deadly. Strikingly, West suggests that even the death Lonelyhearts presumably suffers
might just be preferable to the duty that ethics places upon us. No doubt this is a morbid
assumption, but it is one that finds a natural analogue in the moral philosophy of Emmanuel
Levinas.
As I have suggested above, Lonelyhearts proves an unmistakable moral failure; however,
this failure is significant nonetheless. It is of a far different order than the moral failure of the
world around him, with its culture of degradation and inability to take human needs seriously.
Lonelyhearts's failure is not necessarily one of refusing sincerity; it is a failure precisely because
it cannot be otherwise. It is an indictment – Lonelyhearts, just like each of us, possesses no
capacity whatsoever to satiate the oppressive needs belonging to another human being. Our
obligation is therefore infinite and insatiable. Lonelyhearts's chaotic ordeals place him within a
drama of traumatism that transcends ordinary notions of obligation, ones, for instance, that find
X desirable to the other and Y (or Z, for that matter) the route necessary for the subject to achieve
X. And while he eventually flees back to the temporary solace of abstraction from which he
came, his path ironically illuminates the way for us. For West and Levinas, it is the moments
when obligation most burdens and overwhelms us, when we are embroiled by the trauma of
exposure and unmasked by the other, that the way becomes evident.
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Such moments belong to Lonelyhearts's writer's block – the refusal to annihilate the other,
coupled with a taking of responsibility for our duty and moral ineffectiveness. In its silence,
writer's block identifies the problem of address. We are called upon by the other, and we have to
give an account. How can we, though? How can we address the other in a capacity that is
giving, that belongs to justice? Writer's block speaks, even through its silence. Those times
when Lonelyhearts doesn't know how to proceed or respond to the suffering of others – when he
is most traumatized and overwhelmed – instantiates the ethical moment. As ephemeral as this
moment may be, within its enlightenment, Lonelyhearts experiences the trauma of ethical
asymmetry: the other occupies a position in the ethical relationship that transcends himself and
anything he may offer. What Levinas calls metaphysical desire seems to be at work in these
incidents of writer's block. Cognitive gaps in our thinking and conceptualization of the world
breakdown the interiority of the self, revealing the freedom of the I as belonging to the other (in
other words, illusory). Writer's block, according to West, debars the annihilation of the other in
mass discourse and conventional forms of morality alike. Levinas argues that this giving (in our
ability to see rhetorical address for what it really is) brings us to justice, which can only belong to
the other's mastery:
Justice consists in recognizing in the Other my master.... Justice is the recognition
of his privilege qua Other and his mastery, is access to the Other outside of
rhetoric, which is ruse, emprise, and exploitation. And in this sense justice
coincides with the overcoming of rhetoric. (TI 72)
Justice, or writer's block in this case, refuses the exploitation of rhetorical formulae. Although
his address is silent, he nonetheless comes forth as a signifying responsibility. Writer's block
works as saying even without saying a word – it is the vulnerability of exposure rather than a call
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to retreat. According to Levinas, this exposure “is thus exposing of the exposure, saying, saying
that does not say a word, that signifies, that, as responsibility, is signification itself, the-one-forthe-other” (OB 151). In Levinas and West, ethics is a dangerous game indeed and helps us
account, in part, for the inarticulacy of naturalist characters, who, overwhelmed and obviously
burdened by others, simply can't find a suitable means of address.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Naturalism suggests that we shouldn't care. When reading these naturalist texts, we become
witnesses to suffering and violence that is distanced from our own lives, either by time, place,
experience, or social status. Its sometimes nearly unconscionable scenes of degradation, which
challenge our humanity, threaten to make our responsibility tenuous at best. At worst,
naturalism's determinism bars our responsibility; it says that we should not care if we are in fact
not capable of action. What's the point, one might reasonably ask. If there is suffering that we
are not responsible for, then naturalism appears to depict it. This suffering appears inevitable,
perhaps even necessary in such a world, the end-game of forces that are far beyond anyone's
control. We experience a critical detachment of sorts that seems to absolve us of any
responsibility. But it is in naturalism's scenes of “abject irresponsibility” that we find ourselves
somehow responsible nonetheless. We cannot divorce ourselves from the suffering of others; we
cannot buttress a detachment, for we find ourselves caring and involved. Detachment fails in the
texts I've examined – the more we read and become involved in characters' lives, the more we
realize that we do indeed care despite ourselves and despite conventional ethical viewpoints. We
cannot explain our attachment or our obligation, but we sense these are present in our reading
and are not dependent on reason, sympathy, or conventional standards of obligation. Most
importantly, our inability to “garnish,” or wiggle around, our unconditional responsibility when it
confronts us with brute force in our readings suggests that we are already the subject of some
irrevocable, overwhelming force that positions us as “human” and as uncompromisingly
obligated.
No question, however, that this argument requires us to acknowledge and confront its
nuisances. For instance, the position of the naturalists, from an opposing perspective at least,
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appears reductive. Why should we pretend we are responsible if incapable of action?
Additionally, if neither the naturalists nor Levinas can provide us with a codified approach, then
one might rightfully ask what motivation we may have to act. If we cannot rationally or morally
determine good or bad, right or wrong action, then why should we act at all? What, therefore, is
the basis of moral action and responsibility, and how may we begin to know how to address the
other's needs? One might say that an approach like that of the naturalists and Levinas not only
risks masochism but also dangerously flirts with something that resembles ethical resignation. If
we are deterministic objects at the whim of the cosmos, then what purpose can our actions serve?
And how would we even begin to describe these actions as “moral” or “immoral,” for that
matter? If freedom or autonomy are false, then “moral action” may very well be a delicate
dressing that hides the otherwise unsavory taste of a bland salad. As with Levinas, naturalism's
scenes of trauma and degradation seem to hazard an ethical masochism that makes any ethical
action seem useless and undesirable. Miss Lonelyhearts's willingness to endure the other's
suffering, for example, risks a masochistic pleasure that may not in fact be responsibility but is,
instead, an indulgence in self: “He read it [the letter] for the same reason that an animal tears at a
wounded foot: to hurt the pain.” Similarly, one might interpret Vandover's constant guilt (strongly
associated with grotesque physical sickness) as some sort of bizarre ethical “erotics.” Both
naturalism and Levinas understandably present numerous questions.

In Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, Judith Butler identifies what
may be the masochistic currency of Levinas's thought. Calling attention to Derrida's claim that
attempting to “respond to every Other can only result in a situation of radical irresponsibility,”
she continues by asking,
[I]s it really possible to sidestep self-preservation in the way that Levinas implies?
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Spinoza writes in The Ethics that the desire to live the right life requires the desire
to live, to persist in one's own being, suggesting that ethics must always marshal
some life drives, even if, as a super-egoic state, ethics threatens to become a pure
culture of the death drive. It is possible, even easy, to read Levinas as an elevated
masochist. (140)
Much like Nietzsche, Butler asks, essentially, does sacrifice and altruism even make sense apart
from a drive towards egoistic pleasure? In other words, can we think about a subject capable of
completely dismissing (or “sidestepping,” as Butler puts it) the egoistic drive? If Levinas is
indeed some sort of moral masochist, then his ethics – contrary to his claims – do not avoid
egoistic pleasure. Continuing this critique of Levinas, Critchley speculates about the
implications of such an ethical project for the subject:
Might one not wonder whether Levinas's ethics condemn us to a lifetime of trauma
and lacerating guilt that cannot – and, moreover, should not – be worked through?
Doesn't Levinas leave us in a situation of sheer ethical overload where I must be
responsible even for my persecutor, and where the more that I am just the more I
am guilty? If so, then such a position risks amounting to nothing less than a rather
long philosophical suicide note or at the very least an invitation to some fairly
brutal moral masochism. (67-68)
As Critchley aptly identifies, in Levinas, once we have done the “right” thing (justice), we
already owe exponentially more – that is, we are more guilty the more just we are. We can never
do the “right” thing ipso facto. The “right” thing does not manifest itself in Levinas's ethics and,
therefore, we can never bring ethics to closure.
A reasonable person might rightfully ask, then, if we are not duped by morality. Does it
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even make sense to talk about ethics? During another of her “therapy” sessions with Miss
Lonelyhearts, Betty suggests that it is his job which is affecting his physical health and brusque
behavior (ironically, she is right). Leave the job, according to Betty, and Miss Lonelyhearts's
troubles will leave him. However, as Miss Lonelyhearts claims, the job can never leave him:
“You don't understand, Betty, I can't quit. And even if I were to quit, it
wouldn't make any difference. I wouldn't be able to forget the letters, no matter
what I did.”
“Maybe I don't understand,” she said, “but I think you're making a fool of
yourself.”
“Perhaps I can make you understand. Let's start from the beginning. A
man is hired to give advice to the readers of a newspaper. The job is a circulation
stunt and the whole staff considers it a joke. He welcomes the job, for it might
lead to a gossip column, and anyway he's tired of being a leg man. He too
considers the job a joke, but after several months at it, the joke begins to escape
him. He sees that the majority of the letters are profoundly humble pleas for moral
and spiritual advice, that they are inarticulate expressions of genuine suffering. He
also discovers that his correspondents take him seriously. For the first time in his
life, he is forced to examine the values by which he lives. This examination shows
him that he is the victim of the joke and not its perpetrator.” (94, emphasis mine)
Miss Lonelyhearts is not quite the delusional dummy readers often make him out to be. He is
aware of the extent to which his ethical project may just be a meaningless game in which he is
participating.
Neither naturalism nor Levinas, however, makes sense if these don't help identify and
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accentuate our profound moral confusion. Ethics isn't worth it if it doesn't make moral
masochists out of us all. In the experience of the other in his or her transcendence, we experience
the abject confusion that is ethical action, and this confusion takes us beyond the brink of what is
conventionally accepted as rational behavior. According to Steven Hendley in From
Communicative Action to the Face of the Other: Levinas and Habermas on Language,
Obligation, and Community, “[I]t is the other person's unconditional importance to us that gives
us a reason to be moral, a reason to suppose we are not duped by morality when we give the
other…consideration not strictly entailed by the intelligent pursuit of our self-interest.” He
continues by stating,
Insofar as we are communicatively bound to one another as interlocutors, we find
ourselves called to an unconditional sense of our importance to each other, a sense
of moral solidarity with each other that is knit into the very fabric of human
intercourse with one another…. The “height” or moral authority of the other
person only “comes to pass” in my relationship to the other, as I attempt to
articulate the sense of unconditional importance of the other to which I find myself
called in my communicative proximity to the other. (166-67)
We might say, simply put, that ethics is in the experience of the other before whom we attempt to
reveal ourselves. We need not, then, speculate what the significance is of either moral action or
of the other in-themselves, respectively – at this point, we are already separated from ethical
experience, we are “duped by morality.” We are in the notorious and dangerous triad. Instead,
we locate ethical value within the experience of moral action, wherein talking about ethics or
asking why we should care simply doesn't make any sense whatsoever. And this, as I suggest, is
just one contribution that an argument like that of Westian writer's block or that of Levinasian
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traumatism or that of Vandover's inability to escape the suffering of the Jew offers to the
reevaluation of ethical philosophy in modernity. A dissenter might object that Levinas and
naturalism lead us to some sort of bizarre moral masochism, some unnecessary expenditure of
the self, but Levinas and naturalism would say, “Precisely. So stop whining.”
Naturalism does not make sense without this Levinasian model of primitive obligation.
This kind of responsibility is unconditional and not of our choosing; it cannot be calculated nor
can it be rationalized. If we indeed possessed these abilities, then naturalism would rightly be
criticized as a caricature of morality. But this model denies these capacities. According to
naturalism, we cannot understand our obligation unless we realize that it (as well as the other)
exceeds the formulations found in ethical systems and conventional morality. From this
perspective, it doesn't make sense either to ask how naturalism's determinism may allow for
action. It is precisely the inability to choose that acts as a guarantor of our obligation. While
naturalism's scenes of degradation threaten to obscure our humanity, we find what is most
“humane,” what is most good about ourselves, preserved in an uncompromising argument: what
is most good about ourselves is our unconditional responsibility – we can't help but be obligated
despite ourselves or, in fact, because of ourselves. Any notion that we actually have a choice –
that is, any notion that we can sit back and pick and choose what we deem ourselves responsible
for or how we should act – belies our humanity, that which makes us fundamentally human and
fundamentally good.
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